Report from the Commission on competition policy 2017. Commission staff working document accompanying the report. SWD (2018) 349 final, 18 June 2018 by unknown






Brussels, 18.6.2018  
SWD(2018) 349 final 
 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
Accompanying the document 
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE 
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE 
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
Report on Competition Policy 2017 
{COM(2018) 482 final}  
 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................... 3 
Antitrust and cartels ......................................................................................................................... 3 
1. Guidance in antitrust and cartel proceedings ......................................................................... 4 
2. Significant judgments by the European Union Courts in antitrust and cartels .................. 5 
3. The fight against cartels remains a top priority ................................................................... 15 
4. Continuing close cooperation within the European Competition Network (ECN) and with 
national courts ............................................................................................................................. 18 
Merger control ................................................................................................................................. 20 
1. Recent enforcement trends ..................................................................................................... 21 
State aid control ............................................................................................................................... 25 
1. Uptake of the State Aid Modernisation ................................................................................. 26 
2. State Aid Modernisation continues ........................................................................................ 33 
3. Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts ............................................... 34 
4. Significant judgments by the European Union Courts in the State aid area ..................... 37 
Developing the international dimension of EU competition policy ............................................. 43 
1. Bilateral relations .................................................................................................................... 43 
2. Multilateral cooperation ......................................................................................................... 44 
External Communication ................................................................................................................ 45 
II. SECTORAL OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................ 47 
1. ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT .............................................................................................................. 47 
2. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MEDIA ........................................... 52 
5.  BASIC INDUSTRIES AND MANUFACTURING ................................................................................. 73 
6. AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY ..................................................................................................................... 76 
7. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES SECTOR ..................................................................... 80 
8. TRANSPORT AND POSTAL SERVICES ............................................................................................... 82 
 3 
I. LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
Competition policy empowering citizens and businesses for the benefit of all 
The European Union remains the largest economic and trading area in the world, with more 
than half a billion consumers and 20 million companies forming its strongest lever – the 
internal market. The on-going process of improving and expanding the functioning of the 
single market goes hand in hand with competition policy enforcement. The ultimate goal of 
EU competition policy is making markets function better for the benefit of consumers – both 
households and businesses – and the society as a whole, as well as fostering a competition 
culture in the EU and worldwide.  
This is achieved by giving individuals a wide choice of products at prices they can afford, as 
well as by encouraging and enabling companies – big or small – to innovate, invest, and 
compete on equal terms on the market. Equally, enforcement of competition policy 
contributes towards an open and fair single market in which businesses and individual 
consumers can directly obtain, or lawfully claim, their fair share of the benefits of growth. 
Taken together, competition policy actions in the antitrust area, under the merger control and 
State aid control can make a real difference towards the benefit of European consumers and 
businesses. By stimulating innovation, preventing abuses from dominant players, helping 
achieve a connected Digital Single Market, an integrated and climate-friendly Energy Union, 
supporting competition-friendly regulation, and fostering a global competition culture, 
competition policy actions contribute to the right conditions for economic growth. 
The present Staff Working Document is composed of two parts, one presenting the 2017 
policy and legislative developments across the three competition instruments (antitrust and 
cartels, mergers, and State aid), while specific actions are detailed in the sectoral overview 
part. 
Antitrust and cartels 
 
Articles 101, 102 and 106 TFEU  
According to Article 101 TFEU, anti-competitive agreements are prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market. Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements with an anti-competitive object or effects where companies 
coordinate their behaviour instead of competing independently. However, even if a horizontal or a vertical 
agreement could be viewed as restrictive (for example by combining the production of two competing 
companies) it might be allowed under Article 101(3) TFEU if it ultimately fosters competition (for example by 
promoting technical progress or by improving distribution).  
Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse of a dominant position. It is not in itself illegal for an undertaking to be in a 
dominant position or to acquire such a position. Dominant undertakings, as any other undertaking in the market, 
are entitled to compete on the merits. However, Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abusive behaviour by dominant 
undertakings that, for example, prevent new entry into the market or squeeze competitors out of the market. Such 
practices hamper competition and negatively affect incentives for innovation and growth, as well as consumer 
welfare.  
Finally, Article 106 TFEU prevents Member States from enacting or maintaining in force measures contrary to 
the Treaty rules regarding public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or 
exclusive rights (privileged undertakings). 
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1. Guidance in antitrust and cartel proceedings 
In 2017, the Commission introduced a new whistleblower tool that gives an opportunity to 
individuals who have knowledge of the existence or functioning of a cartel or other types of 
antitrust violations to help end such practices. Moreover, the Commission continued to 
encourage cooperation by parties also in non-cartel antitrust cases and worked on the 
interaction between competition policy, algorithms and data issues. 
To further increase its ability to detect secret cartels and other antitrust violations, the 
Commission launched a new whistleblower tool to make it easier for individuals to alert the 
Commission about such infringements while maintaining their anonymity
1
. The new system 
increases the likelihood of detection and prosecution for undertakings and, as such, stands to 
further deter businesses from entering or remaining in cartels or carrying out other types of 
illegal anti-competitive behaviour. For these reasons, it complements and reinforces the 
effectiveness of the Commission's leniency programme. The new tool protects the anonymity 
of whistleblowers through a specifically-designed encrypted messaging system that allows for 
two way communication. The service is run by a specialised external service provider that 
acts as an intermediary, and which relays only the content of received messages without 
forwarding any metadata that could be used to identify the individual providing the 
information. Individuals that are willing to reveal their identity can instead contact the 
Commission's competition department directly through a dedicated phone number and e-mail 
address. 
 
The Commission continued to encourage cooperation by parties also in non-cartel antitrust 
cases (as is already the well-established practice in cartel cases through the cartel-specific 
framework of leniency and settlement). In addition to acknowledging liability for an 
infringement, companies can further cooperate by voluntarily disclosing (or clarifying) 
evidence, or by helping in the design and implementation of remedies. As a reward for 
genuine and meaningful cooperation by parties, the Commission may decide to reduce the 
                                                            
1 For further information see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/whistleblower/index.html. 
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fines for an infringement
2
. The possible level of fines reduction depends on the extent and 
timing of the cooperation in the specific case and the resulting benefits in terms of efficient 
procedure and effective enforcement.  
The Commission also continued to actively work on the interaction between competition 
policy, algorithms, and data issues. In March, Commissioner Vestager set out a number of 
issues relating to algorithms and automated systems, and how these can reinforce or lead to 
restrictions of competition
3
: a key message was that companies cannot shield themselves from 
antitrust liability by arguing that an algorithm was responsible for their pricing, and what is 
illegal offline is likely to be illegal when carried out through algorithms as well. In June, DG 
Competition made a written contribution to the OECD roundtable on competition and 
algorithms
4
. And in October, Director-General Laitenberger delivered a speech that also dealt 
with the competition implications of data and algorithms
5
.  
2. Significant judgments by the European Union Courts in antitrust and cartels 
Article 101 TFEU 
Restriction of competition by object 
In Telefónica
6
, the European Court of Justice confirmed the Commission's decision
7
 that an 
agreement between Telefónica and Portugal Telecom (now PT) not to compete with each 
other on the Iberian telecommunications markets was contrary to Article 101 TFEU. In its 
decision, the Commission had found that the relevant clause amounted to a market-sharing 
agreement with the object of restricting competition and it imposed fines on both Telefónica 
and PT. The European Cout of Justice confirmed the General Court's finding
8
 that the non-
compete clause was unlawful under Article 101 TFEU and that the clause constituted a 
restriction of competition by object. 
Setting of minimum fees by professional organizations 
The preliminary ruling in joined cases CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria and FrontEx International
9
 
concerned the application of Article 101(1) TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, 
in relation to minimum legal fees established by the Bulgarian professional association of 
lawyers. The European Court of Justice held that national legislation, which does not allow 
for a lawyer and client to agree on a remuneration below the minimum amount established by 
the association, and does not authorise courts to order reimbursement of fees in an amount 
below this minimum level, is capable of restricting competition in the internal market within 
the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. The European Court of Justice, however, also recalled 
that account must be taken of the overall context and the objectives of the decision of the 
                                                            
2 This was done, for the first time under Regulation No 1/2003, in Case AT.39759 ARA foreclosure. For further 
information see IP/16/3116 of 20 September 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-
3116_en.htm. 
3 For further information see https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/vestager/announcements/bundeskartellamt-18th-conference-competition-berlin-16-march-2017_en. 
4 For further information see http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/algorithms-and-collusion.htm. 
5 For further information see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2017_15_en.pdf. 
6 Case C-487/16, Telefónica SA v European Commission, Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 13 
December 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:961.  
7 Commission Decision C(2013) 306 final of 23 January 2013 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU 
and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.839 – Telefónica/Portugal Telecom). 
8 Case T-216/13 Telefónica v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 28 June 2016, EU:T:2016:369.   
9 Joined Cases C-427/16 and C-428/16, CHEZ Elektro Bulgaria AD v. Yordan Kotsev and FrontEx International 
EAD v Emil Yanakiev, judgment of the European Court of Justice of 23 November 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:890. 
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professional association and it has to be considered whether the consequential effects are 
inherent in the pursuit of those objectives. 
Selective distribution and platform bans 
In Coty
10
, a preliminary ruling concerning a prohibition on a reseller of luxury cosmetics not 
to sell the contract goods on third party online platforms (Amazon.de in this case), the 
European Court of Justice clarified that a platform ban neither constitutes a restriction of 
customers under Article 4 b) nor a restriction of passive sales to end users under Article 4 c) of 
the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation
11
. The European Court of Justice also confirmed that 
a selective distribution system for luxury goods, designed primarily to preserve the luxury 
image of those goods can comply with Article 101(1) TFEU provided that the so-called "Metro 
criteria" are met (e.g. resellers are chosen on the basis of objective criteria, laid down uniformly 
for all resellers, not applied in a discriminatory fashion and the criteria do not go beyond what is 
necessary). In its response to the question of the referring court, the European Court of Justice 
also held that a contractual clause which prohibits authorised distributors in a selective 
distribution system for luxury goods to use visible third party platforms for online sales may be 
compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU insofar as the clause has the objective of preserving the 
luxury image (which is a legitimate aim), is laid down uniformly, is not applied in a 
discriminatory fashion and is proportionate in the light of the objective pursued. 
Competition rules in the agricultural sector 
In a preliminary ruling in Endives
12
, the European Court of Justice clarified the application of 
competition rules in the agricultural sector. While recalling that that Article 42 TFEU 
recognises that the common agricultural policy takes precedence over the objectives of the 
Treaty in the field of competition and recognising the EU legislature’s power to decide to 
what extent the rules on competition are to be applied in the agricultural sector, the European 
Court of Justice also recalled that competition is one of the objectives of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The European Court of Justice ruled that price fixing, volume limitations 
and exchange of commercially sensitive information between producer organisations and 
associations of producer organisations are prohibited under Article 101 TFEU. Furthermore, 
the European Court of Justice clarified that under certain conditions Article 101 TFEU may 
not be applicable to some of these practices when they are carried out within a producer 
organisation: first, if the producer organisation or association of producer organisations is 
formally recognised by a Member State; and, second, if these practices are strictly necessary 
and proportional for carrying out specific objectives assigned to them by EU legislation. 
Article 102 TFEU 
Exclusivity rebates  
In Intel
13
 the European Court of Justice set aside the General Court's ruling that had found that 
Intel's exclusivity rebates were anticompetitive in nature, and referred the case back to the 
General Court for further examination.  
                                                            
10 Case C-230/16, Coty Germany GmbH v Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, judgment of the European Court of 
Justice of 6 December 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:941. 
11 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices. 
12 C-671/15, Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence v Association des producteurs vendeurs d’endives 
(APVE) and Others, Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 14 November 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:860. 
13 C-413/14 P Intel v Commission, judgment of the European Court of Justice of 6 September 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:632. 
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The European Court of Justice held that previous case law on exclusivity rebates needed to be 
clarified. To this effect the European Court of Justice made clear that the presumption of 
illegality of exclusivity rebates can be rebutted if the dominant undertaking submits, during 
the administrative procedure, on the basis of supporting evidence, that its conduct was not 
capable of producing the alleged foreclosure effects. In the latter case the European Court of 
Justice held that the Commission "is not only required to analyse, first, the extent of the 
undertaking’s dominant position on the relevant market and, secondly, the share of the 
market covered by the challenged practice, as well as the conditions and arrangements for 
granting the rebates in question, their duration and their amount; it is also required to assess 
the possible existence of a strategy aiming to exclude competitors that are at least as efficient 
as the dominant undertaking from the market".  
The European Court of Justice then observed that, while in the particular case at hand the 
Commission had emphasised that the exclusivity rebates at issue were by their very nature 
capable of restricting competition, it nevertheless had carried out an in-depth examination of 
the capability of those rebates to restrict competition, including by conducting an "as efficient 
competitior" test. As that test played an important role in the Commission’s assessment, the 
European Court of Justice held that the General Court was required to examine all of Intel’s 
arguments concerning that test, which the General Court had failed to do. The European Court 
of Justice therefore referred the case back to the General Court so that it may examine, in the 
light of the arguments put forward by Intel, whether the rebates at issue were capable of 
restricting competition. 
Although the European Court of Justice found no procedural irregularities that affected Intel's 
right of defence, it stressed that "the Commission is required to record, in a form of its 
choosing, any interview which it conducts, under Article 19 of Regulation 1/2003, for the 
purpose of collecting information relating to the subject matter of an investigation". 
Moreover, the European Court of Justice also rejected Intel’s argument alleging that the 
Commission lacked territorial jurisdiction to penalise the abuse and confirmed that conduct 
made outside of Europe falls within the scope of EU antitrust rules, if it has substantial effects 
on European markets. 
Excessive prices  
On a preliminary ruling in Latvijas Autoru apvienība14, the European Court of Justice 
clarified a number of questions related to the assessment of excessive prices. The questions 
were referred to it by the Latvian Supreme Court in the context of a review of the legality of 
rates applied by the national copyright management society to shops and other commercial 
premises for playing copyrighted music. The European Court of Justice held that for the 
purposes of examining whether a copyright management organisation applies unfair prices 
within the meaning of Article 102(a) TFEU, it is appropriate and sufficient to compare its 
rates with those applicable in neighbouring Member States as well as with those applicable in 
other Member States adjusted in accordance with the purchasing power parity index, provided 
that the reference Member States have been selected in accordance with objective, appropriate 
and verifiable criteria and that the comparisons are made on a consistent basis. The European 
Court of Justice clarified that the difference between the rates compared must be regarded as 
appreciable, and thus indicative of an abuse, if that difference is significant and persistent. It 
is then for the copyright management organisation to show that its prices are fair by reference 
to objective factors that have an impact on management expenses or the remuneration of right 
                                                            
14 Case C-177/16 Biedrība "Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra - Latvijas Autoru apvienība" 




Fines and inability to pay  
The European Court of Justice handed down judgments on 14 appeals
15
 against the General 
Court's judgments relating to the Commission's cartel decision in the Bathroom Fixtures and 
Fittings case
16
. This case concerned a long-lasting cartel (1992-2004) in the bathroom fittings 
and fixtures sector, involving 17 manufacturers that coordinated price increases, both 
annually and linked to specific events, across six Member States (Germany, Austria, Italy, 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands). In its 2010 decision, the Commission had imposed 
fines totalling more than EUR 622 million on the participants.  
The European Court of Justice dismissed the appeals of the majority of the applicants. In the 
appeal submitted by Laufen Austria
17
, the European Court of Justice set aside the judgment 
under appeal in so far as the General Court held that the Commission had not made an error in 
taking the turnover of the Roca Group into account for the purpose of applying the 10% 
ceiling in respect of the period for which Laufen Austria was held solely responsible for the 
infringement. The European Court of Justice observed that the Commission must, for the 
purpose of calculating the 10% ceiling for the period for which it was held solely liable, take 
account only of the subsidiary’s own turnover, and must take as a basis the turnover in the 
business year preceding the year in which the fining decision was adopted. The European 
Court of Justice referred the case back to the General Court, which reduced the fine for 
Laufen Austria by EUR 9 511 999, to a final total of EUR 4 788 001
18
. 
The inclusion by the Commission of direct EEA sales through transformed products in 
calculating the fine 
In LG Electronics Inc. (LGE) and Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV.
19
 (television and 
computer monitor tubes), the European Court of Justice confirmed that, for fine calculation 
purposes, the "value of sales" in the EEA includes sales of finished products incorporating the 
cartelised components in the EEA, when those components were first sold intra-group to non-
                                                            
15 Judgements of 26 January of the European Court of Justice in cases C-604/13 P Aloys F. Dornbracht GmbH & 
Co. KG v Commission, EU:C:2017:45; C-609/13 P Duravit AG, Duravit SA and Duravit BeLux SPRL/BVBA v 
Commission, EU:C:2017:46; C-611/13 P Hansa Metallwerke AG, Hansa Nederland BV, Hansa Italiana Srl, 
Hansa Belgium, Hansa Austria GmbH v Commission, EU:C:2017:47; C-613/13 P Commission v Keramag 
Keramische Werke GmbH, Koralle Sanitärprodukte GmbH, Koninklijke Sphinx BV, Allia SAS, Produits 
Céramiques de Touraine SA, Pozzi Ginori SpA and Sanitec Europe Oy, EU:C:2017:49; C-614/13 P Masco 
Corp., Hansgrohe AG, Hansgrohe Deutschland Vertriebs GmbH, Hansgrohe Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 
Hansgrohe SA/NV, Hansgrohe BV, Hansgrohe SARL, Hansgrohe Srl, Hüppe GmbH, Hüppe GesmbH, Hüppe 
Belgium SA/NV and Hüppe BV v Commission, EU:C:2017:63; C-618/13 P Zucchetti Rubinetteria SpA v 
Commission, EU:C:2017:48; C-619/13 P Mamoli Robinetteria SpA v Commission, EU:C:2017:50; C-625/13 P 
Villeroy & Boch AG v Commission, EU:C:2017:52; C-626/13 P Villeroy & Boch Austria GmbH v Commission, 
EU:C:2017:54; C-636/13 P Roca Sanitario SA v Commission, EU:C:2017:56; C-637/13 P Laufen Austria AG v 
Commission, EU:C:2017:51; C-638/13 P Roca SARL v Commission, EU:C:2017:53; C-642/13 P Villeroy & 
Boch Belgium SA v Commission, EU:C:2017:58; C-644/13 P Villeroy & Boch SAS v Commission, 
EU:C:2017:59. 
16 Commission Decision C(2010) 4185 final of 23 June 2010 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU 
and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39092 - Bathroom Fittings and Fixtures). 
17 Case C-637/13 P Laufen Austria AG v Commission, EU:C:2017:51. 
18 Case T-411/10 RENV, judgement of 12 September 2017 of the General Court, EU:T:2017:598. 
19 Joined cases C 588/15 P and C 622/15 P LG Electronics Inc. and Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v 
Commission,  judgment of the Court of 14 September 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:679. 
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EEA entities. In particular, the Court found that although the concept of the ‘value of sales’ 
(point 13 of the Fines Guidelines) does not include sales made by the undertaking that do not 
come within the scope of the infringement, it would be contrary to the objective pursued by 
Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 if vertically integrated participants in a cartel could 
expect to have the value of those goods excluded from the calculation of the fine, solely 
because they incorporated the goods forming the subject matter of the infringement into 
products finished outside the EEA
20
. Given that the LPD group (a joint venture between LGE 
and Philips) intervened in the product market affected by the infringement (TV and computer 
monitor tubes), while LGE and Philips were active in the market for the transformed goods in 
which those products were incorporated (TV and computer monitors), the LPD group and its 
parent companies did form a vertically integrated undertaking within the meaning of the 
aforementioned judgment.  
Therefore, the European Court of Justice held that "the Commission was entitled to include 
direct EEA sales through transformed products by the economic unit formed by the LPD 
group and its parent companies when calculating the basic amount of the fine imposed on the 
appellants".  
Investigative Powers and use of evidence  
Admissibility of evidence transmitted by a National Authority to the Commission other than 
the National competition authorities 
In FSL Holdings
21
 (exotic fruit), the European Court of Justice confirmed the findings of the 
General Court
22
 that the European Commission can use in a cartel investigation evidence 
transmitted by a national authority other than a Member State competition authority. In 
particular, "the lawfulness of the transmission to the Commission by a prosecutor or the 
authorities competent in competition matters of information obtained in application of 
national criminal law is a question governed by national law and second that the Courts of 
the European Union have no jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness, as a matter of national 
law, of a measure adopted by a national authority"
23
. The reason is the general principle of 
EU law that evidence must be freely adduced. The European Court of Justice also confirmed 
the findings of the General Court that the rules of Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 (whose 
objective is to facilitate the exchange of information within competition authorities) are not 
applicable in this case.  
Parental liability  
The Toshiba
24
 case (television and computer monitor tubes) has clarified that the parents of a 
joint venture may be held liable under EU competition law for anti-competitive activities of 
that joint venture. The General Court had previously held that the Commission was right to 
find that both parents of a joint venture exercised joint control as both parents had veto rights 
"with respect to matters of strategic importance which were essential for the pursuit of the 
                                                            
20 Case C 231/14 P InnoLux Corp. v Commission, judgment of the Court of 9 July 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:451. 
21 Case C-469/15 P FSL Holdings and Others v Commission, judgment of the Court of 27 April 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:308. 
22 Case T-655/11 – FSL Holdings and Others v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 16 June 2015, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:383. 
23 See also Case C-407/04 P Dalmine v Commission, judgment of the Court of 25 January 2007, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:53. 
24 Case T-104/13 Toshiba Corp. v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 9 September 2015, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:610. 
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joint venture's activity". The holding of such veto rights is in itself sufficient for it to be 
considered that the parent exercised decisive control over the joint venture. The question 
whether such rights were actually exercised is irrelevant. This was confirmed by the European 
Court of Justice
25, which stated that, contrary to Toshiba’s assertions, the General Court was 
not required to determine whether Toshiba had actually influenced the joint venture’s 
operational management in order to conclude that those two companies formed part of a 
single economic unit.  
To sum up, although a "full-function" joint venture under the EU Merger Regulation can be 
economically autonomous from an operational point of view, this does not mean that it also 
enjoys full autonomy with regard to the adoption of strategic commercial decisions. 
Moreover, even if a parent company has only "negative power" (such as veto rights) to block 
certain decisions of the joint venture and was unable to impose any decisions on it, it can be 
still considered as having decisive influence over it. 
The Akzo Nobel NV and others
26
 case (heat stabilisers), has clarified the rules concerning the 
liability of parent companies for the unlawful conduct of their subsidiaries as regards 
limitation periods. The European Court of Justice has upheld the General Court's judgment, 
which confirmed that the Commission is not prevented from holding a parent company liable 
for infringements committed by two of its subsidiaries where the fines imposed on the two 
subsidiaries have been annulled due to prescription and the limitation period is not exceeded 
for the parent company. In particular, the European Court of Justice held that: "[…] factors 
specific to the parent company may justify assessing the parent company’s liability and that of 
its subsidiary differently, even if the liability of the former is based exclusively on the unlawful 
conduct of the latter".  
Cartel settlements 
The Commission is not bound by the proposals made during settlement proceedings if the 
undertaking decides not to settle. The parallel "hybrid" procedure is fully confirmed as 
lawful. 
"Hybrid" cartel cases are those in which not all cartel participants chose to participate in a 
settlement procedure. Therefore, in hybrid cases, there are two infringement decisions – a 
settlement decision, and an ordinary decision for the parties that chose not to settle.   
In Timab Industries and Compagnie financière et de participations Roullier/CFPR 
27
(animal 
feed), the European Court of Justice upheld the earlier findings of the General Court in the 
Animal Feed cartel case, in which the General Court fully endorsed the first "hybrid" decision 
adopted against Timab, a company that opted out of the settlement and was fined under the 
normal procedure (Timab). The decision against Timab was adopted at the same time as the  
settlement decision. It was thus a parallel "hybrid" case. The European Court of Justice agreed 
that, as long as the equal treatment principle is respected, there are no legitimate expectations 
that the scope of the case or the contemplated fine for the company that opted out of the 
settlement would remain the same as discussed and disclosed during the settlement procedure. 
Therefore, the settlement discussions do not necessarily determine the scope and amount of 
                                                            
25 Case C-623/15 P, Toshiba Corp. v Commission, judgment of the Court of 18 January 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:21. 
26 Case C-516/15P Akzo Nobel NV and Others v Commission, judgment of the Court of 27 April 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:314. 
27 Case C-411/15 P Timab Industries and CFPR v Commission, judgment of the Court of 12 January 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:11. 
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the fine in the ordinary decision. 
In particular, the European Court of Justice's review confirmed that the General Court 
correctly verified the validity of the Commission's analysis. Under that analysis, the 
Commission was justified in ultimately imposing a higher fine on Timab (CFPR) under the 
standard administrative procedure than the amount proposed earlier during the settlement 
procedure. In this respect, the European Court of Justice agreed with the General Court in 
finding that the Commission had to take into account, during the standard procedure, new 
information requiring it to review the file, to redefine the duration of the cartel and to adjust 
the fine by not applying reductions it had proposed during the settlement procedure, thus 
rejecting any arguments of legitimate expectations and equal treatment. 
ICAP – restriction by object, facilitation, staggered hybrid procedure 
The Commission adopted in 2013 a first settlement decision against six banks and one broker, 
while a decision against the non-settling party, the broker ICAP, was adopted at a later stage 
in 2015. The judgement of the General Court
28
 is a staggered hybrid case and it is important 
for several reasons.  
Firstly, the General Court agreed with the Commission's assessment of the cartel 
infringements in the Japanese yen interest rate derivatives sector as a restriction of 
competition by object. The banks' manipulation of the interest rate benchmark was recognised 
as being similar to a "classic" price-fixing agreement despite the particularities of the 
derivative product and the fact that the manipulation of the benchmark could be either 
upwards or downwards.  
Secondly, the conduct of ICAP qualified as cartel facilitation, because ICAP intentionally 
contributed to the common objective of the cartel and was not a peripheral, outside service 
provider. The judgement confirms that competition rules apply to both undertakings on the 
cartelised market and facilitators that are not present on that market. Moreover, the concept of 
facilitation is not limited to secretarial work, as it was the situation in the previous facilitation 
case upheld by the European Court of Justice (AC Treuhand)
29
. In particular, ICAP served as 
a communication channel between cartelists, contacted other banks not participating the 
infringement, with the aim of influencing their behaviour, and spread misleading information. 
Finally, the judgment confirms the legality of the staggered hybrid procedure provided that it 
complies with the presumption of innocence of the non-settling parties. Staggered 
proceedings take place when the settlement decision, and the ordinary decision against the 
parties that chose not to settle, are not adopted at the same time.  
At the same time, the General Court judgement partially annuls the Commission decision.  
Firstly, the General Court has found that the Commission has not succeeded in proving that 
ICAP participated as a facilitator in one of the six infringements described in its decision (it is 
not proven that ICAP was aware of one of the banks' role in that infringement). Moreover, 
The General Court has found that the duration of ICAP’s participation in four other 
infringements was shorter than the duration found by the Commission. The General Court has 
applied a so-called "comprehensive" standard of review which involves a document-by-
document assessment of the evidence. 
                                                            
28 Case T-180/15 ICAP. v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 10 November 2015. 
29 Case C-194/14 P AC Treuhand v Commission, judgment of the European Court of Justice of 22 October 2015. 
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Secondly, the General Court has annulled the fines in full because it considered that the 
Commission failed to provide sufficient reasoning regarding the methodology for calculating 
the fines. The General Court followed its own case law (Printeos
30
) in requesting the 
Commission a detailed reasoning when it imposes a fine, the calculation of which was based 
on point 37 of the 2006 Fines Guidelines. On this aspect, the Commission has appealed the 
judgment and submitted that the General Court incorrectly applied the case law of the Court 
of Justice on the statement of reasons required when imposing fines
31
. 
Finally, the General Court also held that the Commission has infringed the presumption of 
ICAP’s innocence when adopting the 2013 settlement decision because ICAP is mentioned as 
a facilitator in that decision. However, after analysis, the General Court concluded that such 
breach did not have in this case a direct impact on the legality of the ICAP decision and 
therefore ICAP's plea for annulment of the decision on that basis was rejected. 
Commitment decisions 
In Gasorba v Repsol
32
, the European Court of Justice confirmed in a preliminary ruling that a 
national court may still review agreements that were the subject of a commitment decision 
adopted by the Commission. The European Court of Justice found that commitment decisions 
adopted by the Commission under Article 9(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 do not 
prevent a national court from finding that an infringement of Article 101 TFEU has been 
committed and, if necessary, declare the agreements in question void pursuant to Art. 101(2) 
TFEU. At the same time, the European Court of Justice observed that both the principle of 
sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU and the objective of applying EU 
competition law effectively and uniformly require the national court to take into account the 
preliminary assessment carried out by the Commission and regard it as an indication, if not 
prima facie evidence, of the anticompetitive nature of the agreement at issue in the light of 
Article 101(1) TFEU. 
Publications  
Issues regarding publication and Confidentiality under the Leniency Program and the scope 
of powers of the Hearing Officer (especially under Article 8 of the Terms of Reference) 
In Evonik Degussa
33
 (hydrogen peroxide) the European Court of Justice set aside, in part, the 
General Court's judgment insofar as the General Court held that the Commission’s Hearing 
Officer was correct to decline competence to answer the objections regarding the breach of 
the principles of equal treatment and protection of legitimate expectations to the proposed 
publication of a detailed, non-confidential version of the Commission’s decision. The 
European Court of Justice, after giving an overview of the scope of the powers of the Hearing 
Officer (under Article 8 of Decision 2011/695 concerning the Terms of Reference for the 
Hearing Officer) held that the Hearing Officer has the mandate and competence to review any 
objection based on a ground, arising from rules or principles of EU law relied on by the 
interested person in order to claim protection of the confidentiality of the contested 
information.  
                                                            
30 Case T-95/15 Printeos and others v Commission, jundgment of the General Court of 13 December 2016, 
ECLI:EU:T:2016:722.  
31 Case C-39/18 P Commission v Icap and Others. 
32 Case C-547/16, Gasorba SL and others v Repsol Commercial de Productos Petrolíferos SA, judgment of the 
European Court of Justice of 23 November 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:891. 
33 Case C-162/15 Evonik Degussa v Commission, judgment of the Court of 14 March 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:205. 
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The European Court of Justice thereafter dismissed the remaining grounds of appeal, with the 
most notable being the claim that the General Court wrongfully drew a distinction between 
the publication of documents communicated by applicants for leniency, which would 
generally be unlawful, and the publication of information from those documents, such as 
extracts from the statements made by those applicants, which would be lawful. In particular, 
the European Court of Justice held that "In that regard, it must be pointed out that the 
publication, in the form of verbatim quotations, of information from the documents provided 
by an undertaking to the Commission in support of a statement made in order to obtain 
leniency differs from the publication of verbatim quotations from that statement itself. 
Whereas the first type of publication should be authorised, subject to compliance with the 
protection owed, in particular, to business secrets, professional secrecy and other 
confidential information, the second type of publication is not permitted in any 
circumstances". 
Rejection of complaints 
In Confédération européenne des associations d'horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR)
34
 the 
General Court upheld the Commission’s decision rejecting a complaint lodged by the 
European Confederation of Watch and Clock Repairers' Association's ("CEAHR").  
CEAHR's complaint, lodged in 2004, alleged that manufacturers of prestige/luxury watches 
infringed EU competition law by refusing to continue to supply spare parts to independent 
repairers.
35
 The 2008 Commission rejection decision of the complaint was annulled by the 
General Court for errors of assessment and insufficient motivation of some of the 
conclusions.
36
 After a thorough re-assessment of the case, the Commission again rejected the 
complaint in 2014. The General Court fully upheld this second rejection decision. The 
General Court held that the Commission did not err in law by considering that a selective 
distribution system, and, by analogy, a selective repair system, was in conformity with Article 
101 TFEU provided that it was objectively justified, non-discriminatory and proportionate.  
The General Court then held that the Commission, when exercising its discretion, was correct 
in considering that if a selective distribution system falls outside the scope of Article 101(1) 
TFEU, this is an indication that the system is unlikely to have the effect of eliminating all 
competition within the meaning of the case-law relating to Article 102 TFEU. The General 
Court also upheld the Commission's position that it is only in certain circumstances that a 
refusal to supply can constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, and that 




, the General Court upheld the Commission's decision rejecting a complaint 
claiming a vexatious administrative and criminal law campaign pursued by major 
agrochemical complainants allegedly seeking to exclude Agria Polska from markets for the 
supply of plant protection products. The General Court made clear that the Commission's 
refusal to pursue a case that could not be pursued by a national competition authority, due to 
the limitation period under national law, does not deprive Articles 101 and 102 TFEU of their 
                                                            
34 Case T-712/14 Confédération européenne des associations d'horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) v Commission, 
judgment of the General Court of 23 October 2017, EU:T:2017:748.  
35 Case AT.39097 Watch Repair, for further information see  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39097. 
36  Case T-427/08 CEAHR v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 15 December 2010, EU:T:2010:517. 
37 Case T-480/15 Agria Polska and Others v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 16 May 2017, 
ECLI:EU:T:2017:339. 
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effectiveness. In this context, the General Court recalled that private actions for damages can 
contribute to the effective enforcement of these provisions in particular when the Commission 
does not pursue the case. The General Court also pointed out that the fact that the allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct took place in several Member States had to be treated as merely 
indicating that an action at EU level could be more effective than various actions at national 
level. However, such evidence would not, in itself, suffice to justify opening of an 





, the General Court upheld the Commission decision rejecting a complaint alleging 
inter alia that the manner in which certain football bodies and associations licensed 
intellectual property rights, for the purpose of producing collectibles related to major 
international football tournaments (stickers and trading cards), was in breach of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU.  
The General Court, while reconfirming that Article 8(1) of Regulation 773/2004
40
 provides 
for a limited access to file that entitles complainants to receive all the documents on which the 
Commission bases its provisional assessment of the complaint, stressed that this applies even 
if the Commission subsequently decides to no longer rely on those documents in the final 
decision rejecting the complaint. After careful examination of these documents, the General 
Court found no procedural error on the part of the Commission. The General Court also held 
that the Commission did not commit a manifest error of assessment in relying solely on the 
limited likelihood of establishing an infringement of Article 101 and Article 102 and on the 
disproportionate nature of the investigative measures required, nor had it made an error in the 
assessment of the low likelihood of finding infringements of the two provisions.  
In VIMC
41
 the General Court upheld a Commission decision
42
 rejecting a complaint by 
Vienna International Medical Clinic GmbH ("VIMC") on the basis of Article 13(1) of 
Regulation 1/2003. The General Court recalled that for the application of Article 13(1), only 
two conditions need to be satisfied: that a Member State "is dealing with" the case before it 
and that the case concerns the "same agreement, decision of an association or practice". The 
General Court was satisfied with the evidence showing that the Austrian competition 
authority (Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde, "BWB") was actively dealing with the case, namely, 
the BWB's confirmation to the Commission that it had started an investigation and was 
dealing with the case. The fact that the BWB was dealing with the complaint against the same 
practice was also confirmed by documents showing that the BWB had informed the 
complainant of the on-going proceedings and had invited the complainant to a meeting. 
The General Court took the opportunity to recall that national competition authorities and the 
Commission have parallel powers and that a complainant has no right for its case to be dealt 
with by the Commission, even if the Commission were particularly well placed to deal with 
its case. 
  
                                                            
38 Appeal Case before the European Court of Justice C-373/17 P. 
39 Case T-699/14 Topps Europe v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 11 January 2017, 
ECLI:EU:T:2017:2. 
40 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 123 , 27.04.2004, pp.18-24. 
41 Case T-431/16, VIMC – Vienna International Medical Clinic GmbH v Commission, Judgment of the General 
Court of 26 October 2017, ECLI:EU:T:2017:755. 
42 Commission Decision C(2016) 3351 final of 27 May 2016 (Case COMP/AT.40231 – VIMC/WK&FGB). 
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3. The fight against cartels remains a top priority 
Cartels are secret agreements between sellers or buyers of the same product or service. They 
are made with the objective of fixing prices, limiting output or allocating clients and 
suppliers. Cartels harm the consumers at all levels of the value chain and the economy as a 
whole. Cartelists charge inflated prices, limit the choice of the consumers and block 
innovation. Only undistorted competition guarantees that scarce resources are used in the 
most efficient way. The Commission's action to stop hard core cartels prevents companies 
from continuing to profit from illegal overcharges and thereby contributes to fair and 
balanced business relationships. The significant sanctions imposed by the Commission deter 
companies from entering into cartels or from remaining in cartels, sending a clear signal that 
operating a cartel will ultimately not pay off.  
The Commission's cartel enforcement allows the consumers to benefit of an economy that 
works well for them. The Commission's strong enforcement record against hard core cartels 
continued in 2017. As in preceding years, the Commission adopted cartel decisions in 
important sectors for innovation and investment, such as the circular economy and the 
automotive industry. The settlement procedure remains an efficient tool regularly used by the 
Commission in its fight against cartels. 
The car parts investigations 
The Commission has been conducting a number of investigations in the car parts sector. Since 2013 the 
Commission adopted 8 cartel decisions covering around 30 different car parts and sanctioned the undertakings 
involved in these cartels with a total amount of fines of around EUR 1.6 billion. Several other competition 
authorities have sanctioned a number of cases and /or are in the process of adopting further decisions concerning 
these cartels. 
On 8 March, the Commission imposed a total fine of EUR 155 million on six car air conditioning and engine 
cooling43 suppliers for taking part in one or more of four cartels concerning supplies of components to car 
manufacturers in the EEA between 2004 and 2009. All six suppliers (Behr, Calsonic, Denso, Panasonic, Sanden 
and Valeo) acknowledged their involvement in the cartels and agreed to settle the case. Denso was not fined for 
three of the cartels as it revealed their existence to the Commission. Panasonic was not fined for one of the 
cartels as it revealed its existence to the Commission. All other parties co-operated with the Commission under 
the leniency program and benefitted accordingly from fine reductions. Since all six undertakings agreed to settle 
the case with the Commission, they benefited from a further reduction of fines by 10%. 
The Commission fined EUR 27 million three companies which, for more than three years, coordinated prices and 
other trading conditions for the supply of vehicle lighting systems44, across the European Economic Area (EEA). 
Vehicle lighting systems include parts such as headlamps or daytime running lights. The cartel concerned the 
supply of these spare parts to manufacturers of passenger and commercial vehicles after the end of mass 
production of a car model. All three suppliers (Valeo, Automotive Lighting and Hella) acknowledged their 
involvement in the cartel and agreed to settle the case. Valeo was not fined for the cartel as it revealed its 
existence to the Commission. Since the 3 companies agreed to settle the case with the Commission, their fines 
were further reduced by 10%. 
The Commission imposed a total fine of EUR 34 million for four different infringements on five Occupant 
Safety Systems45 suppliers, which for several years coordinated prices or markets and exchanged sensitive 
                                                            
43 Case AT.4000 Thermal Systems, Commission decision of 8 March 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39960. See also 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-501_en.htm  
44  Case AT.40013 Lighting systems, Commission decision of  21 June 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40013. See also 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1741_en.htm   
45 Case AT.39881 Occupant Safety Systems, Commission decision of 22 November 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39881. See also 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4844_en.htm  
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information for the supply of seatbelts, airbags and steering wheels to Japanese car manufacturers (Toyota, 
Suzuki, and Honda) in the European Economic Area (EEA). All companies (Tokai Rika, Takata, Autoliv, 
Toyoda Gosei, and Marutaka) acknowledged their involvement in the cartels and agreed to settle the case. 
Consequently, their fines were further reduced by 10%. Tokai Rika and Takata were not fined for one and three 
infringements respectively, as they revealed their existence to the Commission.  
These three cases bring the total number of settlement decisions adopted since 2010 to 25. During the same 
period, around 54% of the total amount of the fines imposed by the Commission was via settlement decisions. 
The Commission completed its investigation in one "hybrid" case in 14 months after the 
settlement decision. In "hybrid" cases, decisions are adopted both under the ordinary and 
under the settlement procedure in the same case. In these cases, all but a limited number of 
parties (generally one) were willing to settle and the Commission decided to adopt a 
settlement decision for the ones willing to settle which represented a large majority. For the 
parties which did not wish to follow the settlement route, the Commission subsequently 
adopted the decision under the normal procedure.  
The Commission's investigation against Scania was carried out under the standard cartel 
procedure after Scania decided not to settle the Trucks cartel case, unlike the other five 
participants in the cartel. In July 2016, the Commission had reached a settlement decision 
concerning the trucks cartel with MAN, DAF, Daimler, Iveco and Volvo/Renault. The 
Commission's investigation revealed that Scania coordinated prices at "gross list" level for 
medium and heavy trucks in the European Economic Area (EEA), the timing for the 
introduction of emission technologies for medium and heavy trucks to comply with the 
increasingly strict European emissions standards and the passing on to customers of the costs 
for the emissions technologies. The infringement lasted 14 years from 1997 to 2011. The 
Commission imposed a fine of EUR 880 523 000 to Scania its decision of 27 September
46
. 
Ordinary procedures remain significant because not all investigations may be suitable for 
settlement discussions. Relevant factors for screening cases in order to determine whether a 
settlement procedure seeems appropriate include the number of parties, the proportion of 
leniency applicants in relation to the total number of parties, the degree of contestation, 
conflicting positions between the parties and the existence of novel features or aggravating 
circumstances in the investigated practices. When the right circumstances are not met, the 
Commission will apply the ordinary procedure.  
The first cartel case in the circular economy 
On 8 February, the Commission imposed a total fine of EUR 68 million on four European recycling companies47 
for having participated, between 2009 and 2012, in a cartel to fix the purchase prices of scrap automotive 
batteries in Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The cartel concerned the purchases of scrap lead-
acid automotive batteries. The four companies – Campine, Eco-Bat Technologies, Johnson Controls and Recylex 
– colluded in order to reduce purchase prices of waste batteries or prevent their increase. Johnson Controls 
benefited from immunity under the Commission’s 2006 Leniency Notice for revealing the existence of the cartel 
to the Commission. This was the first purchase price-fixing cartel to be sanctioned under the 2006 Guidelines on 
Fines and also the first European cartel case in a sector of the ‘circular economy’.  
                                                            
46 Case AT.39824 Trucks, Commission decision of  27 September 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39824. See also 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3502_en.htm  
47  Case 40018 Car battery recycling, Commission decision of 8 February 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40018.  See also 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-245_en.htm  
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The Commission re-adopted two decisions annulled by the EU's General Court on procedural 
grounds in order not to let cartels unsanctioned and maintain deterrence. 
In 2010, the Commission imposed fines of nearly €800 million on 11 air cargo carriers who 
participated in a price-fixing cartel, in the airfreight services market covering flights from, to 
and within the European Economic Area (a 12
th
 cartel member received full immunity from 
fines). All but one of the 12 air cargo carriers that were the addressees of the 2010 decision 
challenged the decision before the General Court. In December 2015, the General Court 
annulled the Commission's decision against the 11 air cargo carriers that appealed, concluding 
that there had been a procedural error. In the re-adoption decision
48
, the Commission 
addressed the procedural error identified by the General Court while keeping exactly the same 
anticompetitive behaviour previously targeted by the Commission.  
The Commission readopted a cartel settlement decision against the envelopes manufacturer 
Printeos and imposed a fine of nearly EUR 4,7 million for its participation in a price fixing 
cartel. Printeos and four other manufacturers agreed to settle the case in December 2014. In 
December 2016, the General Court annulled the fine against Printeos due to lack of sufficient 
reasoning concerning discretionary fine reductions. The judgment did not question Printeos' 
liability for the cartel, which the company had itself acknowledged in the settlement 
procedure. The re-adoption decision
49
 addresses the procedural error identified by the General 
Court and re-imposes an identical fine on Printeos.  
The Commission remains committed to pursuing all cartels across all sectors where it has 
sufficient evidence of an infringement detected through its leniency programme or its ex-
officio action (more information on the cartel decisions is available in the sectoral overview). 
As part of  the enhancement of its ex-officio activities, the anonymous whistleblower tool was 
launched in March
50
. Whistleblowers can contact the Commission by phone, e-mail or on 
fully anonymous basis through a dedicated online tool. Following the launch, the Commission 
received information through all three communication channels.   
The Commission's cartel enforcement record in 2017 remains strong with seven decisions and 
fines totalling approximately EUR 1,945 billion, coupled with solid work for further 
enforcement in the years to come. 
  
                                                            
48 Case 39258 Airfreight, Commission decision of 17 March 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39258. See also 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-661_en.htm   
49 Case 39780 Envelopes, Commission decision of 16 June 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39780  
50 For further information see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/whistleblower/index.html  
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Car battery recycling 08/02/2017 67 609 000 4 Prohibition 
Thermal systems 08/03/2017 155 575 000 6 Settlement 
Airfreight (readoption) 17/03/2017 776 465 000 11 Prohibition 
Envelopes (readoption)  16/06/2017 4 729 000 1 Settlement 
Lighting Systems 21/06/2017 26 744 000 3 Settlement 
Trucks (Scania) 27/09/2017 880 523 000 1 Hybrid* 
Occupant Safety Systems 22/11/2017 34 011 000 5 Settlement 
* normal procedure part of a hybrid case with a settlement decision in July 2016 
Antitrust and cartel output:  
 
4. Continuing close cooperation within the European Competition Network (ECN) 
and with national courts  
The national competition authorities (NCAs) play a key role in applying the EU competition 
rules alongside the Commission. Action by NCAs accounts for 85% of public enforcement of 
the EU antitrust rules. This is a significant contribution to further drive economic growth and 
to make sure that markets work well, empowering consumers and businesses alike.  
However, there is room for improvement. NCAs often lack the means and instruments they 
need to be truly effective enforcers. If NCAs cannot realise their full potential, this weakens 
one of the main facets of the single market namely, ensuring that competition is not distorted 
in Europe. 
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The 2014 Commission Communication on Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003
51
 identified a 
number of areas of action to make enforcement by the NCAs more effective, in particular that 
they have effective enforcement powers and fining tools, and have adequate resources and are 
sufficiently independent when enforcing EU competition law. By way of follow-up, the 
Commission carried out a public consultation
52
 between November 2015 and February 2016 
and sounded out options for concrete action with both the NCAs and the Member State 
ministries. 
Support for empowering NCAs to become more effective enforcers 
On 22 March, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Directive to empower NCAs to be more effective 
enforcers53. The proposal follows on from the public consultation launched in November 2015, in which 80% of 
stakeholders thought that action should be taken to ensure that NCAs have the means and instruments they 
need54. The proposal aims to ensure that the NCAs have the necessary minimum guarantees that they can take 
decisions independently and have the resources and tools they need to stop and sanction infringements. This 
includes having effective leniency programmes that encourage companies across Europe to come forward with 
evidence of illegal cartels. The proposal takes the form of a Directive to ensure due respect of national traditions 
and specificities. The importance of companies' fundamental rights is underlined: appropriate safeguards must be 
in place for the exercise of NCAs' powers, in accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
general principles of EU law. 
Cooperation with national courts 
Effective overall enforcement of antitrust rules in the EU, for the benefit of for both EU 
households and businesses, requires interplay between public and private enforcement. In 
addition to its cooperation with NCAs in the context of the European Competition Network 
(ECN), the Commission also continued its cooperation with national courts (NCs) under 
Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003. The Commission helps NCs to enforce the EU competition 
rules in an effective and coherent manner by providing case-related information or an opinion 
on matters of substance or by intervening as amicus curiae in proceedings pending before the 
NCs. 
Following approval from the concerned courts, the Commission publishes its opinions and 




Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions (Damages Directive)
56
 aims at ensuring 
that anyone harmed by infringements of the EU competition rules can effectively avail itself 
of the right to compensation before national courts. The deadline to implement the Damages 
Directive in Member States' legal systems expired on 27 December 2016. On 18 January 
2017, the Commission sent Letters of Formal Notice opening infringement procedures for 
                                                            
51 Communication from the Commission of 9 July 2014, Ten Years Of Antitrust Enforcement Under Regulation 
1/2003: Achievements And Future Perspectives, COM/2014/0453 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
antitrust/legislation/antitrust_enforcement_10_years_en.pdf. 
52 For further information see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2015_effective_enforcers/index_en.html. 
53 For further information see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/nca.html.  
54 For further information see IP/15/5998 of 4 November 2015 available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5998_en.htm and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2015_effective_enforcers/index_en.html.  
55 For further information see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/overview_en.html.  
56 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, pp. 1-19. 
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non-communication of transposing measures by the deadline against 21 Member States. Of 
those, 18 Member States fully transposed the Directive in 2017 and the respective 
infringements proceedings were closed. Bulgaria, Greece and Portugal adopted transposing 
measures in the first months of 2018 and the completeness of their transposing measures will 
be assessed before the closure of the infringement proceedings. The Commission will also 
proceed to the conformity check of all the 28 national transpositions.  
Merger control 
 
EU merger control  
The purpose of EU merger control is to ensure that market structures remain competitive while enabling smooth 
restructuring of the industry. This applies not only to EU-based companies, but also to any company active on 
the EU markets. Industry restructuring is an important way of fostering efficient allocation of production assets. 
However, there are also situations where industry consolidation can give rise to harmful effects on competition, 
taking into account the merging companies' degree of market power and other market features. EU merger 
control ensures that changes in the market structure which lead to harmful effects on competition do not occur.  
EU merger control seeks to maintain open and competitive markets, which is the best way to 
ensure that businesses and final consumers obtain fair outcomes. It strives to protect all 
aspects of competition: as a result, it helps to ensure market structures, in which companies 
compete not only on price, but also on innovation in order to attract customers. The 





 sectors, shows that the Commission considers innovation and investments as 
important aspects of competition. The Commission will continue to assess the effects on 
innovation in the ongoing investigations, where relevant, for example in the proposed 
acquisition by Bayer of Monsanto.  
By protecting all these aspects of competition, EU merger control contributes to the 
achievement of fairer market structures and a level playing field. Those transactions which 
may potentially bring discriminatory results by distorting the parameters for competition are 
subject to close scrutiny by the Commission, which is committed to protect consumers by 
requesting the necessary commitments to dispel these concerns or, if necessary, by prohibiting 
the transaction. For example, in 2017 the merger between Deutsche Börse and London Stock 
Exchange
59
 and the acquisition of Cemex Croatia by its rivals HeidelbergCement and 
Schwenk
60
 were ultimately blocked to protect consumers and prevent unfair results. 
EU merger control also takes into account efficiencies brought about by mergers which bring 
positive effects on price, innovation and other aspects, provided they are verifiable, merger-
specific and likely to be passed on to consumers.  
As highlighted in previous reports on competition policy, the Commission continuously 
evaluates the substantive and procedural rules that make up the legal framework in force for 
merger control. Such reflections are conducted both internally, based on collected experience, 
                                                            
57 Case M.7932 Dow/ DuPont, Commission decision of 27 March 2017. For further information see IP/17/722 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-772_en.htm. 
58 Case M.8401 J&J/ Actelion, Commission decision of 9 June 2017. For further information see IP/17/1582 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1582_en.htm. 
59 Case M.7995 Deutsche Börse/ London Stock Exchange Group, Commission decision of 29 March 2017. For 
further information see IP/17/789 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-789_en.htm.  
60 Case M.7878 HeidelbergCement/ Schwenk/ Cemex Hungary/ Cemex Croatia, Commission decision of 5 April 
2017. For further information see IP/17/883 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-883_en.htm.  
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and following external input. In this context, the Commission regularly assesses concerns and 
suggestions for further improvement voiced by stakeholders, evaluates the need for reform 
and policy changes in specific areas which give rise to new debates, and checks that its 
policies and enforcement practices do not unduly create red-tape for companies and thereby 
hamper innovation and investment.   
1. Recent enforcement trends  
In 2017, 380 mergers were notified to the Commission, the second highest number in the 
history of EU merger control. This continues to represent a substantial increase compared 
with preceding years: in the period 2010-2016 the average number of notifications was 306 
per year
61
. Each year since 2013 there has been a steady upward trend in the number of 
merger notifications. Among the notifications received in 2017, 28 were reasoned pre-
notification submissions by the notifying parties to request the referral of a case from the 
Commission to a Member State or vice versa. 
Like in the previous years, most of the notified mergers have not raised any competition 
concerns and could be notified and processed speedily: around 73% of all notified 
transactions in 2017 were dealt with under the simplified procedure. This reflects the impact 
of the simplification package adopted by the Commission in December 2013: the proportion 
of simplified cases in the period 2004-2013 was significantly lower, amounting to 59%. 
Nevertheless, 2017 involved intensive work by the Commission both due to the large number 
of notified transactions and the complexity of a significant number of cases. An increasing 
number of notified transactions related to industries already characterised by significant 
concentration. This required the Commission to cast a particularly close look at their potential 
impact on competition, employing sophisticated quantitative techniques and comprehensive 
qualitative investigations. 
In 2017, in seven cases the Commission opened in-depth investigations (second phase). These 
cases concerned various sectors, including agro-chemicals and seeds, semiconductors, steel, 
eyewear, cellulose derivatives, titanium dioxide, and commercial vehicles components.  
The Commission took 375 final decisions in merger cases in 2017
62
. The number of 24 
interventions was somewhat higher compared with the average of the last seven years, which 
amounted to around 20 interventions per year
63
. In 2017, 18 mergers were cleared subject to 
commitments in the first phase and two in the second phase. In two cases, the parties 
abandoned a transaction during the in-depth investigation
64
. Moreover, in two cases the 
Commission had to adopt prohibition decisions
65
.   
In enforcing control over mergers, the Commission continued to apply well-established legal 
and economic principles.  
                                                            
61 The total number of notifications received in 2017 is 5% higher than in 2016 and 13% higher than in 2015.  
62 For the purposes of this report, decisions based on Articles 6(1)(a), 6(1)b, 6(1)b in combination with 6(2), 
8(1), 8(2) and 8(3) of the Merger Regulation are considered as final decisions. 
63 Commission interventions in merger cases include prohibition decisions and mergers cleared subject to 
commitments, as well as withdrawals during second phase in-depth investigation. 
64 Case M.7095 SOCAR/DESFA, notified to the Commission on 1 October 2014 and the notification withdrawn 
on 2 February 2017. Case M.8222 Knorr-Bremse/ Haldex, notified to the Commission on 1 June 2017 and the 
notification withdrawn on 19 September 2017. 
65 Case M.7995 Deutsche Börse/ London Stock Exchange Group, Commission decision of 29 March 2017 and 
case M.7878 HeidelbergCement/ Schwenk/ Cemex Hungary/ Cemex Croatia, Commission decision of 5 April 
2017.  
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To frame its competitive analysis, as an initial step, the Commission traditionally defines 
relevant markets taking into account all effective alternative sources of supply available to 
customers. The definition of relevant markets is case-specific and based on market realities. 
The Commission's approach is in line with the international best practices and well-founded 
economic principles, as confirmed, for example, by the 2016 independent report of professors 
B. Lyons and A. Fletcher of the University of East Anglia
66
. In its merger assessments in 
2017, the Commission continued to apply those principles. Also, even when some sources of 
competition, such as imports, did not lead to a widening of the geographic market, the 
Commission took them into account, where relevant, as part of the substantive assessment
67
. 
However, the Commission did not artificially expand market definition – while this may 
allow for the creation of larger European Economic Area players, competition may suffer. 
And it is the exposure to continuous competition, from within the European Economic Area 
and abroad, which makes European companies stronger on the European and international 
arena in the long run. 
When reviewing proposed concentrations, the Commission assesses their impact on all 
aspects of competition. In 2017, the Commission had to intervene into several proposed 
concentrations, which, in addition to price, quality and choice, risked to significantly hinder 
innovation. Hence, in Dow/ DuPont
68
 the Commission identified concerns with respect to, 
among other areas, the likely negative impact of the merger on innovation in pesticides. The 
Commission approved this transaction only after the parties offered a comprehensive set of 
remedies, including the divestiture of the pesticide R&D assets, which should allow a new 
competitor to emerge and farmers to continue benefiting from innovative and safer products. 
Similarly, the Commission intervened and acceped a remedy in J&J/ Actellion
69
, where the 
transaction risked impeding the development of a novel promising drug for the treatment of 
insomnia, potentially affecting millions of patients. These examples show that the 
Commission is not only focussing on the impact of mergers on price, but it is also carefully 
examining dynamic effects on innovation, such as a reduction in new products in the future, 
which would potentially bring greater harm to consumers.    
Most of the remedies accepted by the Commission in 2017 to approve the problematic 
transactions consisted of divestitures of tangible or intangible assets.
70
 This is in line with the 
Commission’s general preference in mergers for structural remedies as best suited to address, 
in a durable manner, competition concerns arising from a concentration. In a handful of cases 
in 2017, the Commission accepted non-divestiture remedies
71
, where they were proven to 
solve effectively the underlying competition concern. 
                                                            
66 Amelia Fletcher and Bruce Lyons, Geographic Market Definition in European Commission Merger Control, A 
Study for DG Competition, January 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/study_gmd.pdf. 
67 For instance, in Case M.8348 RAG Stiftung/ Evonik Industries/ Huber Silica, for some types of silica – a 
chemical product used in a wide range of products such as toothpaste – the Commission took into account 
imports from Chinese and Indian suppliers, while for other types of silica such imports did not constitute a valid 
alternative and hence remedies were required. 
68 Case M.7932 Dow/ DuPont, Commission decision of 27 March 2017. For further information see IP/17/722 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-772_en.htm. 
69 Case M.8401 J&J/ Actelion, Commission decision of 9 June 2017. For further information see IP/17/1582 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1582_en.htm.  
70 See, for example, Case M.7962 ChemChina/ Syngenta, Commission decision of 5 April 2017; Case M.8059 
Investindustrial/ Black Diamond/ Polynt/ Reichhold, Commission decision of 12 May 2017; Case M.8454 KKR/ 
Pelican Rouge, Commission decision of 25 August 2017. 
71 See, for example, Case M.8242 Rolls Royce/ ITP, Commission decision of 19 April 2017; Case M.8314 
Broadcom/ Brocade, Commission decision of 12 May 2017. 
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Apart from the substantive merger enforcement, 2017 was marked by significant efforts of the 




In May, the Commission adopted a decision imposing a fine of EUR 110 million on Facebook 
for providing misleading information during the review of its acquisition of WhatsApp
73
. In 
May and July, the Commission also sent four Statements of Objections alleging procedural 
merger infringements: to Altice and Canon regarding their alleged implementation of 
notifiable acquisitions before their notification or approval by the Commission (so-called 
"gun-jumping"), and to Merck GmbH and General Electric concerning their alleged provision 
of incorrect or misleading information during the Commission's merger review proceedings. 
These Commission actions are aimed at ensuring that companies respect their procedural 
obligations under the EU Merger Regulation. The Commission is only able to conduct 
detailed and accurate assessment of mergers within the strict legal deadlines of the EU Merger 
Regulation and before any harm to consumers materialises provided that companies submit 
full and correct information and do not implement their concentrations before receiving final 
approval from the Commission. 
Merger decisions:  
 
2. The ongoing evaluation of selected procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU 
mergers 
In October 2016, the Commission launched a public consultation in the context of the 
evaluation of selected procedural and jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control. This 
evaluation builds notably upon the results of the 2014 public consultation on the White Paper 
                                                            
72 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, pp. 1-22. 
73 Case M.8228 Facebook/ WhatsApp (Art 14.1 proc.), Commission decision of 17 May 2017. For further 

















































* Interventions in merger cases include prohibition decisions and mergers cleared subject to remedies, as well as withdrawals 
in Phase II;  







"Towards more effective EU merger control"
74
. The evaluation focusses on four topics, 
namely (i) possible further simplification of EU merger control, (ii) the functioning of the 
jurisdictional thresholds, (iii) the functioning of the referral system, and (iv) specific technical 
aspects.  
The public consultation was open until mid-February 2017 and attracted wide interest. The 
Commission received more than 90 submissions from public and private stakeholders, 
including national competition authorities, other public bodies, associations, companies, law 
firms, research institutes and private individuals. A summary of the submissions received 
during the public consultation, together with their non-confidential versions, were published 
on the Commission's Competition website on 28 July
75
. 
The replies to the public consultation imply that the EU merger control system works well 
overall and that there is no need for a fundamental overhaul.  
With respect to simplification, there was a general recognition of significant efforts already 
undertaken by the Commission at the time of the adoption of the 2013 Simplification 
Package
76
. Nevertheless, some private stakeholders expressed concerns that a number of 
burdens still persist when notifying transactions under the simplified procedure. Public 
stakeholders voiced a more cautious view on furhter simplification, in particular with respect 
to any legistlative changes to the European Union Merger Regulation.  
Regarding jurisdictional thresholds, the replies to the consultation concluded that there may 
be some high-valued transactions that are not subject to EU merger control due to a low 
turnover realised by the target company. It was submitted that such transactions could occur 
in the digital sector, but also in other sectors, such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. 
Certain stakeholders expressed support for the introduction of a complementary jurisdictional 
threshold based on transaction value to close this possible enforcement gap. However, many 
other stakeholders perceived that there was no significant gap and/or the EU Merger 
Regulation referral mechanisms combined with national merger review systems in the 
Member States were sufficient to ensure that cases without EU dimension were reviewed 
either at national or European Economic Area level. 
The Commission is currently reflecting - taking into account among other things the replies to 
the public consultation - whether potential improvements merit proposing any legislative or 
non-legislative changes to the EU Merger Regulation. The evaluation is however ongoing. 
3. Significant judgments by the European Union Courts in mergers 
In 2017, the EU Courts handed down four judgments in the field of merger control. 
On 7 March, the General Court annulled
77
 the Commission decision of January 2013 
prohibiting the acquisition of the Dutch courier delivery company TNT Express by the US-
based competitor UPS.
78
 The General Court based its annulment on a procedural ground, 
namely that the Commission had not communicated to UPS the final version of the 
econometric model used in the contested decision, thus infringing UPS' rights of defence. The 
                                                            
74 For further information on the 2014 public consultation on the White Paper, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_merger_control/index_en.html.  
75 The summary of the submissions and their non-confidential versions are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2016_merger_control/index_en.html.  
76 For further information, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-1098_en.htm.  
77 Case T-194/13 UPS v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 7 March 2017.  
78 Case M.6570 UPS/ TNT Express, Commission decision of 30 January 2013.  
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Commission takes due process in competition proceedings very seriously. After a careful 
analysis, it considered however that the General Court erred in assessing several points of 
law. Therefore, on 16 May the Commission lodged an appeal. It now looks forward for the 
European Court of Justice to definitively clarify those points.   
On 7 September, the European Court of Justice issued its preliminary ruling on a question 
referred to it by the Austrian Supreme Court.
79
 In that judgment, the European Court of 
Justice clarified that a change from sole to joint control over an existing undertaking is a 
notifiable concentration under the Merger Regulation only if the resulting joint venture will 
be “full function”, that is  performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous 
economic entity. This judgment provides a welcome clarification for the assessment of joint 
ventures / acquisitions of joint control in the future. 
On 26 October, the General Court annulled
80
 the Commission decision of 14 March 2014 
clearing the acquisition by the international cable operator Liberty Global of the Dutch cable 
operator Ziggo subject to commitments.
81
 The General Court based its annulment on one 
procedural ground, namely that the Commission did not explain in its decision the reasons for 
not raising competition concerns in relation to Premium Pay TV sports channels, thus 
breaching its duty to state reasons. The General Court's ruling underscores the importance for 
the Commission to provide sufficient reasoning in its merger decisions. 
On 26 October, the General Court dismissed
82
 the action for annulment brought by Marine 
Harvest against the Commission decision of 23 July 2014 imposing a fine of EUR 20 million 
on Marine Harvest for acquiring its rival salmon producer Morpol ASA before receiving a 
Commission's approval under the EU Merger Regulation
83
. The judgment provides a reminder 
to companies of their duty not to implement concentrations of EU dimension before notifying 
and receiving Commission's approval. The General Court also confirmed the Commission's 
approach when setting the level of the fine.   
State aid control 
 
State aid control is an integral part of EU competition policy and a necessary safeguard to preserve effective 
competition and free trade in the single market. 
The Treaty establishes the principle that State aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition is prohibited 
in so far as it affects trade between Member States (Article 107(1) TFEU). However, State aid, which contributes 
to well-defined objectives of common interest without unduly distorting competition between undertakings and 
trade between Member States, may be considered compatible with the internal market (under Article 107(3) 
TFEU).  
The objectives of the Commission's control of State aid are to ensure that aid is growth-enhancing, efficient and 
effective, and better targeted in times of budgetary constraints that aid does not restrict competition but addresses 
market failures for the benefit of society as a whole. In addition to this, the Commission acts to prevent and 
recover State aid which is incompatible with the Single market. 
  
                                                            
79 Case C-248/16 Austria Asphalt GmbH & Co OG v Bundeskartellanwalt, judgment of the Court of 7 
September 2017.  
80 Case T-394/15 – KPN BV v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 26 October 2017.  
81 Case M.7000 Liberty Global/ Ziggo, Commission decision of 14 March 2014.  
82 Case T-704/14 – Marine Harvest v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 26 October 2017.  
83 Case M.7184 Marine Harvest/ Morpol (Art 14.2 proc.), Commission decision of 23 July 2014.  
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1. Uptake of the State Aid Modernisation  
Since 2014, as part of the State Aid Modernisation (SAM), there has been a surge in State aid 
granted without prior notification to the Commission, indicating an important reduction in red 
tape. Based on the 2017 State Aid Scoreboard
84
, this trend has continued to improve. This is 
possible due to the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)
85
 adopted in the context of 
the State aid reform, which simplifies the aid granting procedure for Member States by 
authorising - without prior notification - a wide range of measures fulfilling certain criteria 
and specific EU objectives which are in the common interest. For the aid categories covered 
by the GBER, only cases with the biggest potential to distort competition in the single market 
will still face ex ante assessment and therefore require a notification.  
As shown by the graph below
86
, since 2015, more than 97% of new measures, for which 
expenditure was reported for the first time, were covered by the GBER, which entails an 
increase of about 25 percentage points compared to 2013. About 80% of all measures for 
which expenditure was reported (i.e. not only new measures), took the form of block 
exempted measures in 2016. On average, total spending on GBER measures in the EU 
represented about 47% of total State aid expenditure (excluding agricultural aid) in 2016, i.e. 
an increase of about 12 percentage points compared to 2014.  
 
The 2014 GBER introduced new categories of aid
87
 and to a large extent, the reported 
                                                            
84 The 2017 State Aid Scoreboard comprises aid expenditure made by Member States before 31 December 2016 
and which falls under the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. The data is based on the annual reporting by Member 
States pursuant to Article 6(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) 794/2004 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html.  
85 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible 
with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p.1. 
86 Figures from the 2017 State Aid Scoreboard. For further information, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html.  
87 Aid to innovation clusters and aid to process and organisational innovation, aid schemes to make good the 
damage caused by natural disasters, social aid for transport residents of remote regions, aid for broadband 
infrastructure, aid for culture and heritage conservation, including aid schemes for audio-visual works, aid for 
sport multifunctional recreational infrastructures, as well as investment aid for local infrastructure; the new 
GBER also broadened categories of aid already covered by the previous (2008) GBER. 
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increase in expenditure on GBER measures already reflects the impact of the new Regulation. 
In 2016, as compared to 2014, total GBER spending for aid to culture and heritage 
conservation, for broadband and for local infrastructure has increased about fivefold, while it 
doubled for SMEs, including risk finance. Increases were also recorded for environmental 
protection and energy savings (+68%), for aid to compensate damages caused by natural 
disasters (+30%), and for research, development and innovation (+8%). The GBER was 
further extended in 2017, especially as regards aid to ports and airports (see section 2 below – 
State aid modernization continues). It is therefore to be expected that the share of block-
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Partnership with Member States 
To facilitate the implementation of SAM, the Commission supports Member States in various 
ways in the framework of a multilateral partnership. The Working Group on SAM 
implementation (SAM WG) is a forum for Member States to exchange best practices on their 
systems for State aid control, creating an effective network for the informal discussion of 
State aid issues among Member States and with the Commission. Other dedicated working 
groups or workshops deal with specific aspects of SAM implementation, in particular the new 
requirements for transparency and evaluation (see respective sections below) or issues related 
to State aid to infrastructure. Once a year, the SAM WG reports to a High Level Forum (HLF) 
which in turn provides guidance on the future work of the Partnership.  
The SAM WG met three times in 2017, under the Chair of France, and addressed several 
policy and compliance issues related to SAM implementation. It reported on the main topics 
discussed in the Working Group during the past year and on the follow-up to 
recommendations from past Chairs (Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom)  to the HLF 
held on 28 June, in Brussels. On this occasion it was agreed to extend the mandate of the 
Working Group in order to include issues related to the interpretation and implementation of 
State aid rules, in addition to national practices for complying with these rules. The HLF also 
endorsed the work plan submitted by the Chair for the period 2017-2018.  
In 2017, the Commission also continued its bilateral cooperation with Member States. 
Launched in 2015, the overall objective of this process is to achieve both good State aid 
policy and effective State aid control at the national level. Three structured cooperation 
processes are on-going with Italy, Bulgaria and Romania. Based on practical work 
programmes, these cooperation processes are dealing with governance issues, issues 
concerning State-owned enterprises, as well as cases in problematic sectors. More tailor-made 
bilateral cooperation has been developed with nine Member States (Belgium, Croatia, Greece, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain), with a view to addressing 
country-specific compliance and implementation issues. Work is on-going towards deepening 
cooperation with additional Member States  
Transparency Award Module 
The transparency provisions currently part of SAM are in force since 1 July 2016 and require 
Member States to publish information about the beneficiaries of aid awards above EUR 
500 000
88
. Member States have six months starting from the date of granting to provide the 
required aid awards' data, with the exception of awards in the form of fiscal aid for which the 
information needs to be provided within one year from the date of granting. The Commission 
services facilitated compliance with this requirement by developing, in cooperation with 
Member States, the Transparency Award Module (TAM) – a new informatics tool for 
submission and publication of data required under the transparency provisions.
89
  
The TAM ensures that information submitted by granting authorities is consistent and 
comparable across Member States. In addition, the associated transparency public search page 
provides all stakeholders, i.a. citizens, competitors and researchers, with a single entry point 
allowing them to make comparable extractions and analysis. For these reasons, the 
Commission pursues efforts to improve the user friendliness and the interoperability 
                                                            
88 For further information see the Competition Policy Brief 4/2016 available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_004_en.pdf.  
89 For further information see the Transparency Award Module (TAM) available at  
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/competition/transparency/public/search/chooseLanguage.  
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capabilities of the tools, to incentivise those Member States already having National State Aid 
Registries in place to use the TAM as well. For example, the Commission has developed a so-
called machine-to-machine interface to transfer directly the relevant information to the TAM, 
in view of reducing administrative burden and promoting the use of information and 
communication technologies applying the "only once" principle. 
As of end October 2017, 24 Member States have joined the TAM. Approximately 15000 aid 
awards have been published by 22 Member States. The Commission services have supported 
the implementation of this new requirement by facilitating, together with Member States' 
representatives, the Transparency Steering Group (two meetings in 2017) and by organising 
dedicated trainings upon request. 
Evaluation 
Evaluation of aid schemes is another requirement introduced by SAM. The aim is to gather 
the necessary evidence to better identify impacts, both positive and negative, of the aid and 
inform future policy-making by Member States and the Commission.  
Since 1 July 2014, evaluation is required for large GBER schemes in certain aid categories
90 




By the end of December 2017, the Commission had approved evaluation plans covering 37 
State aid schemes submitted by 13 Member States
92
. Most of these decisions concerned either 
large regional or R&D&I aid schemes under the GBER or notified energy and broadband 
schemes. These schemes account, in total, for about EUR 48 billion of annual State aid 
budget. The first evaluation report has been submitted in January 2018.  
The Commission services have continued to accompany the implementation of the evaluation 
requirement by publishing policy briefs
93 
and by organising dedicated workshops with 
Member States' representatives and evaluation experts.  
Aid for research, development and innovation  
While one of the headline targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy
94
 is for Research, Development 
and Innovation (R&D&I) investments in the EU to reach 3 % of EU GDP, R&D&I spending 
in the EU has been lagging behind major global competitors, mainly due to lower levels of 
private investment.  
The State aid rules for R&D&I help ensure that public funding goes to research projects that 
would not otherwise be realised due to market failures, i.e. projects that truly go beyond the 
                                                            
90 Schemes with an average annual State aid budget above EUR 150 million in the fields of regional aid, aid for 
SMEs and access to finance, aid for research and development and innovation, energy and environmental aid and 
aid for broadband infrastructures. 
91 Evaluation might apply to notified aid schemes with large budgets, containing novel characteristics or when 
significant market, technology or regulatory changes are foreseen.  
92 The Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
93 For further information see the Competition Policy Briefs 7/2014 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/007_en.pdf and 3/2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_003_en.pdf. 
94 Communication of 3 March 2010 from the Commission, Europe 2020 A Strategy For Smart, Sustainable And 
Inclusive Growth, COM(2010) 2020 final available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid= 
1427303331326&uri=CELEX:52010DC2020.  
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state of the art and which bring innovative products and services to the market and ultimately 
to consumers. The rules, using flexible and simple criteria for assessing the compatibility of 
State aid, facilitate the implementation of support for R&D&I projects by Member States.  
In 2017, the Commission ensured that aid schemes and individual measures notified under the 
R&D&I rules were well targeted to projects enabling ground-breaking research and 
innovation activities. Its State aid control activities covered a variety of sectors including the 
automated/connected driving, e-mobility, aeronautic, and microelectronic sectors. 
In one case
95
, the Commission found that public support by France and Germany for jointly 
developing a new, innovative heavy duty helicopter was compatible with the internal market 
under the R&D&I Framework as it contributed to a well-defined objective of common 
interest without unduly distorting competition on the market of the civil helicopters. 
Moreover, the Commission cooperated with a number of Member States with a view to 
enabling them to adjust certain envisaged R&D&I measures and bring them in line with the 
GBER. This way, aid measures could be granted swiftly without having to be notified to the 
Commission, thereby speeding up public support for R&D&I. 
The ongoing discussions with a group of Member States on an important project of common 
European interest (IPCEI) in the area of microelectronics is a good example of the 
Commission's policy to encourage intra-EU R&D&I cooperation and coordination in the area 
of Key Enabling Technologies, including first industrial deployment.   
Aid to risk finance  
SMEs across the EU remain heavily dependent on traditional bank lending, which is still 
limited by banks' refinancing capacity, risk appetite and capital adequacy. The financial crisis 
has exacerbated the problem with a large number of SMEs still being unable to receive the 
necessary finance in recent years. Given the pivotal importance of SMEs and midcaps for the 
whole EU economy, the situation has a significant negative impact on growth and job 
creation. The current Risk Finance rules aim to offer better incentives for private sector 
investors - including institutional ones – to increase their funding activities in the critical area 
of SME and midcaps financing. The rules also mirror other EU initiatives designed to 
promote wider use of financial instruments in the context of new support programmes such as 




The current Risk Finance Guidelines
97
 and the corresponding parts of the GBER, provide the 
framework for seamless support for new ventures from their creation to their development 
into global players. The aim is to help new ventures to get past the critical stages where 
private financing is either unavailable or not available in the necessary amount or form. 
  
                                                            
95 Case SA.45183 (2017/N), Avance remboursable pour le programme de recherche et développement de 
l'hélicoptère X6 (Airbus Helicopters), Commission decision of 19 June 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_45183. 
96 An overview on the EU programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises is available at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/cosme_en.  
97 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on State aid to promote risk finance investments, OJ C 19, 
22.01.2014, p. 4 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014XC0122(04).  
 31 
Aid measures encouraging investment and innovation in SMEs 
In 2017, under the Risk Finance Guidelines, the Commission dealt with notified schemes aimed at encouraging 
investment in innovative SMEs and midcaps. In particular, it approved the prolongation of an amended scheme 
in Italy granting fiscal incentives for investments in innovative start-ups.  
Moreover, the Commission cooperated with a number of Member States with a view to enable them to adjust 
certain envisaged risk finance measures and bring them in line with the current GBER. This way, aid measures 
could be granted swiftly without having to be notified to the Commission, thereby speeding up public support to 
innovative SMEs.  
In all these cases, the Commission took the view that the measures at issue covered a real gap in the market, and 
worked together with the Member States on solutions to limit the impact on competition in the single market. In 
particular, the Commission considered that the risks inherent to the activities of these young firms and 
innovative companies (i.e. products/technologies not yet proven to be economically viable) and the lack of 
financial guarantees limited their capacity to access funding and that the aid was necessary to stimulate 
investment that, if unprompted, would not have been provided by the market. 
Regional aid  
Regional aid is an important instrument in the EU's toolbox to promote greater economic and 
social cohesion. The 2014-2020 regional aid framework has been in place since July 2014. 
In 2017, the Commission reviewed the regional aid provisions in the GBER. Three important 
changes were introduced. A first one relates to operating aid for outermost regions (widening 
of the sectoral scope of these provisions and a significant increase in the operating aid ceilings 
applicable to these regions). The second modification concerns operating aid for companies 
conducting business in very sparsely populated regions. Finally, the Commission modified the 
anti-relocation provisions by requiring a notification of the investment aid if it  involves a 
transfer of the underlying economic activity from other Member States.  
In 2017, the Commission continued advising Member States' authorities on how to interpret 
and implement the regional aid provisions of the GBER, thus helping them to make a success 
of the reforms introduced under SAM to the benefit of both consumers and businesses. 
Regional aid cases 
The Commission also adopted several decisions on notified regional investment aid measures 
under the Regional aid Guidelines. It approved the Octroi de Mer scheme providing regional 
operating aid for companies located in the French Outermost regions
98
. It also adopted 
positive decisions on regional investment aid for two large investment projects, namely aid to 
Mondi (paper and paper products, Slovakia)
99
 and aid to MOL Petrolkémia (petrochemical 
plant in Hungary)
100
. The Commission initiated a formal investigation procedure in relation to 
a regional investment aid to Jaguar Land Rover in Slovakia (cars)
101
. In addition, it approved 
                                                            
98 Case SA.46899 (2016/N), Operating aid scheme for outermost regions providing reductions on the Octroi de 
Mer Tax, Commission decision of 15 March 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46899  
99 Case SA.45584 (2016/N), Investment aid to Mondi, Commission decision of 13 July 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_45584   
100 Case SA.48382 (2017/N), Regional investment aid to MOL Petrolkémia Zrt, Commission decision of 25 
October 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48382  
101 Case SA.45359 (2016/N), Regional investment aid to Jaguar Land Rover Jaguar, Commission decision of 24 
May 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_45359  
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a Polish regional aid scheme targeting the shipbuilding sector
102
 and an amendment of the 
French Regional aid map
103
.  
Finally, the Commission adopted two decisions approving evaluation plans for Italy on a 
SME investment aid scheme for purchase of new machinery and equipment
104
 and on an aid 




In 2017, the Commission continued providing guidance to the Member States' authorities by 
way of so-called "analytical grids" on the application of State aid rules to the public financing 
of infrastructure projects, which were revised in the light of the adoption of the Commission 
Notice on the notion of State aid in 2016
106
and the adoption of the revised GBER in 2017
107
. 
In 2017, the Commission adopted several positive decisions on aid for the development of 
infrastructures having an economic use, notably aid for the development of the Charles De 
Gaulle Express
108
, aid for the development of a logistics centre in the Port of Pitea
109
, a 
scheme to provide aid for investment in transhipment facilities for combined transport
110
, aid 
for the revitalisation of the Hamburg Congress Centre
111
, aid to the construction and operation 
of the Bratislava national football stadium
112
 and aid for the construction of the Ice Hokey 




                                                            
102 Case SA.47690 (2017/N), State aid scheme for regional investments of SMEs in the shipbuilding sector, 
Commission decision of 15 January 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47690  
103 Case SA.47094 (2016/N), Amendment of the Regional aid map 2014-2020 – Second use of the population 
reserve, Commission decision of 10 February 2017, available at 
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47094  
104 Case SA.47180 (2017/EV), SME investment aid scheme for purchase of new machinery and equipment, 
Commission decision of 15 June 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47180  
105 Case SA.48248 (2017/EV), Evaluation plan of the aid scheme for large investment projects "Contratti di 
Sviluppo", Commission decision of 12 October 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48248  
106 OJ C 262, 19.7.2016 p. 1 
107 OJ  L 156, 20.6.2017, p. 1. 
108 Case SA.45997 (2017/N), Liaison express directe entre l’aéroport Charles-de-Gaulle et la Gare de l’Est, 
Commission decision of 26 June 2017. The public version of this decision will become available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_45997  
109 Case SA.46749 (2016/N), Investment aid for the Haraholmen logistics centre in the Port of Pitea, 
Commission decision of 19 April 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46749  
110 Case SA.46341 (2016/N), Scheme on funding for transhipment facilities for combined transport of non-
federal companies, Commission decision of 4 January 2017. The public version of this decision will become 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46341  
111 Case SA.42545 (2015/N), Revitalisation of the Hamburg Congress Centre (CCH), Commission decision of 7 
April 2017, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_42545  
112 Case SA.46530 (2016/N), Construction and operation of Bratislava national football stadium, Commission 
decision of 24 May 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46530  
113 Case SA.47683 (2017/N), Tampere Arena, Commission decision of 31 July 2017. The public version of this 
decision will become available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47683  
 33 
2. State Aid Modernisation continues  
Notion of aid: comprehensive clarification including public funding of infrastructure 
Since 2016, the Commission took several steps to further clarify the notion of State aid with 
the aim of helping public authorities and companies to identify when public support measures 
can be granted outside the remit of State aid control and approval by the European 
Commission
114
, in particular with the adoption of the Notice on the notion of State aid
115
. This 
Notice gives guidance on all aspects of the definition of the notion of State aid by 
systematically summarising the case law of the EU Courts and the Commission's decision 
making practice.  
Furthermore, the Commission services continue updating the analytical grids on the financing 
of infrastructure projects originally adopted in 2015. A first part of these updated grids were 
presented to and discussed with Member States in a dedicated working group on 
infrastructures in November 2016. A second part was published on the Directorate-General 
for Competition's website in November 2017. These Commission services documents set out, 
sector by sector, when, in view of the Commission services, public funding does not involve 
State aid and when a notification for State aid clearance is needed. The grids also contain 
references to the most relevant Commission decisions relating to the sector concerned. 
Together, these different measures further clarify the notion of State aid and, thus, the scope 
of EU State aid rules, reducing the administrative burden for public authorities and 
companies, avoiding lengthy procedures, and increasing legal certainty for aid beneficiaries 
and competitors.  
Further extension of the scope of the GBER 
The scope of the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) was extended significantly in 
2014 compared to the previous GBER, by including provisions for a large variety of aid 
measures in many different sectors. However, the 2014 GBER did not cover investments in 
ports and airports, as at the time of its adoption, the Commission considered it did not have 
sufficient case experience in these areas. Notwithstanding, recital 1 of the 2014 GBER 
announced that the Commission planned to propose criteria for exempting ports and airports 
infrastructure provided that sufficient case experience were to be developed.  
In the years following the entry into force of the 2014 GBER, the Commission adopted 
numerous State aid decisions in the area of ports and airports. This case practice fully 
supports the extension of the scope of the GBER to facilitate the grant of aid in unproblematic 
cases. 
On the basis of this acquired experience and to fulfil the commitment announced in recital 1 
of the 2014 GBER, the Commission in 2016 published two drafts for consultation and held 
two meetings with the State aid advisory committee of Member States on an extension of the 
GBER. After revisions of the two drafts on the basis of the numerous replies received by 
Member States and stakeholders, the extension of the GBER was adopted on 14 June 2017
116
. 
                                                            
114 For further information see IP/16/1782 of 19 May 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
16-1782_en.htm  
115 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, C/2016/2946, OJ C 262, 19.7.2016, pp. 1-50.  
116 Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1084 of 14 June 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 as regards 
aid for port and airport infrastructure, notification thresholds for aid for culture and heritage conservation and for 
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It provides a major simplification for unproblematic investments in ports and airports. 
Member States can implement State aid measures in these areas without the need to notify 
them before to the Commission, as long as they have checked that they comply with the 
conditions of the Regulation. The revision also addresses some other technical issues beyond 
ports and airports. In particular it makes it easier for public authorities to compensate 
companies for the additional costs they face in the EU's outermost regions. In addition, the 
extension further increases the maximum amount of aid allowed under the GBER for culture 
projects (under the rare circumstances that public funding for culture actually constitutes State 
aid) and for multi-purpose sports arenas.  
By doing so, the extension of the GBER further contributes to the objectives of the State Aid 
Modernisation launched by the Commission in 2012, in the sense that it minimises 
administrative burdens and make it easier for national, regional and local authorities to grant 
aid that contributes to a more dynamic and competitive internal market. It further focuses the 
Commission's State aid scrutiny to larger cases, by block exempting additional unproblematic 
cases. 
Revision of the Simplified Procedure Notice and Best Practices Code 
In 2016, the Commission launched a review of the Simplified Procedure Notice
117
 and of the 
Best Practices Code
118
 in order to reflect, on the one hand, the amendments brought to the 
State aid framework within the State Aid Modernisation initiative and, on the other hand, to 
take account of the experience gained by the Commission with its implementation.  
In the light of the comments received from the public consultations
119
, the Commission will 
review these texts with the objective to ensure coherence and consistency in the application of 
the various instruments of the State aid framework.  
3. Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts  
Increased monitoring of existing State aid to ensure a level playing field 
Over the years, the architecture of State aid control has evolved. Today, a substantial part of 
aid is granted under block-exempted schemes which are not examined by the Commission 
before entering into force. Overall, roughly 85% of aid is granted on the basis of previously 
approved aid schemes or Block Exemption Regulations. In that context, it is essential for the 
Commission to verify that Member States apply State aid rules for the schemes correctly and 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
aid for sport and multifunctional recreational infrastructures, and regional operating aid schemes for outermost 
regions and amending Regulation (EU) No 702/2014 as regards the calculation of eligible costs – available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1497952641554&uri=CELEX:32017R1084.  
117 Commission notice on a simplified procedure for the treatment of certain types of State aid, OJ C 136, 
16.06.2009, pp. 3-12, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0616(01). It sets 
out the conditions under which the Commission usually adopts short-form decisions declaring certain types of 
State support measures compatible with the internal market. The Commission launched a public consultation on 
this notice from January to April 2016. 
118 Commission notice on a Best Practices Code on the conduct of State aid control proceedings, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/best_practices_code_en.pdf . It provides guidance on the 
day-to-day conduct of State aid procedures and exchange of information between the Commission and Member 
States. The Commission launched a public consultation in November 2016 in order to gather on its 
implementation over the past seven years. 
119 Consultation on the Code of Best Practice on the conduct of State aid control proceedings, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2016_cbp/index_en.html; and Consultation on the Notice on a 
Simplified Procedure for the Treatment of Certain Types of Aid, see  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2016_simplified_procedure/index_en.html. 
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that they only grant aid when all required conditions are met.  
To that end, the Commission introduced in 2006 a regular, ex post, sample-based control of 
existing aid schemes ("monitoring"). After a modest start covering about 20 schemes and ten 
Member States in each monitoring cycle, the Commission has considerably stepped up 
monitoring since 2011. Building on the Court of Auditors recommendations
120
, the 
Commission has substantially increased the size of the monitoring sample in the last three 
annual cycles to more than 50 schemes per year. It also extended the scope of its control.  
The 2017 cycle covered most Member States
121
 and all main types of aid approved as well as 
block-exempted schemes. Furthermore, the sample included block-exempted schemes 
implemented under the new GBER
122
. Also, the Commission continued on targeted 
monitoring where it examined whether Member States correctly applied the criterion on the 
incentive effect.  
The Commission follows up on irregularities and uses the means at its disposal, as 
appropriate, to address the competition distortions that these may have caused. In some cases, 
Member States offer to voluntarily redress the problems detected, for example to amend 
national legislation or to recover the excess aid granted. In other cases, the Commission may 
need to take formal action.  
Restoring competition through recovery of State aid granted in breach of the rules 
To ensure the integrity of the single market, the Commission has the power and the duty to 
request that Member States recover unlawful and incompatible aid which has unduly distorted 
competition and trade between Member States. In 2017, further progress was made to ensure 
that recovery decisions are enforced effectively and immediately. 
By 31 December, the sum of illegal and incompatible aid recovered from beneficiaries 
amounted to EUR 13.3 billion
123
. At the same time, the outstanding amount pending recovery 
was EUR 18.4 billion.  
In 2017, the Commission adopted six new recovery decisions and EUR 261.4 million was 
recovered by the Member States. As of the end of December, the Commission had 44 pending 
recovery cases.  
Recovery decisions adopted in 2017 6 
Amount recovered in 2017 (EUR million) 261.4 
Pending recovery cases on 31 December 2017 44 
As a guardian of the Treaty, the Commission may use all legal means at its disposal to ensure 
that Member States implement their recovery obligations, including launching infringement 
procedures. In 2017, the Commission filed one action to the European Courts under Article 
                                                            
120 In its 2011 report on the efficiency of State aid procedures, the Court of Auditors considered that, in view of 
the importance of aids granted under existing aid schemes, the Commission's monitoring activity should be 
reinforced. For further information see the recommendation n° 1 of the Court of Auditors Report recital 96, p. 41 
available at http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/10952771.PDF. 
121 Except Cyprus and Estonia. 
122 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible 
with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1. 




 for failure to implement recovery in the Apple case
125
. 
Cooperation with national courts to ensure the effectiveness of State aid rules  
The Commission continued its cooperation with national courts and tribunals under Article 29 
of the Procedural Regulation
126
. This cooperation includes direct case-related assistance to 
national courts when they apply EU State aid law. The courts and tribunals can ask the 
Commission to provide case related information, or to provide an opinion on the application 
of State aid rules. The Commission may also submit amicus curiae observations at its own 
initiative.  
In 2017, the Commission responded to one request for information. The request was issued by 
the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland and enquired on the status of the investigation 
in a complaint.   
The Commission's possibility to submit amicus curiae observations on its own initiative 
before national courts is a novelty brought about by the 2013 amendment to the Procedural 
Regulation. In that respect, Article 29 of the Procedural Regulation mirrors Article 15(3) of 
Regulation 1/2003 in the field of antitrust.  
In 2017, the Commission submitted written observations for six court cases and also made 
oral observations for two of these cases
127
. All the cases concern the Micula decision.
128
 
To make its views publicly known, in June 2017 the Commission started to publish its 
opinions and amicus curiae observations, as well as observations to others, on its website
129
.  
In 2017, the Commission also continued its advocacy efforts. It was actively involved in 
evaluating the financing of training programmes for national judges and in assessing their 




                                                            
124 Consolidated version of the TFEU, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p.47. 
125 C-678/17, registered on 5 December 2017 at the European Court of Justice concering the recovery decision in 
SA.38373 Aid to Apple, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38373. 
126 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 
108 TFEU, OJ L 248 of 24.9.2015, pp. 9-29. 
127 In particular, the Commission presented its written observations in front of the President of the Tribunal 
d'Arrondissement of Luxembourg on 16 March 2017 and participated to the hearing of 20 March 2017 in the 
case Romania against Viorel Micula (n° rôle 179517) challenging the execution of the arbitral award (case 
ARB/05/20) in Luxembourg. On 26 October 2017 the Commission submitted its written observations in front of 
the Nacka District Court of Sweden in the case Ioan Micula against Romania (réf. A 2550/17) for the execution 
of the arbitral award (case ARB/05/20). Finally, the Commission submitted its written observations and 
requested for permission to participate in the oral hearing of the appeals of Viorel Micula and others against 
Romania (Court of Appeal refs A3/2017/1855 and A3/2017/1853) and of Ioan Micula and others against 
Romania (Court of Appeal refs: A3/2017/1856 and A3/2017/1903) against the orders of Mr Justice Blair of 20 
January 2017 and of 15 June staying the enforcement of the arbitral award (case ARB/05/20) in the United 
Kingdom pending the judgement of the General Court of the European Union. The Commission also appeared at 
the hearing before Mr Justice Blair on 24 May 2017. 
128 Case SA.38517 (2014/NN; 2014/C), Micula v Romania (ICSID arbitration award), Commission decisions of 
26 May and 1 October 2014, and 30 March and 24 July 2015 respectively, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38517.  
129 For further information see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/overview_en.html. 
130 See also the dedicated section Cooperation with national courts, Antitrust and Cartels Section, see I. 
Antitrust, chapter 4. 
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4. Significant judgments by the European Union Courts in the State aid area  
In 2017, the EU Courts adopted a number of important judgments in the State aid area. The 
following overview is based on a selection of court judgments.  
State resources 
In its preliminary ruling in ENEA
131
, the European Court of Justice confirmed that a national 
measure placing an obligation on both private and public undertakings to purchase electricity 
produced by cogeneration does not constitute an intervention by the State or through State 
resources when the extra costs resulting from that purchase obligation cannot be passed on 
entirely to end users and are not financed by a compulsory contribution imposed by the State 
or by a full offset mechanism. In the case at stake, the supply undertakings were not appointed 
by the State to manage a State resource, but were funding a purchase obligation imposed on 
them by having recourse to their own financial resources.  
The ruling further clarifies that the mere fact that the majority of the undertakings having the 
purchase obligations were public companies could not lead to conclude that State resources 
were involved if it is not in addition demonstrated that the State exercised dominant influence 
over public undertakings to direct the use of their resources in order to finance advantages to 
the benefit of other undertakings.  
The issue of State resources is also central in the TV2/Danmark judgment
132
, which put an end 
to the State aid assessment of the public financing of the Danish public broadcaster 
TV2/Danmark, started in 2003. In 2004, the Commission adopted a decision stating that the 
aid granted between 1995 and 2002 to TV2 in the form of licence fee resources was 
compatible, with the exception of an overcompensation for an amount of DKK 628.2 million 
(approximately EUR 85 million) for which the Commission ordered recovery.  
Upon annulment by the General Court in 2008 of that decision
133
, the Commission adopted a 
second decision in 2011 declaring the public financing of TV2 between 1995 and 2002 to 
constitute in its entirety compatible aid. In 2015, the General Court annulled that second 
decision
134
 in so far as the Commission had found that during 1995 and 1996 the advertising 
revenues generated by TV2 by broadcasting commercials constituted State resources because 
they were channelled through a Government-controlled fund. The General Court found that 
the fact that the revenues were channelled through a public entity would not render the 
commercial nature of the income a State resource, even if the State had the possibility to fix 
the amounts to be channelled to TV2. The advertising revenues would keep their character as 
income generated by commercial activities of TV2. 
In TV2/Danmark the European Court of Justice set aside the judgment of the General Court. It 
considered decisive for the question whether TV2’s advertising revenues constituted State 
resources that the State effectively had control over these funds before they were paid to the 
beneficiary. In particular, the European Court of Justice considered that the General Court 
was wrong to hold that resources originating with third parties that are managed by public 
                                                            
131 Case C-329/15 ENEA S.A. v Prezes Urzędu Regulacji Energetyki, judgment of the  European Court of Justice 
of 13 September 2017, EU:C:2017:671. 
132 Case C-656/15 P Commission v TV2/Danmark A/S, judgment of the European Court of Justice of 9 November 
2017, EU:C:2017:836. 
133 Joined cases T-309/04, T-317/04, T-329/04 and T-336/04 TV2/Danmark A/S and others v Commission 
Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 22 October 2008, ECLI:EU:T:2008:457. 
134 Case T-674/11 TV2/Danmark A/S v Commission, Judgment of the General Court of 24 September 2015, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:684. 
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undertakings can constitute State resources only when they are voluntarily placed at the 
disposal of the State by their owners or abandoned by their owners and when the State has 
assumed the management of those resources. The European Court of Justice also 
differentiated this case from PreussenElektra by stating that the latter case related to private 
undertakings that had not been appointed by the State to administer a State resource, but were 
bound by an obligation to purchase by means of their own financial resources. Further, in that 
case, the funds at issue were at no time under public control. By contrast, the present case 
concerns public undertakings, namely TV2 Reklame and the TV2 Fund, that were created, 
owned and appointed by the Danish State to administer the revenue produced by the sale of 
advertising space of another public undertaking, namely TV2/Danmark, and as a consequence 
that revenue was under the control and at the disposal of the Danish State. 
Economic v non-economic activity 
The preliminary ruling in Congregación de Escuelas Pías
135
 related to an exemption of a 
Catholic school from a municipal real estate tax in Spain granted in respect of work to 
buildings intended to be used for educational activities that do not have a strictly religious 
purpose.  
In its judgment, the European Court of Justice noted that the school was engaged in three 
types of activities: (i) strictly religious activities, which are non-economic; (ii) educational 
activities subsidised by the State, which cannot be classified as economic; and (iii) non-
compulsory educational activities receiving no financial support from the State, which can be 
regarded as economic. The European Court of Justice held that the tax exemption may 
constitute State aid if and to the extent to which the activities carried on in the premises in 
question are economic activities, a matter which is for the national court to determine. On this 
basis, the European Court of Justice concluded that the prohibition in Article 107(1) TFEU 
can only apply to the tax exemption if (i) at least some of the activities carried on at the 
school can be classified as economic activities and (ii) the premises in question are used, at 
least in part, for such economic activities.  
The European Court of Justice also held that the tax exemption, if classified as aid, should not 
be regarded as existing aid but as new aid. In the European Court of Justice's view, while the 
agreement between Spain and the Holy See (the basis for the tax exemption at issue) predated 
Spain’s accession to the EU, the tax exemption as such was introduced into Spanish 
legislation only after accession. 
Another relevant judgment as regards the definition of non-economic activity is the one of the 
General Court on TenderNed
136
, an electronic government platform for information on public 
tenders in the Netherlands. In 2014, upon complaint of several commercial players, the 
Commission adopted a decision
137
 declaring that the financing of TenderNed by the Dutch 
authorities did not amount to State aid. In its judgment, the General Court comes to the 
conclusion that the activities of TenderNed (data collection and publication) provide the 
means to comply with statutory obligations and as such form part of the exercise of public 
powers and are non-economic. 
                                                            
135 Case C-74/16 Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v Ayuntamiento de Getafe, judgment of the 
Court of 27 June 2017, EU:C:2017:496. 
136 Case T-183/15 Aanbestedingskalender BV and others v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 28 
September 2017, EU:T:2017:675. 
137 Commission Decision of 18 December 2014 on State aid case SA.34646 (2014/NN) (ex 2012/CP) – The 
Netherlands – E-procurement platform TenderNed, OJ C 422, 8.12.2017, p. 2. 
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In order to reach this conclusion, the General Court first noted that all the functionalities of 
TenderNed must be understood as linked to each other, all being indispensable for e-
procurement and forming different facets of the same activity, and therefore not independent 
of each other. Next, the General Court looked at whether the activities of TenderNed, taken as 
a whole, may be connected with the exercise of public powers. It came to the view that when 
contracting authorities initiate a procurement procedure and comply with procurement rules, 
they are acting as public authorities. The nature and purpose of TenderNed's activities are 
closely linked to this activity and are therefore connected with the exercise of public powers. 
The fact that TenderNed provides its services free of charge is not sufficient in and by itself to 
determine whether an activity is economic or not although is nevertheless a relevant factor. 
The General Court also noted that the question whether or not the creation of a centralised e-
procurement system was provided for by the EU procurement directives, and whether 
provision is made for penalties in the event of breach of the obligations imposed by those 
directives, is not decisive for the purpose of determining the nature of TenderNed's activities. 
The General Court also stated that the coexistence of commercial platforms does not 




 judgment relates to the Spanish plans to facilitate the transition from analogue 
to digital broadcasting for the entire territory of Spain (with the exception of the Autonomous 
Community of Castilla-La Mancha). In particular, the Spanish authorities set up a system of 
public financing to facilitate the digitisation of the so-called Area II, i.e. semi-remote and less 
urbanized areas with only 2.5% of the Spanish population, where the broadcasters had no 
economic interest to invest in digitisation.  
In May 2009, the Commission received a complaint from a satellite operator alleging that the 
various regional schemes to facilitate the digitisation of Area II constituted non-notified aid 
which distorted competition between terrestrial and satellite broadcasting platforms, since the 
parameters of the tenders made satellite operators ineligible. The Commission adopted a 
decision in 2013 finding that the support granted to terrestrial operators in Area II amounted 
to incompatible State aid as it distorted competition between satellite and terrestrial 
broadcasting platforms. In 2015, the General Court entirely dismissed the actions brought by 






, the European Court of Justice rejected the arguments of the appellants with just 
one exception in Retegal. By that judgment, the European Court of Justice set aside the 
judgment of the General Court and moreover annulled the Commission decision for failure to 
state reasons. According to the European Court of Justice, the Commission had not 
sufficiently motivated why the measure under assessment was selective and dismissed the 
                                                            
138 Case C-70/16 P Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia and Retegal v Commission and SES Astra SA, judgment of 
the Court of 20 December 2017, EU:C:2017:1002. 
139 Cases T-461/13 Spain v Commission; T-462/13 Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco and Itelazpi v 
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140 Joined Cases C-66/16 P Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco and Itelazpi v Commission, C-67/16 P 
Comunidad Autónoma de Cataluña and CTTI v Commission, C-68/16 P Navarra de Servicios y Tecnologías v 
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Autónoma de Galicia and Retegal v Commission, and C-81/16 P Spain v Commission. 
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Commission’s argument that no additional reasoning was necessary since the selectivity 
condition is automatically satisfied if a measure applies exclusively to a specific economic 
sector or to undertakings in a particular geographic area. Instead, the European Court of 
Justice argued, by making reference to Lübeck Airport
141
, that the decision contained no 
indication of the reasons why undertakings active in the broadcasting sector should be 
regarded as being in a factual and legal situation comparable to that of undertakings active in 
other sectors or why undertakings using digital terrestrial technology should be regarded as 
being in a factual and legal situation comparable to that of undertakings using other 





The most relevant judgment as regards advantage is Frucona
143
. In 2004, the beverage 
producer Frucona Košice became insolvent mainly due to accumulated tax debts amounting to 
SKK 640.4 million (approximately EUR 16.9 million). The company asked its creditors for an 
arrangement under the applicable insolvency legislation and in July 2004, the tax office 
agreed to write off 65% of its debt. Following a complaint, the Commission took in 2006 a 
decision concluding that the debt write-off was not consistent with the market economy 
creditor principle (MECP) and constituted unlawful and incompatible State aid.  
In 2010, the General Court fully confirmed the decision (case T-11/07). However, the 
European Court of Justice concluded in 2013 (case C- 73/11 P) that the Commission had 
committed a manifest error of assessment by not taking into account in its MECP assessment 
the likely duration of the bankruptcy procedure. As a result, the European Court of Justice set 
aside the judgment of the General Court and referred back the case.  
The Commission decided to replace its 2006 decision and to adopt a new negative decision 
with recovery in October 2013. Frucona Košice brought an action for annulment before the 
General Court who in 2016 annulled the 2013 decision (case T-103/14), in particular because 
the Commission had not proven to the sufficient legal standard the existence of State aid, 
since the evidence on the file was, according to the General Court, not capable of 
substantiating that a private creditor would have preferred alternative scenarios to the 
proposed arrangement.  
On appeal in Frucona, the European Court of Justice fully confirmed the judgment of the 
General Court. It stressed that the MECP test is intended to determine whether the recipient 
undertaking would manifestly not have obtained comparable facilities from a private creditor 
in a situation as close as possible to the public creditor. As a result, the European Court of 
Justice came to the view that the Commission’s assessment cannot be limited to just the 
options that the competent authority actually took into consideration but must cover all the 
options that a private creditor would reasonably have envisaged in such a situation. It is for 
the Commission to ask the Member State concerned to provide it with all the relevant 
information for such overall assessment. This must include all information liable to have a 
significant influence on the decision-making of a normally prudent and diligent creditor at the 
time the measure was granted. At the same time, in a series of recent judgements, which rely 
                                                            
141 Case C-524/14 P Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck, judgment of the Court of 21 December 2016, 
EU:C:2016:971. 
142 Such as cases C-323/16 P Eurallumina SpA v Commission and T-314/15 Hellenic Republic v Commission. 
143 Case C-300/16 P Commission v Frucona Košice a.s., judgment of the Court of 20 September 2017, 
EU:C:2017:706. 
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rather on C 124/10 P Commission v EDF, the Union Courts have rather emphasised that the 
Market Economy Operator Principle (MEOP) test is not applicable if the Member State did 
not base its investment decision on preliminary economic evaluations, as a private investor 
would have done
144
. When a Member State invoked the MEOP, it had to show these in order 
to prove its claim. 
Existing aid vs new aid 
By its judgments in Dutch social housing
145
, the European Court of Justice set aside two 
orders of the General Court of 12 May 2015
146




The European Court of Justice concluded that when the Commission adopts a decision under 
Article 19(1), in conjunction with Article 18, of Regulation 659/1999 (now Articles 23(1) and 
22 of Regulation 2015/1589), and accepts the commitments of the Member State, it concludes 
the examination process provided for in Article 108(1) TFEU. Such decision necessarily 
presupposes that the Commission had first assessed in its letter under Article 17 of Regulation 
659/1999 (now Article 21 of Regulation 2015/1589) whether the existing aid scheme was 
compatible with the internal market, and that it had concluded that the existing aid scheme 
was not (or no longer was) compatible. Therefore, the conclusion that the Commission drew 
in its decision (i.e. that appropriate measures were needed) results from that first preliminary 
finding of incompatibility registered in the Article 17 letter (now Article 21 letter). According 
to the European Court of Justice, such first assessment cannot be excluded from judicial 
review without undermining the right to effective judicial review. Therefore, in the original 
appeal against the Article 19(1) decision, the General Court should have assessed the question 
of whether the existing aid scheme (before the commitments of the Member State) was 
compatible with the internal market.  
The European Court of Justice also concluded that, irrespective of the respective roles of the 
Commission and the Member States in the procedure leading to the adoption of appropriate 
measures under Article 19(1) (now Article 23(1), it is the Commission's decision recording 
the proposals of the Member State that renders those proposals binding. As a result, the 
European Court of Justice ruled that the General Court had erred in law by rejecting as 
manifestly unfounded the appellants’ arguments that (i) the Commission had erred in law and 
abused its powers by requiring the Dutch authorities to provide a new definition of "social 
housing" and (ii) the Commission had incorrectly interpreted the 2005 SGEI Decision. 
As a result, the cases were referred back to the General Court. 
Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI) 
The judgments of the General Court in Société nationale maritime Corse Méditerranée 
                                                            
144 See, for example, cases  T-1/15 SNCM v Commission, C-472/15 P Servizi assicurativi del commercio estero 
SpA (SACE) and Sace BT SpA v Commission, T-747/15 Électricité de France (EDF) v Commission, and T-
423/14 Larko Geniki Metalleftiki kai Metallourgiki AE v Commission. 
145 Case T-202/10 RENV Stichting Woonlinie and others v Commission, order of the General Court of 12 May 
2015, EU:T:2015:287, and case T-203/10 RENV Stichting Woonpunt and others v Commission, order of the 
General Court of 12 May 2015, EU:T:2015:286. 
146 Case C-414/15 P Stichting Woonlinie and others v Commission, judgment of the Court  of 15 March 2017, 
EU:C:2017:215, and case C-415/15 P Stichting Woonpunt and others v Commission, judgment of the Court  of 
15 March 2017, EU:C:2017:216. 
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 are relevant inter alia because they confirm the necessary link between the 
demonstration of a market failure and the discretion left to a Member State to define a public 
service obligation (PSO) in a given market. 
These two judgments relate to a 2013 Commission Decision
149
 concerning the award of a 
public service contract to the French shipping company SNCM for the period 2007-2013. The 
Commission concluded that the aid granted to SNCM for the additional service needed to 
cover peak periods during the holiday seasons did not compensate a real public service need 
(since the market could provide such services) and that it was incompatible. 
By its judgments, the General Court dismissed the actions of France and SNCM seeking the 
annulment of the Decision. The General Court first clarified that the Commission, in its 
assessment of a possible manifest error in the definition of a PSO in the case of an SGEI may 
rely on non-State aid related EU legislation (such as the Maritime Cabotage Regulation), 
which may limit the discretionary power enjoyed by Member States. The General Court also 
confirmed that the definition of the PSO must meet a real need for public service and that its 
scope must be necessary and proportionate to that need. In particular, where a Member State 
has the choice between a PSO scheme open to all operators and a public service delegation 
entrusted to one or few operators, it must opt for the solution that will least distort the good 
functioning of the internal market. 
In cases relating to SGEI/public service compensation, the General Court in T-220/14 
Saremar - Sardegna Regionale Marittima SpA recalled that the Member States' discretion on 
the definition of SGEIs cannot preclude the Commission from verifying that the SGEI 
derogation has been properly applied.  
Autonomy of State aid rules 
The autonomous and separate nature of State aid rules as opposed to legislation relating to 
excise duties (and other tax rules) was confirmed definitively in the C-323/16 P Eurallumina 
case. 
Regulatory acts in the sense of the third limb of Article 263(4) TFEU 
The C-640/16 P Greenpeace Energy case gave further support to the position that State aid 
decisions are not regulatory acts in the sense of the third limb of Article 263(4) TFEU, 
although the Union Courts still have not explicitly stated this in cases relating to aid schemes.  
Rights of complainants 
On the rights of complainants (i) the C-228/16 P Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou AE (DEI) 
judgment reinforced these rights because the European Court of Justice considered that a 
formal decision can validly replace an illegal previous services' letter rejecting a complaint 
only if that decision explicitly states the illegality of the previous services' letter; (ii) the T-
841/16 Alex SCI case confirmed that a services' letter may constitute a challengeable act if it 
is worded in categorical terms.  
 
                                                            
148 Case T-366/13 France v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 1 March 2017, EU:T:2017:135, and 
case T-.454/13 Société nationale maritime Corse Méditerranée (SNCM) v Commission, judgment of the General 
Court of 1 March 2017, EU:T:2017:134. 
149 Commission Decision of 2 May 2013 on State aid case SA.22843 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by 
France in favour of Société Nationale Maritime Corse-Méditerranée, OJ L 220, 17.8.2013, p. 20. 
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Developing the international dimension of EU competition policy 
The Commission aims at fostering a level playing field as regards market access and promotes 
the values of EU competition enforcement, including State aid control, across the world. The 
progressive globalisation of trade and the spread of competition regulatory systems around the 
world call for convergence of competition rules and the coordinated enforcement of these 
rules. Companies need a transparent, stable and reliable competition enforcement wherever 
they do business. This will also benefit consumers in the long-term run. And this is why the 
Commission seeks to reinforce the role of competition policy in international negotiations, in 
international organisations and cooperates with competition agencies globally.  
1. Bilateral relations 
The Commission is holding negotiations on Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the aim to 
include competition and State aid provisions in such agreements. In 2017, the European 
Union concluded the negotiations with Japan and Armenia. The Commission continued FTA 
negotiations with Mexico, Mercosur and Indonesia, and opened negotiations with Chile and 
Azerbaijan.  
The Commission also continued negotiations with the People's Republic of China regarding 
an Investment Agreement. The agreement aims at establishing a level playing field between 
EU and Chinese investors, including State owned enterprises, through inter alia enhanced 
provisions on transparency as regards subsidies.  
In June, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the National Development and 
Reform Commission of the Peoples’ Republic of China to create a permanent forum for 
dialogue on the enhancement of an effective, transparent and non-discriminatory state aid 
control and fair competition review.  
Negotiations between the Commission and its Canadian counterparts to include provisions on 
the exchange of evidence into the existing EU-Canada Cooperation agreement have been 
completed at working level. The updated draft agreement (the so-called "Second Generation 
Agreement") with Canada will allow the Commission and the Canadian Competition Bureau 
to exchange evidence collected in the course of their respective proceedings. The possibility 
to exchange such evidence would improve cooperation between both competition authorities 
in all competition cases which affect both markets and would lead to more effective and more 
efficient competition law enforcement. In July 2017, the European Court of Justice issued its 
Opinion on another agreement, the envisaged EU-Canada Passenger Name Record 
Agreement, clarifying the standards for private data protection. The Commission is analysing 
the impact of the Court's Opinion on the draft Second Generation Agreement. 
The Commission is also negotiating a similar agreement with Japan to update the existing 
cooperation agreement from 2003. The Council's authorisation for negotiations was received 
in April and negotiations started in October.  
Another key area of Commission activity is technical cooperation with main trading partners 
that are developing their competition policy and enforcement regimes and with which the 
Commission has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). The Commission has signed 
MoUs with all the BRICS
150
 countries in recent years, and has engaged in technical 
                                                            
150 BRICS is the acronym for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa. 
 44 
cooperation with these countries to varying degrees. In the same vein, the Commission will 
soon start negotiating an Administrative Arrangement with Mexico. The Commission also 
assists in the implementation of the competition provisions included in recent FTAs with 
neighbouring countries. It is involved in negotiating the necessary implementing rules to this 
effect with Tunisia, as well as monitoring the implementation of the EU competition acquis in 
countries such as Ukraine and Moldova.  
In the accession negotiations with candidate countries, the Commission's main policy 
objective, in addition to fostering a competition culture, is to further help candidate countries 
and potential candidate countries to build up a legislative framework with well-functioning 
competition authorities and an efficient enforcement practice in order to meet the conditions 
for EU accession in the competition policy field. The Commission is continuously monitoring 
compliance of candidate countries with their commitments under the Stabilisation and 
Association agreements. 
2. Multilateral cooperation 
The Commission continued its active engagement in competition-related international fora 
such as the Competition Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the International Competition Network (ICN), the World Bank and 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  
In OECD in June, the Commission contributed to the discussions on methodologies for 
conducting market studies
151
, use of traditional antitrust enforcements tools in multi-sided 
markets
152
, algorithms and collusion
153
, and competition issues in aftermarkets
154
. Likewise, 
during the OECD Competition Committee's meeting in June, the Commission presented, its 
proposal for a EU Directive to empower national competition authorities to be more effective 
enforcers (the ECN+ initiative), and the key findings of the e-commerce sector inquiry. In 
December, the Commission contributed to the OECD's discussions on judicial perspectives of 
competition law
155
, the challenges related to the imposition of extraterritorial remedies
156
, the 
cooperation between competition agencies and regulators in the financial market
157
 and safe 
harbours, presumptions of illegality and standards in competition law
158
. 
In the ICN, following the Porto Annual Conference which took place in May, the 
Commission continued co-chairing the Cartel Working Group and contributed to updating the 
ICN 2008 report on "Setting Fines for Cartels in ICN Jurisdictions"
159
 and the "Anti-Cartel 
Enforcement Manual"
160
. The Commission is also an active member of the Merger and 
                                                            
151 For further information see http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/market-study-methodologies-for-
competition-authorities.htm. 
152 For further information see http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/rethinking-antitrust-enforcement-tools-in-
multi-sided-markets.htm. 
153 For further information see http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/algorithms-and-collusion.htm. 
154 For further information see http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/aftermarkets-competition-issues.htm. 
155 For further information see http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/judicial-perspectives-competition-law.htm. 
156 For further information see http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/extraterritorial-reach-of-competition-
remedies.htm. 
157 For further information see http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/cooperation-between-competition-agencies-
and-regulators-in-the-financial-sector.htm. 
158 For further information see http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/safe-harbours-and-legal-presumptions-in-
competition-law.htm. 
159 For further information see http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1127.pdf. 
160 For further information see https://icn2017.concorrencia.pt/downloads/materials/CWG-Compliation-of-Good-
Practices.pdf.  
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Unilateral Conduct Working Groups where it contributes to the various projects carried out by 
these groups, such as the development of the Unilateral Conduct Workbook
161
 and the 
revision of the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review 
Procedures
162
 and the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis
163
.  
The Commission also participated in the 16th meeting of the UNCTAD Intergovernmental 
Group of Experts (IGE) on Competition Law and Policy (CLP), which was held in Geneva in 
July 2017. The conference included discussions on the capacity-building and technical 
assistance in the area of competition law and policy, enhancing international cooperation in 
the investigation of competition cross-border cases and challenges faced by young and small 
competition authorities in the design of merger control.  
External Communication 
The Directorate-General for Competition's external communication is largely based on the use 
of mass media to reach a variety of audiences, including businesses, lawyers, researchers, 
academics, students and the general public. This is achieved principally via the 
Commissioner's press conferences, press releases and speeches, as well as social media. In 
addition, the Directorate-General issues newsletters and other publications aimed at 
stakeholders and the general public, as well as participation by staff in stakeholder 
conferences. 
The mass media are by far the most cost-effective channel to reach a wide audience.  
According to a 2014 Eurobarometer on "Citizens’ Perception about Competition Policy", 
people's two main sources of information about competition policies were television (62%) 
and newspapers or magazines, including online (60%). These were followed by internet-based 
media (38%) and radio (34%). 
The Directorate-General for Competition produced 518 press releases related to competition 
cases during 2017. Of these, 127 were longer, multilingual, press releases while a further 391 
were shorter and monolingual.  Media coverage of some of the cases was worldwide, reaching 
tens of millions of people, for example, the Google Shopping and Qualcomm antitrust cases 
and the Apple and Amazon state aid cases. All of these cases were covered by TV, radio, print 
and internet media around the globe. 
Throughout 2017, Commissioner Vestager delivered around 70 speeches to a variety of 
audiences, including a TED Talk, the video of which was viewed over 1 million times.  The 
Director-General delivered 25 speeches at a variety of international events. 
On social media, the Directorate General for Competition was active on Twitter during 2017. 
Throughout the year, Over 1000 tweets from the Directorate-General’s account achieved 
more than 3 million impressions (i.e. the number of times a tweet appears in someone's feed). 
Topics achieving high traffic included the Dow/Dupont, Bayer/Monsanto and Morpho 
Detection/Smiths mergers, the Apple and Amazon State aid cases, and the Google Shopping, 
International Skating Union and Aspen Pharma antitrust cases. Followers of the 
DirectorateGeneral's twitter account rose to 10,000 during the year. 
                                                            
161 For further information see http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-
groups/current/unilateral/ucworkbook.aspx.  
162 For further information see http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1108.pdf. 
163 For further information see http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1107.pdf. 
 46 
The DirectorateGeneral's electronic newsletters had over 20,000 subscribers in 2017 while 
paper publications in the EU Bookshop were downloaded 5000 times. 
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II. SECTORAL OVERVIEW 
The Commission's competition policy actions in 2017 focused on a wide range of policy 
areas, helping make markets work more fairly. At the same time, EU competition policy 
supported several key EU policies and initiatives, including a connected Digital Single 
Market, an integrated and climate friendly Energy Union, a deeper and fairer internal market 
and taking actions against selective tax advantages. This section provides an overview of 
competition policy developments and enforcement activities that the Commission particularly 
focused on in 2017.  
 1. ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
Competition policy plays a key role in making the Energy Union, one of the Commission's ten 
priorities, function properly by opening markets, avoiding discrimination and creating a level 
playing field between all market players, regardless of their nationality. Competition 
enforcement ensures that gas and electricity flow freely across borders between Member 
States, promotes interconnectivity and avoides territorial restrictions or artificial market 
partitioning within the EU. It ultimately empowers consumers – whether energy-intensive 
users, such as big manufacturing plants, small companies or citizens – to demand a fair deal, 
and gives them the trust that the EU markets are working well. This ensures that Europe has 
secure, affordable and green energy.  
Competition policy is also key in the area of the environment for achieving the EU's climate 
targets in particular regarding the shift in the transport sector from polluting fossil fuels to 
alternative fuels in accordance with the Commission's mobility policy (e-mobility from 
renewable sources, use of hydrogen and natural gas for low emission vehicles) as well as the 
introduction of the necessary infrastructure to enable this shift. To this end aid measures aim 
to address market failures and stimulate demand for low emission vehicles both in public 
transport as well as for the acquisition of low emission vehicles by consumers. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
The scope of competition law enforcement in the energy sector is to strengthen and integrate 
the principles outlined in sector-specific regulation in order to create a well-functioning 
unified market, where energy can be exchanged freely and securely across Europe and all 
related services are provided at competitive levels. For instance, by making sure that 
dominant positions by incumbent operators are not abused, that suppliers compete effectively 
and fairly, that State intervention is limited only to those areas in which is really needed and 
that renewables can compete in the market, competition policy helps keeping overall energy 
costs under control and at the same time allows for a sustainable economic growth in the EU.  
Competition policy in 2017 has focused mainly on the four areas, as presented below:  
First, the Commission acted against (privately or State-owned) companies' attempts to 
artificially segment or partition the internal energy market. In particular, the Commission is 
concerned that limiting the free flow of gas and electricity between Member States constitutes 
an obstacle to the Energy Union. For this reason, the Commission has enforced competition 
rules against territorial restrictions unduly limiting the possibility for customers to deliver or 
re-deliver energy where needed. Discriminatory conduct against foreign energy or any 
limitations of imports/exports within the EU have also been under closer scrutiny.  
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The second important focus was on ensuring that competitors could compete on fair terms and 
incumbent operators were not allowed to unduly exploit their dominant position, whether 
gained legitimately on the market, conceded by the State or favoured by national legislation. 
In fact, the Commission has showed that it is ready to intervene when national rules create or 
facilitate an infringement of competition law.  
Third, the Commission enforced the State aid rules ensuring public support results in a 
positive balance between the objectives achieved and the potential negative effects of State 
intervention on the European energy market. In this context, the Commission pays special 
attention to any market distortions that may arise as a result of public financing, such as the 
crowding out of investment, negative effects on upstream or downstream markets and 
excessive profits which may lead to strengthened market positions, deterrence of new entrants 
and ultimately market foreclosure. By the effective enforcement of State aid rules in 2017 the 
Commission has ensured that the risk of such distortions is limited to the minimum. This has 
been achieved by promoting the implementation of more marketoriented capacity 
mechanisms, new support schems to renewable energy producers, who receive aid under a 
clear, transparent and equitable set of rules. Ensuring that technology providers compete on 
equal grounds. In addition, the Commission ensured that technology providers compete on 
equal grounds, for example when assessing the restructing aid to the nuclear technology 
provider Areva (Areva changed its name to Oreno as of January 2018).  
Fourth, the Commission swiftly approved aid measures in support of the introduction of the 
necessary infrastructure for low-emission mobility (networks of charging stations for e-
mobility and for the use of other alternative fuels) and worked together with a number of 
Member States to ensure that shemes promoting the acquisition of low/zero emission vehicles 
would not create competition concerns. 
Reaping the benefits of a pro-competitive gas, oil and other fuel sectors in the EU 
The purpose of antitrust enforcement in the gas sector is to achieve more competitive markets 
in Europe, thereby offering citizens and businesses arbitrage opportunities and greater choice 
at lower prices. 
The Gazprom case164 is a good example of the efforts made by the Commission to facilitate 
cross-border flows of energy between the Member States. In its Statement of Objections, the 
Commission considered that Gazprom may have abused its dominant position by pursuing an 
overall strategy to partition the Central and Eastern European gas markets. This may have 
enabled Gazprom to charge unfair prices in certain Member States. The Commission also 
considered that Gazprom may have abused its dominant market position by making the 
supply of gas dependent on obtaining unrelated commitments from wholesalers concerning 
the gas transport infrastructure.  
Gazprom offered commitments to address the Commission's competition concerns and ensure 
the free flow of gas at competitive prices across the Central and Eastern European gas 
markets.  
  
                                                            
164 Case AT.39816, Upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe. For further information see  
 IP/15/4828 of 22 April 2015 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4828_en.htm.  
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The commitments offered by Gazprom 
In order to ensure cross-border flows of gas across the investigated Central and Eastern European Member 
States, Gazprom has offered to remove all contractual barriers to the free flow of gas in Central and Eastern 
European gas markets (including clauses which merely reduce customers' incentive to re-sell gas). In addition, 
Gazprom has committed to take active steps to enable better integration of these markets. First, Gazprom has 
offered to facilitate market interconnections between Bulgaria and its EU neighbours, by committing to 
introduce changes to its contracts that are necessary for the conclusion of interconnection agreements between 
Bulgaria and other EU Member States. Second, Gazprom offered to overcome the isolation of the Bulgarian and 
Baltic gas markets, caused by the lack of gas connecting infrastructure, by creating additional opportunities for 
gas flows through swap-like operations between, on the one hand, the Baltic and Bulgarian gas markets and, 
on the other hand, other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Gazprom has also committed to introduce a number of important changes to its contractual price revision clauses 
to ensure competitive gas prices in the five Member States (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) in 
which Gazprom had been preliminary found to charge unfair prices. In essence, Gazprom's customers would be 
able to ask for a price renegotiation when prices diverge from Western European price benchmarks, including 
prices at competitive and liquid European gas hubs. The level of the new prices would have to take account of 
these benchmarks. In case of disagreement between Gazprom and its customer, the matter could be referred to 
binding arbitration, which would revise prices in line with the same competitive benchmarks. Finally, contractual 
price revisions would also become more frequent and their timing streamlined as compared to current price 
revision clauses. 
Finally, as regards South Stream, Gazprom has committed not to seek any damages from its Bulgarian partners 
following the termination of the South Stream project.  
In March, the Commission decided to submit Gazprom's commitments to a market test.
165
 In 
response to the market test, the Commission has received a significant number of comments 
and submissions from various market players and interested parties. The Commission has 
subsequently discussed with Gazprom how the commitments would need to be improved in 
the light of the comments received in the market test.  
In 2017, the Commission also continued its investigation into the possible foreclosure of gas 
markets in Bulgaria by Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH)
166
. State-owned and vertically 
integrated Bulgarian Energy Holding was being investigated for hindering competitors' access 
to key gas infrastructures in Bulgaria and the import pipeline brining gas to Bulgaria. The 
company is not only active in the gas supply market but also owns or controls the Bulgarian 
gas transmission network, the only gas storage facility in Bulgaria and the capacity on the 
main gas import pipeline into the country. The aim of the case is to ensure a competitive gas 
market in Bulgaria and foster the integration of the Bulgarian gas market with neighbouring 
markets. 
In June, the Commission opened formal proceedings against the Romanian Transmission 
System Operator of natural gas (Transgaz)167 to investigate whether it might be hindering the 
free flows of natural gas from Romania to neighbouring Member States. The aim of the 
investigation is to ensure the free flow of the natural gas from Romania to neighbouring 
countries and to improve integration of Romania into the European gas network.  
Whilst the Commission primarily focuses on the gas sector, it also monitors other fuel sectors, 
such as ethanol, a biofuel. Oil and biofuel prices are important to Europe's citizens and 
                                                            
165 Case AT.39816 Upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe. For further information see IP/17/555 
of 13 March 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-386_en.htm.  
166 Case AT.39849 BEH Gas. For further information see IP/15/4651 of 23 March 2015 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4651_en.htm. 
167 Case AT.40335 Romanian gas interconnectors. For further information see IP/17/1501 of 1 June 2017 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1501_en.htm.  
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businesses. In 2017, the Commission continued its investigation into potential collusion 
practices between three ethanol producers, Abengoa SA of Spain, Alcogroup SA of Belgium 
and Lantmännen ek för of Sweden, in relation to the ethanol price formation mechanism at 
wholesale level.168 If confirmed, these practices would increase prices for renewable energy, 
in this case biofuels used for transport, and would be therefore harming competition and 
undermining EU energy objectives.  
The Greek Lignite
169
 case shows the Commission's willingness to tackle also anticompetitive 
behaviours created or facilitated by national legislation. During 2017 the Commission has re-
opened the case after the judgments by the General Court
170
 in December 2016, upholding the 
2008 Commission decision. In the 2008 Commission decision it was established that the 
Hellenic Republic granted in violation of Article 106 TFEU together with Article 102 TFEU 
to the State-controlled dominant electricity operator PPC special rights for the exploitation of 
lignite in Greece. Those special rights created inequality of opportunities for PPC's 
competitors and enabled PPC to maintain its dominant position on the Greek wholesale 
electricity market. To remedy this imbalance around 40% of lignite-fired generation capacity 
had to be divested by PPC to third parties. At the end of 2017 the Hellenic Republic submitted 
a divestment package proposal.  
Benefits of properly functioning and interconnected electricity markets 
Electricity transmission networks in various countries and/or regions are interconnected, and 
therefore electricity transmission system operators from various areas also manage 
interconnections with other networks. Where a transmission system operator resolves network 
congestion problems by limiting cross-border transmission capacity, this may constitute 
discrimination against cross-border flows of electricity as compared to internal flows and 
could impede consumers from reaping the benefits of the EU's single market for energy. It can 
also distort prices, leading to inefficient electricity production and the wrong investment 
signals. 
State aid measures to ensure security of energy supply for European citizens and businesses  
In 2017, the Commission started its enforcement actions based on the findings of the 
Commission's 2016 sector inquiry into capacity mechanism, which has formed the basis for a 
close cooperation between the Commission and the EU Member States to ensure that capacity 
mechanisms are well-designed and fit for purpose. In 2017, the Commission took a final 
decision on a capacity mechanism in France
171
 and approved the joint capacity mechanism for 
Ireland and Northern Ireland
172
. The joint capacity mechanism for Ireland and Northern 
Ireland is open to all potential types of capacity providers, including the demand response, in 
the 'all-island market'. The power plants and other capacity providers will be paid for being 
                                                            
168 Case AT.40054 Ethanol Benchmarks. For further information see IP/15/6259 of 7 December 2015 available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6259_en.htm. 
169 Case AT.38700 Greek Lignite and electricity markets. For further information see IP/08/386 of 5 March 2008 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-386_en.htm?locale=fr.  
170 Judgments of the General Court T-169/08 RENV and T-421/09 RENV of 15 December 2016. 
171 Case SA.40454 Tender for additional capacity in Brittany, for further information see IP/17/1325 of 15 May 
2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1325_en.htm.  
172 Case SA.44464 Irish Capacity Mechanism: reliability option scheme, Commission decision of 24 November 
2017 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_44464, and 
SA.44465 Northern Irish Capacity Mechanism: reliability option scheme, Commission decision of 24 November 
2017 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_44465. For 
further information see IP/17/4944 of 24 November 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
4944_en.htm. 
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available to generate electricity, and the demand response operators for being ready to reduce 
their electricity consumption to help balancing the demand with supply. The capacity 
contracts are allocated through regular, competitive auctions. When the electricity prices 
reach very high levels (i.e. more than €500 per MWh), the capacity mechanism triggers an 
obligation for power plants selected in the auctions to pay back some of the State aid 
received. They can finance this payback obligation from the revenues they generate from the 
sale of electricity. This ensures that the capacity is available, and encourages power plants to 
use this capacity to offer their electricity on the market when there is scarcity. 
Commission continued to ensure that six further capacity mechanisms
173
 in Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy and Poland - which concern more than half of EU population - are 
well-designed and meet the strict criteria under EU State aid rules, in particular the 
Commission's 2014 Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy.
174
 
Sustainability, Competitiveness and State aid 
Promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency increases the sustainability of the EU 
energy sector and contributes to environmental protection. In 2017 the Commission adopted 
22 decisions on new support schemes to renewable energy producers. Currently almost every 
Member State has an approved renewable energy support scheme. That ensures not only that 
Europe becomes greener, but also provides certainty for investors, who receive aid under a 
clear, transparent and equitable set of rules.  
A recently approved State aid scheme provides support to landlords in Germany175 who are 
willing to install solar panels on the roof of the rented buildings and sell this electricity to 
their tenants. The scheme is a new feature of the already approved EEG 2017
176
. It will allow 
new investments in a segment of the solar market that is currently under developed, and will 
tap on the potential of rented buildings for the production of renewable electricity.  
Ensuring that technology providers compete on equal grounds 
In 2017 the Commission authorised restructuring aid in form of a capital injection to the 
nuclear technology provider Areva
177
(Oreno) in exchange for commitments aimed at 
minimising competition distortions in the markets of nuclear fuel. For instance, Areva is not 
allowed to increase its production capacity of enriched nuclear fuel and acquire companies 
during the time of its restructuring.  
Merger control 
In the field of merger control, as in the previous years, a number of companies invested in 
                                                            
173 See IP/18/682 of 7 February 2018 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-682_en.htm.  
174 See IP/14/400 of 9 April 2014 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-400_en.htm.  
175 Case SA.48327 Support for PV installations on appartment buildings (Mieterstrom), Commission decision of 
20 November 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48327. 
176  Case SA. 45461 EEG 2017 Reform of the Renewable Energy Law, Commission decision of 20 December 
2016  available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_45461. For 
further information see IP/16/4471 of 20 December 2016 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-
4471_en.htm. 
177  Case SA. 44727 Restructuring aid to Areva, Commission decision of 10 January 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_44727. For further information 
see IP/17/36 of 10 January 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-36_en.htm. 
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development and production from renewable sources,178 in particular in wind parks.179 
In 2017 the Commission also analysed two acquisitions in the industry for the production of 
wind turbines: the acquisition of Gamesa by Siemens180 and of LM Wind by GE181. In both 
cases, the analysis carried out by the Commission revealed that competition in the industry 
will not be negatively affected and that developers and operators of wind parks will continue 
to have sufficient choice of wind turbines manufacturers and that prices will remain 
competitive. 
Following extensive review, the proposed acquisition of the Greek gas transmission system 
operator DESFA by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR)182 has been 
abandoned by the parties. The new tender issued by the Greek authorities included an 
unbundling requirement, addressing the concerns raised by the Commission when opening the 
in depth investigation. 
In 2017, the Commission analysed and authorised the acquisition of Areva's nuclear reactors 
business by EDF.183 The acquisition was part of the restructuring plan to restore Areva's 
competitiveness.  
The Commission also analysed the acquisition of Baker Hughes by GE184 in the oilfield 
services industry and concluded that it will not negatively affect competition in that industry. 
 2. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MEDIA  
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
In 2017, competition policy and enforcement continued to contribute to the implementation of 
the Digital Single Market Strategy
185
, one of the priorities of the Commission. In particular 
                                                            
178  Case M.8508 Engie/Cdc/Solairecorsica 1-2-3, Commission decision of 4 July 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8508; Case M.8413 
Engie/Omnes Capital/Predica/Engie Pv Besse/Engie Pv Sanguinet, Commission decision of 10 April 2017 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8413. 
179  Case M.8635 Sojitz/Kepco/Luricawne/Fixarra/Evalair/Plum, Commission decision of 25 October 2017 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8635; Case M.8608 
Engie/La Caisse Des Depots Et Consignations/Ceolfalram76, Commission decision of 18 October 2016 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8608; Case M.8595 
GE/Macquarie/Mett, Commission decision of 28 August 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8595; M.8592 
Centerbridge/Egph/JV, Commission decision of 4 September 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8592; M.8346 
Macquarie/Ussl/Osw Assets Of UK Gib, Commission decision of 22 May 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8346. 
180  Case M.8134 Siemens/Gamesa, Commission decision of 13 March 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8134. 
181  Case M.8283 GE/LM Wind Power Holding, Commission decision of 20 March 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8283. 
182  Case M.7095 SOCAR/DESFA, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7095. 
183 Case M.7764 EDF/Areva Reactor Business, Commission decision of 29 May 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7764. For further information see 
IP/17/1466 of 29 May 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1466_en.htm. 
184 Case M.8297 GE/Baker Hughes, Commission decision of 31 May 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8297. 
185 Communication of 6 May 2015 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy for 
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the Commission completed its sector inquiry into e-commerce and carried out a number of 
investigations in the information, communication and media sectors. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Completing the e-commerce sector inquiry 
On 10 May, the Commission adopted the final report
186
 on the e-commerce sector inquiry.
187
 
The objective of the sector inquiry was to gather market information in order to better 
understand the nature, prevalence and effects of barriers to online trade erected by companies, 
and to assess them in light of EU Competition rules.  
The report confirms that the growth of e-commerce over the last decade and, in particular, 
increased online price transparency and price competition, had a significant impact on 
companies’ distribution strategies and consumer behaviour.  
The final results of the e-commerce sector inquiry highlight the following major market trends: 
 a large proportion of manufacturers decided over the last ten years to sell their products directly to consumer 
through their own online retail shops, thereby competing increasingly with their distributors; 
 increased use of selective distribution systems, where the products can only be sold by pre-selected 
authorised sellers, allows manufacturers to better control their distribution networks, in particular in terms of 
the quality of distribution but also price;  
 increased use of contractual restrictions to better control product distribution - depending on the business 
model and strategy, such restrictions may take various forms, such as pricing restrictions (resale price 
maintenance), marketplace (platform) bans, restrictions on the use of price comparison tools and exclusion 
of pure online players from distribution networks. 
Some of these practices may be justified, for example in order to improve the quality of 
product distribution, others may unduly prevent consumers from benefiting of greater product 
choices and lower prices in e-commerce.  
With respect to digital content, the results of the sector inquiry confirm that the availability of 
licences from content copyright holders is essential for digital content providers and a key 
factor that determines the level of competition in the market. The report points to certain 
licensing practices which may make it more difficult for new online business models and 
services to emerge. Any assessment of such licensing practices under the EU competition 
rules has however to consider the characteristics of the content industry. One of the key 
findings of the sector inquiry is that almost 60% of digital content providers who participated 
in the inquiry have contractually agreed with right holders to "geo-block". Geo-blocking 
prevents consumers from purchasing consumer goods and accessing digital content online 
from other EU Member States.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Europe, COM(2015)192 final available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1447773803386&uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0192.  
186 Report of 10 May 2017 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Final report 
on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry (SWD(2017) 154 final), COM(2017) 229 final available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiry_final_report_en.pdf. 
187 For further information see sector inquiry website available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiries_e_commerce.html. 
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In light of the results of the e-commerce sector inquiry, the Commission is:  
 targeting enforcement of the EU competition rules at the most widespread business practices that have 
emerged or evolved as a result of the growth of e-commerce and that may negatively impact competition 
and cross-border trade and hence the functioning of a Digital Single Market; and  
 broadening the dialogue with national competition authorities within the European competition network on 
e-commerce-related enforcement to contribute to a consistent application of the EU competition rules as 
regards e-commerce-related business practices. 
Furthermore, the sector inquiry has prompted companies to review their commercial practices 
on their own initiative. This can help consumers to purchase products more easily cross-
border and benefit from lower prices and a wider choice of retailers.  
Addressing restrictions to cross-border and online sale of goods  
On 2 February, the Commission has launched three separate investigations to assess if certain 
online sales practices mandated by vertical agreement among companies prevent, in breach of 





 and hotel accommodation
190
 at competitive prices. 
With respect to consumer electronics, the Commission is investigating whether Asus, Denon 
& Marantz, Philips and Pioneer
191
 have breached EU competition rules by restricting the 
ability of online retailers to set their own prices for widely used consumer electronics 
products such as household appliances, notebooks and hi-fi products. The effect of these 
suspected price restrictions may be aggravated due to the use by many online retailers of 
pricing software that automatically adapts retail prices to those of leading competitors. As a 
result, the alleged behaviour may have had a broader impact on overall online prices for the 
respective consumer electronics products. 
Concerning video games, the Commission is investigating bilateral agreements concluded 
between Valve Corporation, owner of the Steam game distribution platform, and five PC 
video game publishers, Bandai Namco, Capcom, Focus Home, Koch Media and ZeniMax.
192
 
The investigation concerns geo-blocking practices, where companies prevent consumers from 
purchasing digital content, in this case PC video games, because of the consumer's location or 
country of residence. After the purchase of certain PC video games users need to confirm that 
their copy of the game is not pirated to be able to play it. This is done with an "activation key" 
on Valve's game distribution platform, Steam. This system is applied for a wide range of 
games, including sports, simulation and action games. The investigation focuses on whether 
the agreements in question require or have required the use of activation keys for the purpose 
                                                            
188 Cases AT.40465 Asus, AT.40469 Denon & Marantz, AT.40181 Philips and AT.40182 Pioneer. For further 
information see IP/17/201 of 2 February 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
201_en.htm. 
189 Cases AT.40413 Focus Home, AT.40414 Koch Media, AT.40420 ZeniMax, AT.40422 Bandai Namco, and 
AT.40424 Capcom. For further information see IP/17/201 of 2 February 2017 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-201_en.htm. 
190 Case AT.40308 Holiday pricing. For further information see IP/17/201 of 2 February 2017 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-201_en.htm. 
191 Cases AT.40465 Asus, AT.40469 Denon & Marantz, AT.40181 Philips and AT.40182 Pioneer. For further 
information see IP/17/201 of 2 February 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
201_en.htm. 
192 Cases AT.40413 Focus Home, AT.40414 Koch Media, AT.40420 ZeniMax, AT.40422 Bandai Namco and 
AT.40424 Capcom. For further information see IP/17/201 of 2 February 2017 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-201_en.htm. 
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of geo-blocking. In particular, an "activation key" can grant access to a purchased game only 
to consumers in a particular EU Member State (for example the Czech Republic or Poland). 
This may amount to a breach of EU competition rules by reducing cross-border competition 
as a result of restricting so-called "parallel trade" within the Single Market and preventing 
consumers from buying cheaper games that may be available in other Member States. 
On 6 June, the Commission has opened a formal antitrust investigation into the distribution 
agreements and practices of clothing manufacturer and retailer Guess
193
. The Commission 
investigates information indicating that Guess' distribution agreements may restrict authorised 
retailers from selling online to consumers or to retailers in other Member States. They may 
also restrict wholesalers from selling to retailers in other Member States. 
On 14 June, the Commission opened three formal antitrust investigations against Nike, Sanrio 
and Universal Studios
194
 respectively to investigate potential barriers to online and offline 
cross-border trade stemming from licensing practices implemented by the companies 
concerned. Nike, Sanrio and Universal Studios license the rights for some of the world's most 
well-known brands. Sports apparel manufacturer Nike is responsible for licensing of rights 
for, in particular, Fútbol Club Barcelona's merchandise. Sanrio is a licensor of rights for, in 
particular, Hello Kitty. Universal Studios is a licensor of rights for, in particular, the Minions 
and Despicable Me. The investigated merchandising products are of a varied nature (mugs, 
bags, clothing, shoes, toys, etc.), but all carry one or more logos or images from a licensor.  
The three investigations aim to ascertain whether certain licensing and distribution practices 
of these companies illegally restrict traders from selling licensed merchandise cross-border 
and online within the EEA.  
Defending innovation in the e-books market 
On 4 May, the Commission adopted a decision rendering legally binding a set of 
commitments offered by Amazon
195
 to increase competition in e-books distribution. In 
essence, the commitments ban Amazon from enforcing or putting in place any non-price and 
price-parity clauses in the whole of the EEA for a period of 5 years.  
The Amazon Case 
This e-book investigation had been opened on 11 June 2015 to examine whether Amazon may have abused its 
dominant position in the distribution of English and German language e-books to consumers in the EEA by 
imposing a number of parity provisions (so-called Most Favoured Nation or MFN clauses). These provisions 
required e-books publishers to notify Amazon of more favourable or alternative non-price and price terms and 
conditions they offer elsewhere and/or to make available to Amazon those more favourable or alternative terms 
and conditions.  
During its investigation, the Commission reached the preliminary conclusion that these MFNs were reducing 
publishers' incentives to support and invest in differentiated offers with Amazon's competitors. They also 
reduced Amazon's competitors' ability and incentives to develop and differentiate their offerings, thus deterring 
their entry and/or expansion. The binding commitments offered by Amazon and made legally binding apply for 
five years to all e-book distribution agreements in the EEA and cover the following points: 
                                                            
193 Case AT.40428 Guess. For further information see IP/17/1549 of 6 June 2017 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1549_en.htm. 
194 Case AT.40432 Licensed merchandise – Sanrio, Case AT.40433 Licensed merchandise Universal Studios, 
and Case AT.40436 Licensed merchandise – Nike. For further information see IP/17/1646 of 14 June 2017, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1646_en.htm.   
195 Case AT.40153 MFNs and related matters. For further information see IP/17/1223 of 4 May 2017 available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1223_en.htm.   
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 Amazon will not enforce clauses requiring publishers to offer Amazon (or inform it about) similar terms and 
conditions as those offered to Amazon's competitors; 
 Publishers whose e-book contracts with Amazon contain a clause linking discount possibilities for e-books 
to the retail price of a given e-book on a competing platform (so-called Discount Pool Provision) will be 
offered the possibility to terminate such contracts; and 
 Amazon will not include in any new e-book agreement any of the MFN clauses mentioned, including 
Discount Pool Provisions. 196 
A Monitoring Trustee is in charge of monitoring the application of the commitments throughout their duration. 
Third parties who have queries in relation to the Commitments may contact the Trustee as provided for in the 
Commission's Decision.197 
Ensuring pro-competitive telecoms framework  
One of the key actions under the second pillar of the Digital Single Market strategy is the 
review of the telecoms regulatory framework. On 14 September 2016 the Commission 
adopted three legislative proposals: a proposal for a Directive establishing the European 
Electronic Communications Code
198
, which recasts the existing directives, a proposal for a 
Regulation establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC)
199
, which enhances the role of BEREC and of national regulatory authorities and a 
proposal for a Regulation on the promotion of Internet connectivity in local communities and 
public spaces (WiFi4EU)
200
. They are accompanied by two Communications: Connectivity 
for a European Gigabit society: Laying the foundations for a competitive Digital Single 
Market
201
, which establishes a set of connectivity objectives for 2025, and 5G for Europe: An 
Action Plan
202
, which sets out targeted actions with the aim of fostering 5G deployment in 
Europe.  
The Commission proposals introduce a new connectivity (i.e. investment) objective as an 
additional policy objective, alongside the other objectives of the framework, namely 
safeguarding competition, internal market and consumer protection. Indeed, stimulating 
competition not only drives investments but also results in lower prices, better quality and 
                                                            
196 For further information see IP/17/1223 of 4 May 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
1223_en.htm.   
197 Case AT.40153 MFNs and related matters. For further information see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40153/40153_4447_3.pdf.  
198 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Electronic 
Communications Code, COM(2016) 590 final available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-590-EN-F1-1.PDF.  
199 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Body of European 
Regulators for Electronic Communications http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0591&from=EN.  
200 Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulations No 1316/2013 and No 283/2014 as regards the promotion of 
Internet connectivity in local communities http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0589&from=EN.  
201 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market - 
Towards a European Gigabit Society, COM(2016)587 and Staff Working Document SWD(2016)300 available 
at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-connectivity-competitive-digital-single-
market-towards-european-gigabit-society.   
202 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 5G for Europe: An Action Plan, COM(2016)588 and Staff 
Working Document SWD(2016) 306 available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/communication-5g-europe-action-plan-and-accompanying-staff-working-document .    
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more choice. At the same time, investment is not an end in itself, as investment as such does 
not directly benefit consumers. It is the impact of investment on parameters of competition 
such as lower prices, better quality of service or greater adoption that translates into consumer 
benefits. 
Operators with Significant Market Power (SMP) will continue to be obliged to provide access 
to their networks to other operators, where this is necessary for effective retail competition. 
De-regulation is possible only when competition is effective in a given telecoms market. The 
proposal contains new elements which aim at stimulating investments, while safeguarding 
effective competition. For example access to civil infrastructure is incentivized and a 
framework rewarding co-investment in very high capacity networks is set up, encouraging 
fibre deployments from both incumbents and access seekers.    
Communication services provided by Over-the-Top providers (OTTs) such as Skype and 
WhatsApp  would fall within the proposed scope of the new Electronic Communications 
Code under the new heading of interpersonal communications service. OTTs are typically 
present at different levels of the value chain, as telcos own network infrastructure and OTTs 
do not. Regarding spectrum, the Commission proposals contain measures to enhance 
investment certainty (a minimum licence duration of 25 years, timely availability of spectrum 
in the market and enhanced co-ordination of spectrum authorisation) and promote competition 
(such as a possibility to apply spectrum caps, spectrum reservation for new entrants or 
wholesale access obligations). The proposals also reinforce the role of national regulators and 
of BEREC, to ensure the consistent and predictable application of the telecoms rules. 
The legislative proposals are in their final stages of negotiations between the European 




The Commission Guidelines on Significant Market Power (SMP Guidelines)
204
 are also part 
of the telecoms framework. They were adopted in 2002 on the basis of Article 15(2) of the 
Framework Directive to provide guidance to national regulatory authorities for the analysis of 
markets and effective competition under the regulatory framework. After 15 years, there is a 
need to review the SMP Guidelines to bring more clarity, in particular, on the criteria for the 
finding of joint dominance, in accordance with the European Courts' jurisprudence. The 
Commission is working towards the adoption of new SMP Guidelines before the entry into 
force of the European Electronic Communications Code.
205
   
Antitrust enforcement in the telecoms sector 
In 2017 the Commission continued its investigation into a mobile network sharing agreement 
between the two largest operators in the Czech Republic, O2 CZ /CETIN and T-Mobile CZ.
206
 
The Commission investigates in particular whether the cooperation between O2 CZ/CETIN 
                                                            
203 For further information see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/10/11/new-eu-
telecoms-rules/.  
204 European Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under 
the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ C 165, 
11.7.2002, p.6. 
205 Additional information on the public consultation on the review of SMP Guidelines is available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-reports-public-consultation-smp-guidelines. The 
text of the new SMP Guidelines, adopted on 26 April 2018, is available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/communication-smp-guidelines. 
206 AT. 40305 - Network sharing - Czech Republic . For further information see IP/16/3539 of 25 October 2016 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3539_en.htm.  
 58 
and T-Mobile CZ risks slowing down quality improvements in existing infrastructure, and 
delaying or hindering the deployment of new technologies, such as 4G/LTE and future 
technologies, and new services based on them, in particular in densely populated areas.  
In the area of baseband chipsets, which process the core communication functions in 
smartphones, tablets and other mobile broadband devices, the Commission continued the 
investigations in the Qualcomm cases
207
 as regards Qualcomm's payments to a major 
customer conditional on exclusivity and potential "predatory pricing" by charging prices 
below costs with a view to forcing Qualcomm's competition out of the market.  
Antitrust enforcement in technology markets 
The Commission's actions in technology markets aim to keep markets competitive, and 
maximise incentives to innovate.  
On 27 June, the Commission fined Google EUR 2.42 billion for breaching EU antitrust 
rules.
208
 The Commission found that Google has abused its market dominance as a search 
engine by giving an illegal advantage to another Google product, its comparison shopping 
service. 
The Google case 
In its decision, the Commission concluded that Google is dominant in general internet search markets throughout 
the EEA. The Commission based its finding on the fact that Google's search engine has held very high market 
shares in all EEA countries, exceeding 90% in most, and on the presence of high barriers to entry in these 
markets, in part because of network effects: the more consumers use a search engine, the more attractive it 
becomes to advertisers. 
The Commission found that Google abused its market dominance by giving its own comparison shopping 
service an illegal advantage, notably through the more favourable positioning and display, in its general search 
results pages, of its own comparison shopping service compared to competing comparison shopping services. As 
such, Google leveraged its dominant position in the market for general search into the adjacent market for 
comparison shopping. Google's service is positioned prominently and not subject to dedicated algorithms that 
make competing comparison shopping services prone to having their ranking reduced, thus affecting their 
visibility in Google's general search pages. Furthermore, Google’s own comparison shopping service is 
displayed with enhanced features (e.g. product pictures) at or near the top of the first general search page, while 
such features are not available to its rivals.  
The Google decision is based on a detailed effects-based analysis:  
First, to show that Google's conduct diverts traffic from competing comparison shopping services, the decision 
analyses the influence of visibility of generic search results on user behaviour and the actual evolution of traffic 
to competing comparison shopping services and to Google's own comparison shopping service (short-term 
impact on click-through rates, visibility data and long-term evolution of traffic).  
 
                                                            
207 AT. 39711 Qualcomm (predation) and AT.40220 Qualcomm (exclusivity payments). Statements of 
Objections were sent to the company on 8 December 2015. For further information see IP/16/6271 of 8 
December 2015, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6271_en.htm. On 24 January 2018, the 
Commission adopted a prohibition decision in case AT.40220 Qualcomm (exclusivity payments) and fined 
Qualcomm EUR 997 million for abusing its market dominance in LTE baseband chipsets. For further 
information see IP/18/421 of 24 January 2018, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-
421_en.htm. 
208 Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping), Commission decision of 27 June 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf. For further information see 
IP/17/1784 of 27 June 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm and 
MEMO/17/1785 of 27 June 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1785_en.htm. 
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Second, the decision shows that generic search traffic from Google's general search results pages represents a 
large proportion of competing comparison shopping services' traffic and cannot be replaced effectively through 
alternative sources of traffic, such as AdWords, mobile applications and direct traffic.  
Third, the decision shows that Google's conduct had a number of potential anti-competitive effects: (i) 
foreclosure of competing comparison shopping services, which may lead to higher fees for merchants, higher 
prices for consumers, and less innovation; (ii) likelihood to reduce the ability of consumers to access the most 
relevant comparison shopping services.  
Google's conduct would also have potential anti-competitive effects even if comparison shopping services did 
not constitute a distinct relevant product market, but rather a segment of a possible broader relevant product 
market comprising both comparison shopping services and merchant platforms. 
The Commission concluded that Google's behaviour stifled competition on the merits in comparison shopping 
markets and ordered Google to bring the abuse to an end within 90 days of the decision and to refrain from any 
measure that has the same or an equivalent object or effect. In particular, the Decision orders Google to comply 
with the simple principle of giving equal treatment to rival comparison shopping services and its own service, 
meaning that Google has to apply the same processes and methods to position and display rival comparison 
shopping services in Google's search results pages as it gives to its own comparison shopping service. 
It is Google's sole responsibility to ensure compliance, and the Commission is monitoring Google's compliance 
closely. 
Antitrust enforcement in sports market 
On 8 December, the Commission decided that the International Skating Union's (ISU) rules 
imposing severe penalties on athletes participating in speed skating competitions that were not 
authorised by the ISU were in breach of EU antitrust law.
209
 
The ISU case 
In October 2015 following a complaint by two Dutch professional speed skaters the Commission opened formal 
proceedings into ISU's rules under which athletes would face severe penalties for participation in unauthorised 
speed skating events. 210 The ISU, made up of national ice-skating associations, is the sole body recognised by 
the International Olympic Committee to administer the sports of figure skating and speed skating on ice. The 
ISU and its members organise and generate revenues from speed skating competitions, including from major 
international competitions such as the Winter Olympic Games and the World and European championships. 
The Commission's investigation found that under the ISU eligibility rules, in place since 1998, speed skaters 
participating in competitions that were not approved by the ISU faced severe penalties up to a lifetime ban from 
all major international speed skating events. The ISU could impose these penalties at its own discretion, even if 
the independent competitions posed no risk to legitimate sports objectives, such as the protection of the integrity 
and proper conduct of sport, or the health and safety of athletes. By imposing such restrictions, the ISU 
eligibility rules restricted competition and enabled the ISU to pursue its own commercial interests to the 
detriment of athletes and organisers of competing events. In particular, the Commission considered that the ISU 
eligibility rules restricted the commercial freedom of athletes who were prevented from participating in 
independent skating events. As a result of the ISU eligibility rules, athletes were not allowed to offer their 
services to organisers of competing skating events and could be deprived of additional sources of income during 
their relatively short speed skating careers. The ISU eligibility rules made it more difficult for independent 
organisers from putting together their own speed skating competitions because they were unable to attract top 
athletes. This has limited the development of alternative and innovative speed skating competitions. 
  
                                                            
209 Case AT.40208 International Skating Union’s Eligibility rules. For further information see IP/17/5184 of 8 
December 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5184_en.htm. 
210 Case AT.40208 International Skating Union’s Eligibility rules available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_40208.   
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The ISU introduced certain changes to its eligibility rules in June 2016. The Commission, however, found that 
the 2016 rules still did not allow for equality of opportunity for third party organisers and that the penalties set 
by the eligibility rules remained disproportionately punitive. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the ISU 
 eligibility rules were anticompetitive and had breached Article 101 TFEU since 1998. 
Merger review in ICT and media  
In the telecommunications sector, the Commission cleared in July the creation of a joint 
venture that will provide mobile payment services to businesses and consumers in 
Lithuania.
211 
The parents of the JV, Bitė, Tele2 and Telia are all retail mobile 
telecommunications services providers, while Telia also provides colocation services, hosting 
other companies' servers in its data centers. The Commission approved the transaction since it 
raised no competition concerns on the nascent market for mobile payment services in 
Lithuania and there was no risk that the joint venture's parents would shut out rivals, which 
have alternative means to securely store information and to authenticate users. 
In the IT sector, the Commission conditionally approved in April the acquisition of smart card 
maker Morpho by Advent International
212,
 a private equity firm already controlling smart card 
and digital security provider Oberthur. Smart cards are widely used in the banking sector 
(payment cards), in the telecommunications sector (SIM cards) and in the identity document 
sector (e-passports, e-ID cards, e-health cards). The Commission was concerned that the 
proposed transaction would have significantly reduced competition for payment smart cards 
in France, a particularly difficult market for suppliers to enter. To address these concerns, 
Morpho offered to divest its French subsidiary CPS and ultimately the Commission cleared 
the transaction. 
In May, the Commission cleared the acquisition of networking products supplier Brocade by 
semiconductor manufacturer Broadcom, subject to conditions.
213
 The Commission had 
concerns that confidential information from competitors could be used by the merged entity to 
favour its own products in markets for Fibre Channel Storage Area Network products. In 
addition, there was a risk that the merged entity could degrade the interoperability between its 
own Fibre Channel switches and the Host Bus Adaptor (HBA) cards of competing vendors to 
favour its own HBA cards. The transaction was cleared subject to remedies which ensure that 
Broadcom will cooperate closely and in a timely manner with competing HBA cards suppliers 
to achieve the same level of interoperability as that of its own HBA cards and that it will 
protect third party confidential information. 
In January 2018, the Commission cleared, subject to conditions, the proposed acquisition of 
NXP by Qualcomm, two of the leading players in the semiconductor industry.
214
 In June 2017, 
the Commission had opened an in-depth investigation based on concerns that the merger 
could lead to higher prices, less choice and reduced innovation in chipset products used in 
mobile devices, such as smartphones. The Commission also had concerns that the 
combination of the two companies' IP Portfolio related to Near Field Communication (NFC) 
chips would enable the merged entity to disproportionately improve its bargaining power and 
                                                            
211 Case M.8251 Bitė/Tele2/Telia Lietuva/JV, Commission decision of 19 July 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8251.  
212 Case M.8258 Advent International/Morpho, Commission decision of 19 April 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8258. 
213 Case M.8314 Broadcom/Brocade, Commission decision of 12 May 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8314. 
214 Case M.8306 Qualcomm/NXP Semiconductors, Commission decision of 18 January 2018, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8306.  
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allow it to charge significantly higher royalties for the NFC patents  than the Parties charge 
currently for the same patents. Ultimately, the Commission considered that the IP 
commitments, the product-related commitments and the MIFARE
215
 commitments proposed 
by Qualcomm (interoperability between third party products and the parties' baseband 
chipsets and NFC products, third party access to NXP's MIFARE technology and carve-out 
and licensing and non-assert obligations in relation to the NXP's NFC portfolio) fully 
addressed its concerns and cleared the transaction.   
In the media sector, in April the Commission cleared 21st Century Fox's (Fox) proposed 
acquisition of Sky
216
, the leading pay-tv operator in Austria, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the 
United Kingdom. Fox is a diversified global media company and one of the six major 
Hollywood film studios (20th Century Fox), as well as a TV channel operator (Fox, National 
Geographic). The Commission found that the transaction would lead to only a limited 
increase in Sky's existing share of the markets for the acquisition of TV content as well as in 
the market for the wholesale supply of TV channels in the relevant Member States. 
The Commission approved the acquisition of Telecom Italia by Vivendi, subject to conditions, 
in May.
217
 Telecom Italia provides voice and data services through mobile and fixed 
technologies, digital content services and IT services to enterprises in Italy. Vivendi is active 
in the music, TV, cinema, video sharing and games businesses and advertising. Both Telecom 
Italia and Vivendi also hold a significant share, through their respective shareholdings in 
Persidera and Mediaset, in the market for the wholesale access to digital terrestrial networks 
for the broadcast of TV channels. The Commission was concerned that Vivendi would raise 
prices charged to TV channels in that market as other players did not constitute a viable 
alternative for TV channels, making it more expensive for them to reach audiences in Italy. 
The Commission ultimately cleared the transaction subject to the divestment of Telecom 
Italia's stake in Persidera. 
State aid enforcement in ICT and media 
The achievement of the European broadband targets218, despite substantial progress, 
                                                            
215 MIFARE is NXP's proprietary technology used mainly for public transit and hospitality. 
216 Case M.8354 Fox/Sky, Commission decision of 7 April 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8354.   
217 Case M.8465 Vivendi/Telecom Italia, Commission decision of 30 May 2017, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8465.   
218 In its Communication "Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market - Towards a European Gigabit 
Society" of 14 September 2016 (COM/2016/587, available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/communication-connectivity-competitive-digital-single-market-towards-european-gigabit-
society), the Commission confirmed the importance of Internet connectivity for the Digital Single Market and, 
building on the Digital Agenda for Europe goals for 2020, set out a strategy for a European Gigabit society 
operationalised through three strategic objectives for 2025: 
- Gigabit connectivity for all main socio-economic drivers such as schools, transport hubs and main providers of 
public services as well as digitally intensive enterprises.  
- All urban areas and all major terrestrial transport paths to have uninterrupted 5G coverage.  
- All European households, rural or urban, will have access to Internet connectivity offering a downlink of at 
least 100 Mbps, upgradable to Gigabit speed.   
As indicated in the Communication, the Commission will reflect the foreseeable evolution of long-term demand 
when applying the "step change" approach of the Broadband State Aid Guidelines in conjunction with the 
strategic objectives set in this Communication, and will consider favourably efficient blended financing that 
contributes to lower the aid intensity and to reduce risks of distorting competition, as part of its assessment of 
State aid interventions. 
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represents a significant challenge, in particular for the deployment of ultrafast networks219. 
Reaching the Digital Single Market connectivity objectives for 2020 and 2025 is estimated to 
require an overall investment of around EUR 500 billion over the coming decade, 
representing an additional EUR 155 billion over and above a simple continuation of the trend 
of current network investment and modernisation efforts of the connectivity providers220.  
Most of the financing for the upgrade and deployment of next-generation networks in the 
broadband sector comes from private companies. Private companies tend to invest mostly in 
urban, highly populated areas which can assure rapid return on investment. As a result, in 
certain areas - in particular rural - public funds support the deployment of broadband 
networks, within the broader objectives of inclusion and economic development. State aid 
control seeks to ensure that where a market failure arises and publicly funded networks are 
needed, these do not crowd out private investments.  
Pro-competitive principles for public funding to support the deployment of broadband networks 
Where Member States provide funding or have discretion in the spending of European funds, a number of pro-
competitive principles apply, based on the State aid rules: 
i) Public support must be based on an identified need of investment, based on appropriate mapping and 
market consultation, to avoid a crowding out of private initiatives (defining the market failure); 
ii) different technologies should be allowed to bid for the objective connectivity targets set;  
iii) a competitive selection process has to take place to ensure the best offer for the best price and;  
iv) to avoid a 'subsidy to monopoly', publicly funded projects have to be open to all users at fair, reasonable 
and appropriate.  
These principles are also embedded in the General Block Exemption Regulation221 (GBER) which is intended 
particularly for underserved areas and allows Member States to deploy broadband networks without State aid 
notification. In assessing notified measures, Member States and selected operators must fulfil a number of 
conditions as specified in the Broadband State Aid Guidelines222. 
All Member States have adopted and/or updated their national and/or regional broadband 
strategies
223
. As proposed in the Commission Communication of 14 September 2016
224
, 
                                                            
219 According to Europe’s digital progress report 2017, available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/europes-digital-progress-report-2017, Next Generation Access (NGA) networks coverage 
continues to improve. At the end of 2016, NGA networks were available to 76 % of EU homes. Despite a 
persistent gap with urban areas, NGA networks rollout is catching up in rural areas, covering 40% of homes in 
2016 compared with just 30% a year before.  
220 Based on the study by Analysys Mason "Costing the new potential connectivity needs" (SMART 2015/0068, 
available at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e81ae17f-9d27-4b68-8560-
7cd45dbe21d8) and the Commission's estimates.  
221 The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) frees categories of State aid, deemed to bring benefits to 
society, that outweigh the possible distortions of competition in the Single Market triggered by public funding 
from the requirement of prior notification to the Commission. Consequently, Member States may implement 
measures which fulfil the condition of the GBER without prior scrutiny by the Commission. 
222 Communication from the Commission, EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the 
rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ C 25, 26.1.2013, p.1; available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:025:0001:0026:EN:PDF.   
223 Even though a few Member States do not yet have a single document that can be regarded as a national 
broadband plan, all of them have at least an overall strategic approach for the deployment of next generation 
access networks that is implemented in practice.  
224 Commission Communication COM/2016/587 "Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market - 
Towards a European Gigabit Society" of 14 September 2016, available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
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Member States have initiated a process to adapt their National Boadband Strategies to the new 
2025 connectivity strategic objectives proposed by the Commission. Extensive national and 











. Some Member 
States completed or modified former broadband schemes with additional investment in the 
roll out of Next Generation Access networks. For instance, Austria supported the roll out of a 
passive broadband infrastructure in rural areas of Lower Austria operated by an operator 
selected trhough a tender to provide only wholesale services. During the period 2009-2017, 
the Commission approved State aid for broadband amounting to EUR 38 billion. The Member 
states effectively spent 30% of this amount, often with a co-financing from European funds
230
 
amounting to roughly EUR 3 billion. During the same period, ber States adopted 85 
broadband State aid measures benefitting from the GBER.  
During the period 2009-2017, the Commission approved State aid for broadband amouting to 
EUR 38 billion. Despite the approval of this amount of State aid by the Commission, the 
Member States only effectively spent around 30% of this amount, often with a co-financing 
from European funds
231
 amounting to around EUR 3 billion. During the same period, Member 
States adopted 85 broadband State aid measures benefitting from the GBER.  
In the media and broadcasting markets State aid support measures may also be justified to 
overcome market failures and fulfil public service missions. In this area, the Commission 
relies on the guidance of the Cinema Communication
232
 and the Broadcasting 
Communication
233
 to ensure that support is well-designed in order to meet the underlying 
objectives of common interest while limiting negative effects on competition. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
market/en/news/communication-connectivity-competitive-digital-single-market-towards-european-gigabit-
society. 
225 State aid case SA.46372 - Lithuania - NGA broadband deployment in rural areas of Lithuania (PRIP 2), 
Commission decision of 4 July 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46372. 
226 State aid case SA.41065 - Croatia - National Programme for broadband aggregation infrastructure, 
Commission decision of 6 June 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_41065. For further information 
see IP/17/1545 of 6 June 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1545_en.htm. 
227 State aid case SA.46731 – Austria – Aid to fast broadband infrastructure in rural areas in Niederösterreich, 
Commission decision of 3 April 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46731.  
228 State aid case SA.46805 – Germany – Follow up German NGA/Vula product, Commission decision of 11 
August 2017 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46805. 
For further information see IP/17/2502 of 11 August 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
17-2502_en.htm.  
229 State aid case SA.46203 – Poland – Modifications in the aid scheme the Broadband network project in 
Eastern Poland, Commission decision of 21 December 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46203. Further information 
available under http://europa.eu/rapid/midday-express-21-12-2017.htm. 
230 See State aide case SA.46805 – Germany – Follow up German NGA/Vula product. For further information 
see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46805.  
231 European funds mostly used by Member States for the financing of their broadband programmes are the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and to a less 
extent the Cohesion Fund.  
232 Communication from the Commission on State aid for films and other audio-visual works (2013/C 332/01), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:332:0001:0011:EN:PDF. 
233 Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting, OJ 
C 257 of 27.10.2009, p.1 to 14, available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC1027(01)&from=EN.  
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 to favour the development and the promotion of educational and culturally 
valuable video games which would have not subsisted under normal market conditions.  
  3. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Overview of the key challenges in the sector 
Financial services provide the lifeblood of the European economy. Banks, payment operators, 
insurance companies, stock exchanges and trading platforms and other financial infrastructure 
providers are crucial for economic growth. Free and equal access to financial services is key 
because it empowers citizens and business alike to participate in and benefit from economic 
opportunities. This is why the Commission is committed to equip the EU with a strong and 
effective Banking Union and Capital Markets Union to which competition policy provides 
decisive contributions. 
While the new institutions in charge of supervision and resolution of banks
236
 have assumed 
their responsibilities under the new Banking Union framework, competition policy continues 
to play an important role to ensure that financial markets remain competitive. 2017 has shown 
good examples of close cooperation with the new supervisory and resolution authorities as 
well as very effective collaboration across instruments. While State aid rules ensure that 
public money is not used to keep non-viable banks artificially alive, merger rules ensure that 
the takeover of assets or full institutions as part of a recovery scheme do not result in less 
competition which would harm citizens and businesses that depend on competitive services 
provided by banks. Competition enforcement by the Commission has played an important 
role in restructuring the sector for financial services across the single market. 
The importance of well-functioning financial markets that are based on fair competition and 
enable equal access to finances is not restricted to banks. The whole economy benefits when 
businesses can raise money also on competitive financial markets for which exchange 
operators create the necessary infrastructure. Because the proposed merger between Deutsche 
Börse and London Stock Exchange
237
 would have significantly reduced competition by 
creating a de facto monopoly in the crucial area of clearing of fixed income instruments, and 
no sufficient remedies were offered, it had to be prohibited by the Commission in March 
2017. 
From an antitrust perspective, the Commission also continues to closely monitor regulatory 
developments on EU capital markets to ensure that new rules are implemented in a 
procompetitive way. The same is true for payment systems, an area that is undergoing rapid 
technological change and where competition policy plays a crucial role to ensure that new as 
well as existing technology is applied to the benefit of the consumer. The Commission is 
actively enforcing competition rules in this sector along with regulatory action, in particular 
                                                            
234 State aid cases SA.46572 – Germany - Bavarian games support measure, Commission decision of  
4 September 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=3.  
235 Case SA.45735 – Denmark - Scheme for the development, production and promotion of cultural and 
educational digital games, Commission decision of 12 May 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=3.  
236 In particular the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM),and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). 
237 Case M.7995 Deutsche Börse/London Stock Exchange available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result. 
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the implementation of the Interchange Fee Regulation
238
 and the new Payment Services 
Directive
239
. Last but not least, close monitoring has been taking place in the insurance sector, 
notably retail insurance, to make sure that citizens are not disadvantaged by anticompetitive 
practices. 
As in previous years, the Commission has been very active in the financial services sector to 
promote effective and undistorted competition. It continued its role in State aid and merger 
control as well as in antitrust enforcement to combat anticompetitive behaviour and empower 
citizens and businesses. In 2017 it has been able to show significant progress in all three areas 
by ensuring that the Singel market for financial services remains competitive for the benefit of 
all. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges  
Contribution of EU competition policy to innovation and fairness in payments 
The Commission continues to monitor the implementation of the Interchange Fee 
Regulation
240
 (IFR). On 4 October, the Commission adopted the Regulatory Technical 
Standards
241
 (RTS) under the Interchange Fee Regulation, which establish the requirements 
for payment card schemes and processing entities to ensure independence in terms of 
accounting, organisation and decision making processes. The RTS gives guidance for 
implementation of the IFR requirement on independence of card schemes and processing 
entities. The requirement on independence aims at making the processing of card payments 
more competitive by allowing banks and retailers to choose processors for their card-based 
payment transactions.  
In most Member States credit cards are the main means of internet payment. But card 
payments over the internet can be cumbersome, expensive to merchants and insecure with 
high levels of fraud
242
. Moreover, only 60 % of EU citizens possess such cards. The Payment 
Services Directive
243
 (PSD II) takes account of and regulates third-party players (bank-owned 
and non-bank owned) who offer alternative means of internet payments (e.g. through credit 
transfers via the consumer's bank's website, including most importantly the Single Euro 
                                                            
238 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 2015/751 of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for 
card-based payment transactions, OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p.1 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_. 
239 European Parliament and Council Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015 on payment services in 
the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35 available at 
://ec.europa.eu/finance/payments/framework/index_en.htm#151008.  
240 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 2015/751 of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for 
card-based payment transactions, OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p.1 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32015R0751. 
241 Commission delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/72 of 4 October 2017 supplementing Regulation (EU) 
2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council on interchange fees for card-based payment 
transactions with regard to regulatory technical standards establishing the requirements to be complied with by 
payment card schemes and processing entities to ensure the application of independence requirements in terms of 
accounting, organisation and decision-making process, OJ L13, 18.1. 2018, p. 1 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2018:013:TOC.  
242 Estimated by the European Central Bank (ECB) to represent about two-thirds of total card fraud in the EU 
worth EUR 800 million in 2014. 
243 European Parliament and Council Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015 on payment services in 
the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/payments/framework/index_en.htm#151008. 
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Payment Area (SEPA) Credit Transfer system) or allow consumers to have a global view on 
their financial situation and spending patterns across all their bank accounts.  
Implementation of the IFR and PSD II opens the door for more competition and innovation in 
the payments sector, to the benefit of consumers and merchants.  
Antitrust and cartel investigations in the financial services sector 
In 2017, the Commission continued its antitrust investigations in the financial sector, one of 
the Commission's priority areas to achieve a fairer and more integrated internal market. The 
Commission also continued to monitore the competition in the capital markets, in particular it 
focussed on the markets for equity data and equity trading where high fees/prices persist. In 
the field of motor insurance, the Commission carried out inspections in July 2017 in view of 
allegations of breaches of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in the market of Ireland.  
In 2017, the Commission continued its antitrust investigations into MasterCard's, Visa Inc.'s 
and Visa International's
244
 multilateral interchange fees ("MIFs") for transactions in the EEA 
made with cards issued outside the EEA ("inter-regional transactions"). Inter-regional MIFs 
are not capped by the Interchange Fee Regulation. Those fees still represent a significant 
burden to European merchants and increase retail prices for all consumers. The Commission 
has also continued the investigation into MasterCard's rules with respect to cross-border 
acquiring, which allegedly have prevented merchants in countries with high interchange fees 
for acquiring services to seek lower priced services from acquirers established in other 
Member States. The Comission issued a Supplementary Statement of Objections to Visa Inc 
and Visa International on inter-regional MIFs in August
245
. In the MasterCard case the 
Statement of Objections was issued in July 2015
246
, and an oral hearing was held in May 
2016.  
As technology allows new services to emerge, such as electronic and mobile payments, with 
significant potential benefits for consumers and businesses notably in the Digital Single 
Market, the Commission has continued to monitor developments in the new payments 
services and in October it carried out inspections investigating allegations that online access 
to bank account information by competing non-bank owned service providers may be 
prevented in order to exclude such service providers from the market.
247
 It is important to 
ensure that new and innovative services have a fair chance to develop and that incumbents do 
not exclude new market entrants or attempt to secure substantive parts of markets for 
themselves. 
Merger investigations in the financial sector 
The Commission continued to ensure that concentrations in the financial services sector do 
not lead to consumers paying higher prices or being offered less choice. 2017 did not show a 
major consolidation trend but several important cases where reviewed. 
                                                            
244 These proceedings were closed as regards Visa Europe following its commitments, Case AT.39398 VISA MIF, 
Commission decision of 26 February 2014 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39398/39398_9728_3.pdf. 
245 Case AT.39398 Visa MIF. For further information see European Commission daily news of 3 August 2017 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-17-2341_en.htm. 
246 Case AT.40049 MasterCard II. For further information see IP/15/5323 of 9 July 2015 available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5323_en.htm. 
247 For further information see MEMO/17/3761 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-
3761_en.htm.   
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In March, the Commission prohibited the merger between Deutsche Börse and London Stock 
Exchange
248
 because the merger would have led to a de facto monopoly in clearing of fixed 
income instruments (bonds and repurchase agreements) in Europe. This monopoly in clearing 
fixed income instruments would also have had a knock-on effect on the downstream markets 
for settlement, custody and collateral management. The remedies proposed by the parties 
were not sufficient to solve the competition concerns as was revealed in the market test so that 
the Commission could not clear the transaction. 
In June, the Commission conditionally approved the acquisition of Intrum Justitia active in 
credit management services by Nordic Capital.
249
 The decision is conditional on the 
divestment of the companies' overlapping debt collection and debt purchasing activities in 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The remedies imposed by the Commission 
ensure that competition in the relevant markets is not affected because it will lead to a new 
competitor entering the market for the benefit of customers and businesses active in the 
relevant areas. 
In addition, several smaller cases were cleared in the banking and insurance sector that did not 
negatively impact competition. This included the acquisition of Banco Popular by Banco 
Santander
250
 in Spain and the acquisition of Novo Banco of Portugal by Lone Star Funds
251 
which both showed the well-functioning cooperation of the EU bank recovery procedures, 
state aid rules and merger review processes to ensure that the orderly restructuring of the 
banking sector does not impede effective competition for the benefit of customers and 
businesses in Europe. 
State aid investigations in the financial sector 
In 2017, the Directorate-General for Competition continued exercising State aid control in the 
financial sector, within the framework of the Banking Union. While the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive ("BRRD")
252
 is fully in force since 2016, its application does not 
prejudge the application of State aid rules.  
Since the 2013 Banking Communication
253
, the application of State aid rules for the financial 
sector has been resting on three pillars: (1) Restoring long-term viability of aided financial 
institutions or orderly market exit otherwise, (2) burden sharing by shareholders and 
subordinated creditors in the cost of ailing banks, (3) Minimisation of distortions of 
competition from the aid. 
In this vein, the rules make a basic distinction between ailing banks for which a return to 
viability can be demonstrated and non-viable banks. The most distortive type of support, 
especially at a time where banks are overall carrying out deep adjustments to reduce 
overcapacities, is keeping artificially alive banks with a business that is not viable anymore in 
the new economic, technological and regulatory environment. Under State aid rules, banks are 
required to present a restructuring plan that demonstrates the return to viability in the long 
                                                            
248 For more details see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7995. 
249 For more details see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8287. 
250 For more details see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8553. 
251 For more details see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8487.    
252 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Pariament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059. 
253 Communication from the Commission on the Application of State aid rules to support measures in favour of 
banks in the context of the financial crisis (Banking Communication), OJ C 216, 30.7.2013, p.1 available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013XC0730%2801%29&from=EN .  
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term, otherwise they need to exit the market in an orderly manner. Last but not least, State aid 
rules ensure that the cost to taxpayers is reduced by burden sharing from shareholders and 
holders of subordinated debt. 
In  2017 a series of decisions were adopted – both, related to some “legacy” cases preceding 
the entry into force of the BRRD, but also some cases where the interaction of State aid rules 
with the BRRD was tested.  
In April and June, the Commission approved the sale of the four Italian bridge banks, which 
were created by the Italian Resolution Authority in 2015 in the resolution of Banca Marche, 
Banca Etruria, Carichieti and Carife, to Unione di Banche Italiane (UBI Banca) and BPER 
Banca, respectively.
254
 All bridge banks will be fully integrated into the respective acquirer's 
operations, so as to turn around their loss-making operations to viability. This will also avoid 
undue distortions of competition.  
In June, the Commission approved State support by Italy to facilitate the liquidation of Banca 
Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca under national insolvency law following the European 
Central Bank declaration that the banks were failing or likely to fail and the Single Resolution 
Board decision that resolution action was not in the public interest.
255
 These non-viable banks 
were not artificially kept alive but exited the market. At the same time, State aid has 
cushioned repercussions on the real economy, in particular of the regions in which these 
banks mainly operated. The aid granted facilitated the transfer of some activities of the 
liquidated banks, with full integration and downsizing by the acquiring bank. Nonetheless, the 
aid was limited under State aid rules by full burden sharing from shareholders and 
subordinated creditors.  
In July, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena
256
 (MPS) was recapitalised by the Italian 
government. To ensure MPS's long-term viability, the bank will re-focus its business model 
and move more than €26 billion in non-performing loans off its balance sheet. As the bank 
met the conditions for compatible aid qualifying as “precautionary recapitalisation” under the 
BRRD (i.e. the recapitalisation is of temporary nature, injected into a solvent institution and is 
not used to offset losses the institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future), this 
capital injection could only be approved after junior bondholders and shareholders have 
contributed to the costs of restructuring, in line with "burden-sharing" requirements under the 
State aid rules. 
In October, the Commission approved Portuguese aid in the context of the sale of Novo 
Banco
257
, the bridge bank that Portugal had created in 2014 in the resolution of Banco 
Espirito Santo (BES), prior to the entry into force of the BRRD. The aid approval was based 
on the viability of the sold entity ensured through a plan proposed by the buyer, which also 
                                                            
254 Case SA.41925 – Italy, Commission decision of 29 june 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_41925. And State aid cases 
SA.39543, SA. 41134, SA. 43547  – Italy, Commission decision of 30 April 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_39543. 
255 Case SA.45664 – Italy, Commission decision of 25 June 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_45664. For further information 
see IP/17/1791 of 25 June 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1791_en.htm.  
256 Case SA.47677 – Italy, Commission decision Commission decision of 4 July 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47677. For further information 
see IP/17/1905 of 4 July 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1905_en.htm. 
257 State aid case SA.49275 – Portugal, Commission decision of 11 October 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_49275. For further information 
see IP/17/3865 of 11 October 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3865_en.htm. 
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contained measures to limit distortions of competition.  
Finally, there have been cases where the Member State intervened in a market-conform 
manner and where the Commission found that such measure therefore did not constitute aid. 
In March 2017 Caixa Geral de Depósitos
258
 (CGD) was recapitalised by the Portuguese 
government on market investor terms. The industrial plan running until end-2020 presented 
by Portugal foresees a structural transformation of CGD and should enable the bank return to 
profitability in 2018.  
In September, the Commission approved the prolongation of the Italian guarantee scheme to 
facilitate the securitisation of non-performing loans
259
 (GACS), initially approved in 
February 2016. Under the scheme, Italian banks, meeting certain conditions, will continue to 
be able to request a State guarantee on the lower-risk senior notes issued by private 
securitisation vehicles which help to finance the purchase of non-performing loan portfolios 
from them. The GACS mechanism is set up such to ensure that State guarantees on the senior 
notes will be remunerated at market terms according to the risk taken, i.e. in a manner 
acceptable for a private operator under market conditions. 
In all these cases State aid control has been important to make sure that public support is kept 
to the necessary minimum and that adequate measures are taken to ensure return to viability 
and minimise distortions of competition, to preserve equality of treatment among Member 
States and to maintain the integrity of the internal market. Fair competition in the banking 
sector means that banks with sound business models, lending practices and cost-efficient 
structures can indeed play their role in supporting jobs and growth in the economy and put 
their customers' funds into viable projects.    
4. TAXATION AND STATE AID 
Overview of key challenges on tax evasion and avoidance and fiscal aid 
The focus the Commission has put on fighting tax evasion and tax avoidance echoes the 
priorities set by President Juncker in his Political Guidelines and which are also reflected in 
his Mission Letter to Commissioner Vestager. That is also in line with efforts at the 
international level, namely by the OECD, to tackle tax base erosion and profit shifting to 
better align the right to tax with economic activity
260
. State aid investigations into Member 
States' tax ruling practices, which began in 2013, before the Luxleaks revelations, are one of 
the tools the Commission has at its disposal to ensure that companies pay the taxes they owe 
in the Member States where they generate economic value. 
Tax evasion and avoidance can be the result of aggressive tax planning strategies, in so far as 
they shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity, 
resulting in little or no overall corporate tax being paid. Aggressive tax planning can be 
pursued by making use of preferential tax schemes, or by requesting individual tax rulings. 
They all have in common that they result in a loss of tax revenue in the Member State where 
economic value is generated but not taxed, and in Europe as a whole because the tax 
eventually paid is less than it would have been if the profits had not been shifted. 
                                                            
258 State aid case SA.47178 – Italy, Commission decision of 10 March 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47178. For further information 
see IP/17/556 of 10.03.2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-556_en.htm. 
259 Case SA.48416 – Italy, Commission decision of 6 September 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48416.  
260 OECD (2013) Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
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The side effects of aggressive tax planning for the EU are particularly negative: first, it results 
in undue tax reliefs that distort competition by granting advantages only to selected 
companies; second, it involves an issue of social equity as the revenues foregone from 
untaxed multinationals need to be compensated, which normally shifts the burden to the less 
mobile income of SMEs and labour and third, from the perspective of the dislocation of 
activities, aggressive tax planning can present a threat to the sustainable growth of the internal 
market if some Member States were to offer exit points for European profits of multinationals 
in exchange for creating jobs on their territory and a limited tax payment. 
The Commission's State aid decision of 4 October, requiring Luxembourg to recover a 
selective tax advantage granted to Amazon in Luxembourg of up to EUR 250 million, was 
another step forward in the Commission´s overall strategy to ensure fair taxation
261
.  
Both collecting taxes and combating tax avoidance and evasion are normally competences of 
the Member States. However, even in this area where the Member States enjoy fiscal 
autonomy, any national tax measures adopted have to comply with internal market rules and, 
amongst others, abide by competition law
262
. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
State aid investigations and decisions concerning aggressive tax planning 
Since 2013, the Commission has been looking into tax planning practices via its dedicated 
Task Force, which was turned into a regular administrative unit in 2016. 
Throughout 2014-2017, the Commission has continued to gather information on tax planning 
practices, enquiring into the tax rulings practice and possible fiscal aid schemes of all 
Member States. The enquiry is aimed at clarifying allegations that tax rulings may constitute 
State aid and to allow the Commission to take an informed view of the practices of all 
Member States. Overall the Commission has looked into more than 1 000 rulings. 
Financing companies provide financial services intra-group and their profit is the remuneration 
for their financing activities. This remuneration has to be in line with the arm's length principle. 
This issue has been one of Directorate-General for Competition's key areas since it started 
looking into the tax ruling practices of Member States. The Working Paper published as part of 
                                                            
261 President Juncker stressed in his State of the Union speech of 14 September 2016 that the decision previously 
taken with respect to the granting of State aid by Apple in Ireland shows that "every company, big or small, has 
to pay its taxes where it makes its profits. This goes for giants like Apple too, even if their market value is higher 
than the GDP of 165 countries in the world. In Europe we do not accept powerful companies getting illegal 
backroom deals on their taxes" available at http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/state-union-2016_en . For further 
information on the decision of 4 October see IP/ of 4 October 201717/3701, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-3701_en.htm. 
262 The Commission work in the area of tax rulings was closely followed by the European Parliament's Special 
Committee on Tax Rulings and Measures Similar in Nature or Effect (TAXE). On 25 November 2016, European 
Parliament adopted a Report on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect prepared by the TAXE 
Committee, which viewed positively the contribution of State aid control to tax fairness in Europe. In fact, it 
"strongly welcomes and supports the key role of the Commission as the competent competition authority in the 
ongoing State aid inquiries dealing with tax rulings" (para. 130). On 25 November 2016, the Committee issued a 
report which broadly endorsed the Commissions approach on State aid available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-
0408+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.   
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this review in June 2016 indicated concerns that some tax rulings for financing companies 
endorse very low margins and a low taxable base.
263
  
The Directorate-General for Competition supported Luxembourg and Cyprus to amend their tax 
rules in order to avoid undue advantages to financing companies. Luxembourg amended its 
rules on financing companies at the end of 2016, by way of an administrative circular
264
. These 
rules entered into effect as of 1 January 2017. Similarly, with a circular dated 30 June 2017, 
Cyprus introduced changes to their national rules to make them more stringent as regards the 
tax treatment of financing companies. 
 
Specific cases 
On 4 October, the Commission decided to require Luxembourg to recover a selective tax 
advantage granted in 2003 to Amazon
265
 by way of tax ruling amounting up to up to EUR 250 
million.  
Luxembourg – The Amazon decision  
The ruling was prolonged in 2011 and remained valid until mid-2014. The tax ruling agreed to a calculation of the 
tax base of Amazon's Luxembourg based subsidiary Amazon EU, which records all the sales of Amazon in the EU. 
Following the application of the calculation method endorsed by the ruling, Amazon EU paid a tax deductible 
royalty to its parent, also established in Luxembourg, but which is not subject to corporate tax in Luxembourg. As a 
result, around 75% of the European sales profits of Amazon were shifted to the parent and were not taxed. 
The Commission concluded that the level of royalty could not be justified for two reasons: First, the parent 
company was an empty shell with no employees and no business activities. Therefore, it did not, and could not, 
develop, enhance or manage these rights so as to justify the level of royalties received. Second, the operating 
company was the only entity which managed and added value to the IP and actively took decisions and carried out 
activities related to Amazon's European retail business. It was therefore entitled to higher profits than those 
established by the ruling. 
This incorrect determination of the royalty, leading to a very low tax base for Amazon EU, gave Amazon a 
selective advantage over other businesses that are subject to taxation rules in Luxembourg. The Commission 
estimates that this unfair tax advantage amounts to up to EUR 250 million for the period 2006-2014, which 
Luxembourg has to recover from Amazon.   
On 26 October, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into the United Kingdom 
scheme that exempts certain transactions by multinational groups from the application of United 




                                                            
263 Directorate-General for Competition working paper on state aid and tax rulings, Internal Working Paper – 
Background to the High Level Forum on State Aid of 3 June 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/working_paper_tax_rulings.pdf.  
264 Circular of the Director of Contributions, L.I.R. n° 56/1 – 56bis/1 of 27 December 2016 available at 
http://www.impotsdirects.public.lu/content/dam/acd/fr/legislation/legi16/circulairelir561-56bis1-27122016.pdf.   
265 Case SA.38944 – Luxembourg – Aid to Amazon, Commission decision of 4 October 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3&case_title=
amazon. For further information see IP/17/3701 of 4 October 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-3701_en.htm. 
266 Case SA.44896 – United Kingdom – Potential State aid scheme regarding United Kingdom CFC group 
financing exmeption, Commission decision of 26 October 2017, the letter is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3&case_title=
cfc. For further information see IP/17/4201 of 26 October 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-4201_en.htm. 
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United Kingdom – The CFC Group financing examption 
The scheme is an exemption from the United Kingdom’s Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules. The purpose of 
these rules is to prevent United Kingdom companies from using a subsidiary, based in a low or no tax jurisdiction, 
to avoid taxation in the United Kingdom. Under the CFC rules such profits artificially shifted to an offshore 
subsidiary are reallocated back to the United Kingdom parent company, where it is taxed accordingly. However, in 
2013 the United Kingdom introduced an exception from CFC rules  
for certain financing income (i.e. interest payments received from loans) – the Group Financing Exemption. The 
United Kingdom's Group Financing Exemption exempts from reallocation of the CFC income financing income 
received by the offshore subsidiary from another foreign group company.  
At this stage, the Commission has doubts whether this exemption is consistent with the overall objective of the 
United Kingdom CFC rules, which is to reallocate income artificially shifted to offshore subsidiaries of United 
Kingdom parent companies to the United Kingdom for taxation. The Commission does at this stage consider that 
the United Kingdom should apply the anti-abuse rule to all companies which artificially divert income, including 
those earning group financing income, since they all are in a comparable factual and legal situation with regard to 
the objective of that measure. The case law of the EU Courts confirms that an exemption from an anti-avoidance 
provision can amount to State aid.  
On 18 December, the European Commission opened an in-depth investigation into the 
Netherlands' tax treatment of Inter IKEA, one of the two groups operating the IKEA business.
267
 
Netherlands – The Inter IKEA investigation 
Inter IKEA Systems, a Dutch entity part of the Inter IKEA group, records all revenues from franchise fees paid by 
IKEA shops worlwide. The Commission's investigation concerns two tax rulings, granted by the Dutch tax 
authorities in 2006 and 2011, which have significantly reduced Inter IKEA Systems' taxable profits in the 
Netherlands. 
The 2006 tax ruling endorsed a method to calculate an annual licence fee to be paid by Inter IKEA Systems to 
another company of the Inter IKEA group based in Luxembourg. The annual licence fee, which represents a 
significant part of Inter IKEA Systems' revenue, remained untaxed in Luxembourg due to a special regime.  
In 2011, simultaneously to the repeal of the special regime in Luxembourg as requested by a Commission decision 
of 2006 which concluded that it was illegal and incompatible268, the Inter IKEA group amended its structure and 
Inter IKEA Systems acquired the intellectual property rights located in the past in Luxembourg. The Dutch 
authorities issued a second tax ruling, which endorsed the price paid by Inter IKEA Systems for the acquisition of 
the intellectual property and thus the deduction of the interests of the inter-company loan granted to finance this 
acquisition. 
The Commission considers at this stage that the treatment endorsed in the two tax rulings may have resulted in a 
selective advantage in favour of Inter IKEA Systems, which was not available to other companies subject to the 
same national taxation rules in the Netherlands. 
Fight against discriminatory tax schemes and measures sheltering national companies from 
competition in the internal market  
Beyond the cases involving tax rulings, the Commission remains vigilant to ensure that Member 
States do not use fiscal tools to unduly favour certain companies/sectors and shelter national 
companies from competition in the internal market. 
In 2016, Poland introduced a tax on the retail sector. Subject to the tax were undertakings 
                                                            
267 Case SA.46470 – Netherlands – Potential State aid to Inter Ikea, Commission decision of 18 December 2017. 
The public version of this decision will become available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46470. For further information 
see IP/17/5343 of 18 December 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5343_en.htm. 
268 The so called "1929 billionaire scheme", for further information see IP/06/1021 of 19 July 2006 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-1021_en.htm. 
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operating in Poland in the retail sector. The tax had progressive rates, increasing with the 
turnover in a way that it would result to a disproportionate burden for big  companies. On 30 
June 2017 the Commission adopted a negative decision considering that the progressivity of the 
tax rates granted a selective advantage to undertakings with low turnover (mainly national 
companies) and constituted State aid which was not compatible with the internal market.
269
 This 
case is similar to previous cases of Hungarian progressive turnover-based taxes in which the 
Commission adopted three final negative decisions in 2016.
270
  
With regard to the investigation into fiscal aid to ports, further to the negative decision on the 
corporate tax exemption for Dutch public companies, including seaports of January 2016
271
, 
the Commission took two further negative decisions in July 2017 requiring France
272
 and 
Belgium273 to abolish the corporate tax exemptions for their ports and continues to assess the 
taxation of ports in other Member States to ensure fair competition in the sector across the 
EU. The Commission's action is consistent with the need to ensure that all companies pay 
their fair share of taxes and that no sector or company of a certain type unduly receives a 
more favourable corporate tax treatment. Ports are essential to the EU economy and the 
Commission does not prevent Member States from providing aid to their ports, for instance 
when this is necessary to develop port infrastructure. However, corporate tax exemptions 
provide a bigger advantage to those beneficiaries who are most profitable. They are neither 
transparent, nor limited or targeted at financing activities or investments which are necessary 
and justified by objectives of common interest.  
 5.  BASIC INDUSTRIES AND MANUFACTURING 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
The European manufacturing sector is currently facing important challenges related to 
globalisation, the "forth industrial revolution" and digitisation of the industry, as well as 
decarbonisation. Manufacturing accounts for over 80% of Europe's exports and private 
research and innovation. However, over the last forty years, the relative contribution of 
industry to the EU economy has declined and its productivity growth has been lagging behind 
that of other OECD countries. Moreover, certain sectors such as steel are characterised by 
structural overcapacities.  
Basic industries and manufacturing are key to the European economy. In 2017 the 
Commission expended significant resources on competition policy actions in these sectors, 
which range widely from consumer products such as cars and musical instruments, to 
manufactured goods, intermediary products such as coolants and solar panels, to industry 
inputs such as chemicals and outputs such as plastics. To ensure that manufacturers, 
                                                            
269 Case SA.44361 Polish tax on retail sector with progressive rates, Commission decision of 30 June 2017 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_44351. 
270 Cases SA.39235 Hungarian advertisement tax, Commission decision of 4 November 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_39235; SA.40018 Amendment to 
the Hungarian food chain inspection fee, Commission decision of 4 July 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_40018; and SA.41187 
Hungarian health contribution of tobacco industry businesses, Commission decision of 4 July 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result.  
271 Case SA.25398 Corporate tax exemption of Dutch public enterprises, Commission decision of 21 January 
2016 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_25338.  
272 Case SA.38398 Ports taxation in France, Commission decision of 27 July 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38398. 
273 Case SA.38393 Ports taxation in Belgium, Commission decision of 27 July 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38393.  
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distributors and consumers alike reap a fair share of the benefits of a modern specialised 
economy and society, the entire value chain of such products is subject to scrutiny under EU 
competition rules. Where unfair restrictions on the manufacturing or the distribution of these 
products to certain customers or in certain areas within the EU lead to a reduction in 
efficiency and to an unfair accrual of the benefits to one particular part of the value chain, to 
the detriment of consumers in particular, the role of the Commission is to remove these unfair 
restrictions to the benefit of all.  
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Competition enforcement in manufacturing is aimed at addressing these challenges, in 
particular by boosting the competitiveness of European manufacturers and by maintaining a 
level playing field in the internal market, where companies can compete on the merits. 
Competition enforcement supports the efficient functioning of markets and ensures that public 
funding is steered towards objectives of common interest, such as reducing pollution by 
promoting environment-friendly means of transport, providing affordable food and medicines 
or fostering sustainable growth and jobs.  
Healthy and vigorous competition is of fundamental importance to a fair EU economy and 
society. Anti-competitive practices stifle innovation, introduce rigidities, push prices up, and 
reduce the competitiveness of EU companies and the real income of EU consumers. The 
Commission must therefore be vigilant to ensure that the fairness of business dealings in 
Europe is not jeopardised by such practices.  
Antitrust investigations in basic industries 
Basic manufacturing and consumer goods industries continue to represent a significant share 
of the Commission's enforcement practice. In 2017, the Commission continued its lines of 
action (including individual case work, market surveillance and advocacy) in these sectors. 
The EU's high value-added manufacturing industry requires access to basic materials at 
affordable prices that reflect international cost conditions. In 2017, the Commission actively 
monitored the markets for these inputs to ensure that firms have adequate access in a healthy 
and competitive environment.  
Merger investigations in basic industries 
Over the past year, there have been several merger investigations in the basic industries and 
manufacturing sectors. The Commission intervened in some of those cases in order to avoid a 
significant loss of competition to the detriment of customers.  
As regards the cement industry, the Commission prohibited the joint acquisition by German 
cement manufacturers HeidelbergCement and Schwenk of the operations of Mexican-based 
Cemex in Hungary and Croatia. The Commission concluded that the takeover would have 
significantly reduced competition in grey cement markets in Croatia. This decision followed 
previous conditional clearances in the cement industry where the Commission had approved 
the acquisition of Italian cement company Italcementi by HeidelbergCement subject to the 
divestment of Italcementi’s cement plant in Belgium (in 2016) and the acquisition of Lafarge 
by Holcim subject to the divestment over several cement plants across Europe (in 2015). 
As regards other basic industries, the Commission investigated in particular two transactions 
in the refractories industry. In June 2017, the Commission cleared the acquisition of 
Magnesita Refratários by RHI subject to the divestment of the two companies’ overlapping 
businesses in certain dolomite-based and magnesite-based refractories.  In June 2017, the 
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Commission cleared the acquisition of specialty cement manufacturer Kerneos by French 
minerals and refractories producer Imerys unconditionally. The Commission also continues to 
investigate transactions in the aerospace sector where the Commission approved Rolls 
Royce’s acquisition of ITP subject to the condition that Rolls-Royce eliminates a conflict of 
interest concerning the EPI engine consortium. As regards consumer goods, the Commission 
opened an in-depth investigation into the proposed merger of Italian manufacturer of frames 
and sunglasses Luxottica with the French manufacturer of ophthalmic lenses in September 
2017. 
In 2017, the Commission analysed the acquisition of Haldex, a manufacturer of various 
brake-related systems and components for commercial vehicles by a competitor, Knorr-
Bremse. The transaction had the potential to severely negatively affect this concentrated 




In the automotive sector, the Commission closely scrutinised a number of transactions 
concerning both the manufacture and supply of vehicles (Peugeot/Opel) and the manufacture 
of automotive components. In Valeo/FTE, for example, the Commission intervened as the 
acquisition would have reduced the supplier base of passive hydraulic actuators from 3 to 2, 
leading to potential price increases and reduces choice in the EEA. The Commission will 
continue to closely monitor the ongoing concentration in the automotive industry. 
State aid investigations in basic industries 
Economic growth is only possible where efficient and innovative companies have room to 
expand. To make this happen, less efficient companies with outdated products have to leave 
the market. Subsidising inefficient companies interferes with this process and may 
significantly slow down economic growth. The State aid rules on industrial restructuring 
ensure that public funding goes to companies that are addressing their problems in order to 
become viable on their own.  
In 2017, the Commission has continued its in-depth investigation into the restructuring of the 
Romanian petrochemical company Oltchim
275
. After years of loss-making, the state-owned 
company is being privatised with the aim of restructuring its business model with a new 
industrial partner and paying existing debts from the sales proceeds. The Commission's 
inquiry is aimed at ensuring that the privatisation will enable the company to become viable 
in the long term and that debt waivers by Oltchim's public creditors do not result in giving the 
company an unfair advantage over its competitors.  
In order to address the particular challenges of Europe's steel sector, the EU State aid rules 
focus public support in this area on measures aimed at improving long-term competitiveness 
and efficiency (research and development, training, energy and environment) for viable 
companies. That's why no rescue and restructuring aid can be granted to steel companies. 
Keeping ailing companies afloat with public money would only aggravate the structural 
problems of the steel sector and lead to subsidy races between Member States. Since the mid-
90s, the Commission has therefore consistently prohibited such aid.  
                                                            
274 Case M.8222 Knorr-Bremse / Haldex  available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8222. 
275 Case SA.36086 Potential aid to Oltchim, Commission decision of 8 April 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_36086. For further information 
see IP/16/1321 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1321_en.htm.  
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In line with these principles, the Commission has concluded that two measures granted by 
Italy in favour of the Italian steel maker ILVA
276
 gave the company an undue advantage over 
competitors. In particular, this concerns the pricing conditions of a State guarantee on a €400 
million loan and a €300 million public loan. These served to finance ILVA's liquidity needs 
for its commercial activity and not for any environmental clean-up carried out at the site. Both 
were granted on terms below market conditions and placed ILVA in a better situation than 
other EU steelmakers, which have to finance their operations and restructure at their own 
expense. ILVA has to pay back the undue advantage of around €84 million, consisting in the 
difference between the rates. ILVA would have had to pay to raise the funding on the market 
and the price at which the company actually received the money.  
 6. AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY 
Overview of key challenges in the food sector  
While many undertakings in the European food sector are able to grasp the full benefits from 
operating in a broad common European market place, some others seem to face challenges 
operating in the EU Internal Market and in a globalised world. European farmers, food 
manufacturers and retailers can get more out of their ability to buy and sell across national 
borders and their access to a wide common market in a pro-competitive way. 
Challenges for European farmers operating in the Internal Market  
Farmers are particularly vulnerable to the challenges raised by globalisation and their 
functioning in a larger internal market for a number of reasons. European farmers are 
increasingly facing (1) more competition from other farmers inside as well as outside Europe, 
(2) higher demands from end consumers in terms of quality, variety and traceability, and (3) 
higher investments needs linked to initiatives to come to a greener and more sustainable 
agriculture.  
The European agricultural sector still has some structural characteristics which make it harder 
to cope with these challenges. First, agricultural producers are still the least concentrated level 
in the food supply chain in Europe. The most common situation across sectors and Member 
States is that agricultural producers remain atomised or grouped into small cooperatives and 
other producer organisations. In contrast, their input suppliers and customers (processors, 
wholesalers and retailers) are often much larger and more concentrated, giving them more 
bargaining power in their negotiations with farmers. Second, unforeseeable natural elements 
(such as adverse weather conditions and diseases) can significantly alter production, resulting 
in volatility of production and therefore volatility of prices and revenues.  
European farmers operating in a globalised world and in the Internal Market can manage 
these challenges better by their integration in larger organisations where these organisations 
aggregate supply (both in terms of volumes and variety of products), offer supporting services 
and add value through processing. Such integration can provide more stability, scale to reach 
more customers, flexibility, more value and more bargaining power. 
Opportunities and challenges posed by increased retail concentration in the Internal Market 
Chains of retailers have developed sophisticated distribution systems and varied store formats 
                                                            
276 Case SA.38613 – Italy – Aid to Ilva, Commission decision of 21 December 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_38613. For further information 
see IP/17/5401 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5401_en.htm.  
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that supply wide arrays of products to customers. Using the characteristics (scalability, 
economies of scale, etc.) of their business model, chains of retailers seem to take the benefits 
of operating in a global world and an EU Internal Market. Many such chains have opened 
shops in other Member States than their home market, hereby bringing a different business 
model and more competition to other markets. Indeed the number of shops of retail chains has 
increased very significantly since 2000. Consumers often value the offer of different products, 
a wider choice and variety coming from other markets, especially when this goes along with 
lower prices. On the other hand, the increasing concentration of retailers (through internal 
growth, mergers/acquisitions and/or the formation of buying alliances) continues to worry 
certain trading partners, especially smaller operators. In particular, they question whether 
large retail chains have obtained too much bargaining power (in the bilateral negotiations with 
their suppliers) and buyer power (in the market overall) thanks to their dual role of customers 
and competitors (through private labels) of their suppliers. 
Challenges to the optimal functioning of the EU Internal Market itself 
There are challenges to the EU Internal Market itself, restricting competition at all levels of 
the food supply chain.  
Operators in some national markets sometimes agree on excluding operators from other 
Member States and give preference to domestic products even though this preference is not 
based on objective criteria (quality, specific traits, etc.) of the products. These discriminations 
based on nationality are hurting the fundamental principle of the EU to give a fair chance to 
all producers inside the EU independently of their origin.  
Further, international food manufacturers, for years already present with equal or similar 
brands in different Member States reportedly (try to) segment the Internal Market by 
preventing or hindering retailers from bringing products from lower-priced markets into 
higher-priced markets.  
Contribution of EU competition policy to make the Internal Market work better  
Making farmers more competitive in the EU Internal Market 
In previous years, several legislative initiatives were launched in order to help European 
farmers better cope with the challenges posed by the Internal market and globalisation, to 
increase the competitiveness of the EU agricultural sector and to strengthen the bargaining 
power of smaller agricultural producers. Several derogations from competition rules were 
granted to the EU agricultural sector through the CMO Regulation: for instance, the reform of 
the Common Agricultural Policy in 2013 set out derogations to antitrust rules for certain 
agricultural sectors (olive oil, beef and veal, and arable crops (cereals, oilseeds, etc.))
277
. The 
sector-specific derogations have been deleted in 2017 when the Council and the European 
Parliament amended the application of the competition rules to the agricultural sector by 
creating a horizontal provision which allows recognised producer organisations and their 
associations to engage in practices such as production planning and contractual negotiations, 
in derogation from Article 101 TFEU. 
In 2017, the co-legislators decided to amend competition rules to the agricultural sector by 
                                                            
277 The CMO Regulation is the European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of 17 
December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing 
Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013R1308.  
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amending the Omnibus legislative proposal made by the Commission for a different purpose, 
i.e. the simplification of financial regulations.  
The Commission confirms its commitment to maintain effective competition in the 
agricultural sector, and give full effect to the objectives of the CAP laid down in Article 39 
TFEU. In this context, the Commission noted in an accompanying statement to the Omnibus 
Regulation that the amendments agreed by the co-legislators foresee only a very limited role 
for both the Commission and the national competition authorities to act to preserve effective 
competition. The Commission noted that the legal text must be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the Treaty, notably as regards the possibility for the Commission and national 
competition authorities to intervene if a producer organisation, which covers a large share of 
the market, seeks to restrict the freedom of action of its members. 
Tackling the challenges of increased retail concentration and unequal bargaining power in 
the EU Internal Market 
Supply Chain Initiative - In parallel with the Omnibus legislative proposal and as a follow-up 
to the AMTF Report,
278
 the Commission has published an Inception Impact Assessment (IIA) 
to improve the functioning of the food supply chain.
279
 The IIA covers three areas which have 
a bearing on the functioning of the food supply chain in respect of agri-food products and the 
bargaining position of operators in the chain: (i) unfair trading practices (UTPs)
280
 in 
Business-to-Business relationships, (ii) market transparency and (iii) producer cooperation 
through value sharing agreements.
281
 
Preventing market segmentation and trade restrictions by food manufacturers in the EU 
Internal Market 
In  November, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to AB InBev
282
 outlining its 
preliminary view that AB InBev pursued a deliberate strategy to prevent supermarkets and 
wholesalers from buying its most popular beer brands in Belgium, at lower prices in the 
Netherlands and France and from importing them into Belgium.
283
 AB InBev practices, which 
prevent the free trade of goods in the EU Internal Market, may result in a violation of Article 
102 TFEU.  
The Commission's objections concern Jupiler and Leffe, two brands that are long established 
in Belgium, France and the Netherlands, and relate to different practices put in place by AB 
InBev: 
- AB InBev apparently changed the packaging of Jupiler and Leffe beer cans to prevent 
imports;  
- AB InBev seems to have required a supermarket in the Netherlands with retail outlets 
in Belgium to buy certain Jupiler products in Belgium instead of importing these from 
the Netherlands; 
                                                            
278 For further information see https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/agri-markets-task-force_en and the Annual 
Competition Report 2016: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2016/part2_en.pdf.  
279 For further information see http://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-3735471_en. 
280 UTPs are defined as “practices which grossly deviate from good commercial conduct, are contrary to good 
faith and fair dealing and are unilaterally imposed by one trading partner on its counterparty. 
281 Value sharing agreements have in the meantime been addressed by the Omnibus Regulation through 
amendments by the European Parliament.  
282 Case AT.40134 AB InBev (previously Limes). For further information see IP/17/5041 of 30 November 2017 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5041_en.htm. 
283 For further information see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5041_en.htm.  
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- AB InBev apparently capped the quantities of Jupiler products sold to a wholesaler in 
the Netherlands; 
- AB InBev seemingly did not offer certain Jupiler products and/or certain day-to-day 
Jupiler promotions to supermarkets in the Netherlands. 
Further competition enforcement in the EU Internal Market 
The Commission is looking into an alleged infringement of EU antitrust rules that prohibit 
agreements between undertakings (Article 101 TFEU) by some supermarket chains and some 
alliances of supermarket chains. The Commission, accompanied by national competition 
authorities, carried out inspections at the premises of several supermarket chains and alliances 
of supermarket chains, in France and Belgium.  
 
The Commission's investigation concerns possible competition issues linked to the general 
commercial strategies of some supermarket chains and to the procurement by some 
supermarket chains and alliances of supermarket chains of a large range of everyday 
consumer goods. 
Merger investigations in the agri-food industry  
In 2017, the trend of consolidation in the agrochemical industry continued. The Commission 
ensures effective competition also in this sector so that farmers can have access to innovative 
products, better quality and competitive prices, as seeds and pesticide products are essential 
for farmers and ultimately consumers. 
In August, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation to assess the proposed 
acquisition of Monsanto (US) by Bayer (Germany) under the EU Merger Regulation
284
. The 
Commission had preliminary concerns that the proposed acquisition could reduce competition 
in a number of different markets resulting in higher prices, lower quality, less choice and less 
innovation. In particular, the initial market investigation identified preliminary concerns in the 
areas of pesticides, seeds and traits. The Commission also investigated whether competitors' 
access to distributors and farmers could become more difficult if Bayer and Monsanto were to 
bundle or tie their sales of pesticide products and seeds, notably with the advent of digital 
agriculture. Digital agriculture consists in the collection of data and information about farms 
with the aim of providing tailored advice or aggregated data to farmers. Both Bayer and 
Monsanto are currently investing in this emerging technology. 
Given the worldwide scope of Bayer and Monsanto's activities, the Commission has 
cooperated closely with other competition authorities, notably with the Department of Justice 
in the US and the antitrust authorities of Australia, Brazil, Canada and South Africa. 
In the same market, the Commission also assessed under the EU Merger Regulation the recent 
mergers between Dow and Dupont and between Syngenta and ChemChina. Both decisions 
followed an in-depth review of the proposed transactions. 
In March, the Commission approved the merger between US-based chemical companies Dow 
and DuPont, subject to conditions on the divestiture of major parts of DuPont's global 
pesticide business, including its global Research & Development organisation
285
. The 
                                                            
284 Case M.8084 Bayer / Monsanto, see IP/17/2762 of 22 August 2017, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-2762_en.htm. 
285 Case M.7932 Dow / DuPont, Commission decision of 27 March 2017, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7932. 
 80 
Commission had concerns that the merger as notified would have reduced competition on 
price and choice in a number of markets for existing pesticides. Furthermore, the merger 
would have reduced innovation. The commitments submitted by Dow and DuPont addressed 
these concerns in full. 
In April the Commission cleared ChemChina acquisition of Syngenta (based, respectively, in 
China and Switzerland), subject to conditions
286
. The Commission had concerns that the 
transaction as notified would have reduced competition in a number of existing markets for 
pesticides. Furthermore, the Commission had concerns that the transaction could reduce 
competition for plant growth regulators. The approval was therefore conditional on the 
divestiture of significant parts of ChemChina's European pesticide and plant growth regulator 
business. The Commission's investigation focused on competition for existing pesticides, 
since ChemChina does not compete with Syngenta for the development of new and 
innovative pesticides. 
 7. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES SECTOR  
Overview of key challenges in the sector  
Ensuring access to high quality healthcare and medicines at competitive prices is an important 
objective in competition law enforcement in pharmaceutial and health services sector. 
Competition law enforcement can complement regulation that exists in this sector. 
Taking into account the sensitive balance between ensuring innovation, on the one hand, and 
more affordable medicines, on the other, the Commission's antitrust enforcement will 
continue to promote open and competitive markets in the sector and, in particular, access to 
affordable medecines for European citizens, whilst safeguarding the incentives for innovation, 
research and development. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges  
On 15 May, the Commission initiated formal antitrust proceedings against Aspen Pharma for 
a suspected abuse of market dominance under Article 102 TFEU.
287
 The Commission intends 
to investigate information that Aspen has imposed unfair and excessive prices in the form of 
significant price increases for medicinal products containing the active pharmaceutical 
ingredients chlorambucil, melphalan, mercaptopurine, busulfan and tioguanine in the EEA 
Member States except Italy
288
. 
In its pay-for-delay investigation in relation to the market entry of generic modafinil (sleeping 
disorder medicine), on 17 July, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Teva 
regarding an agreement with Cephalon whereby Teva would undertake not to sell its generic 
modafinil products in the EEA until October 2012.
289
 In exchange, Teva received a 
substantial transfer of value from Cephalon through a series of cash payments and various 
other agreements. The Commission's preliminary view is that the transferred value served as a 
                                                            
286 Case M.7962 ChemChina / Syngenta, Commission decision of  5 April 2017, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_7962. 
287 Case AT.40394 Aspen. For further information see IP/17/1323 of 15 May 2017 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1323_en.htm and the opening of proceedings at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40394/40394_235_3.pdf.   
288 The Italian competition authority already adopted an infringement decision against Aspen on 29 September 
2016. 
289 Case AT.39686 Cephalon. For further information see IP/17/2063 of 17 July 2017 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2063_en.htm. 
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significant pay-for-delay inducement for Teva not to compete with Cephalon's modafinil 
worldwide, including in the European Economic Area. The Statement of Objections argues 
that the agreement between Cephalon and Teva may have caused substantial harm to EU 
patients and health service budgets. This is because they may have delayed the entry of a 
cheaper generic medicine, leading to higher prices for modafinil. This behaviour, if 
confirmed, would infringe Article 101 TFEU that prohibits restrictive business practices.  
The Commission continued monitoring patent settlements between originator and generic 
companies. The 2017 report (on the eighth monitoring exercise covering the year 2016) shows 
that the number of settlements that might merit closer scrutiny by competition authorities has 
progressively decreased since the 2009 Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry and has stabilized at a 
low level (around 10%).
290
 
Merger review in the pharmaceutical sector  
Merger activity in the pharmaceutical sector continued to be sustained in the course of 2017, 
with the Commission taking a leading role in ensuring that concentration would not result in  
reduced competition or innovation to the detriment of patients and health systems. 
In June, the Commission approved the acquisition of Actelion by Johnson & Johnson
291
, 
subject to remedies. While the activities of the two companies were largely complementary, 
they were both working on a treatment for insomnia, based on a novel way to cure this 
condition. The Commission’s market investigation indicated that the transaction as notified 
would give Johnson & Johnson the ability and incentive to rationalise its competing insomnia 
research and development programmes by either delaying or discontinuing one of them. In 
order to address these competition concerns Johnson & Johnson offered remedies to ensure 
that it cannot influence negatively the development of either insomnia research programme. 
State aid actions in the health services sector 
The Commission's State aid actions in the health services sector mainly concern hospitals, 
related services (e.g., ambulance transport) and health insurance. The Commission decision of 
20 December 2011 (based on Article 106(2) TFEU
292
) specifies the conditions under which 
compensation to companies for providing public services is compatible with the EU State aid 
rules and does not have to be notified to the Commission in advance. Compensation granted 
to hospitals, including emergency services and ancillary services, for services of general 
economic interest, benefits from the decision irrespective of the amounts involved provided 
that the conditions are met. Accordingly, the Commission very rarely takes decisions on 
financing covered by this exemption decision. 
During 2017, the Commission continued examining and/or decided on a number of 
complaints lodged by private health service providers about their allegedly unfair treatment or 
potentially excessive compensation of publicly-owned hospitals. Those complaints usually 
came from operators in Member States with healthcare markets more open to competition 
(e.g. France and Germany).  
                                                            
290 More information is available on the Commission's competition website, in the pharmaceuticals section. 
291 Case M.84401 J&J/Actelion. For further information, see  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8401. 
292 Commission decision of 20 December on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings 
entrusted the with operation of services of general economic interest, OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p.3. 
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8. TRANSPORT AND POSTAL SERVICES 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
The transport and postal services sectors account for about 5.0 % of the EU economy293, and 
their performance can have many beneficial effects for other sectors of the European 
economy. Transport is the key to both an integrated internal market and to an open economy 
integrated into the world economy. In the postal sector parcel services are supplied by 
competitive transnational suppliers while other services are mostly in the hands of national 
postal operators often depending on compensation from their government
294
.  
In 2017, the Commission used its competition tools to keep the transport and postal markets 
open and competitive, and to facilitate entry. It also continued to facilitate State aid that 
enabled interoperability between different modes of transport as well as on State aid for 
modern infrastructure.  
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Merger review in air transport 
The air transport sector is still very fragmented. In the EU there are more than 150 airlines 
offering scheduled air passenger transport. The five largest airlines in the EU, comprising 
Lufthansa, Air France / KLM and the International Consolidated Airlines Group ("IAG" is the 
parent company of Aer Lingus, British Airways, Iberia, and Vueling), Ryanair, and easyJet,  
account for around 50 % of the EU market. In contrast, in the United States, the three legacy 
carrier groups American Airlines, Delta and United together with the low cost carrier 
Southwest jointly control more than 80 % of the United States market. The need for further 
consolidation was underpinned by the insolvency of three major airlines: Alitalia, Air Berlin 
and Monarch Airlines.  





  Lufthansa initially notified the Commission of its intention to 
acquire two of Air Berlin's susbsidiaries, NIKI and LGW, as well as a collection of Air 
Berlin's aircraft, crew and slots. Following a comprehensive market investigation and a 
market test of the commitments proposed by Lufthansa, the Commission shared its 
preliminary views with Lufthansa, indicating that the acquisition of NIKI would lead to a 
significant number of routes where the merged entity would hold very high market shares, 
and that barriers to entry for competitors would increase significantly. While the 
Commission's investigation was still on-going, Lufthansa decided to rescind the NIKI 
transaction on 13 December, leading to NIKI filing for insolvency on the same day.
297
 The 
                                                            
293 For further information see EU transport in figures Statistical pocketbook (2017) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-fundings/statistics/doc/2017/pocketbook2017.pdf, p.19; prepared by the 
Commission with around EUR 651 billion in Gross Value Added (GVA) at basic prices, the transport and 
storage services sector (including postal and courier activities) accounted for about 5.0 % of total GVA in the 
EU-28 in 2015 (or 4.5 % excluding postal and courier services). 
294 It should be noted however, that the third postal Directive (2008/6/EC) introduced full opening of the 
Member States' postal markets, allowing new operators and services. 
295 Case M.8633 Lufthansa/certain Air Berlin assets. Further inforamtation available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8633. 
296 Case M.8672 easyJet/ certain Air Berlin assets. Further information available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_8672. 
297 Following a decision of NIKI's creditors committee, the assets of NIKI were sold in January 2018 to its 
founder, Mr Niki Lauda, and rebranded as Laudamotion. 
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Commission eventually approved the remaining part of the transaction between Lufthansa and 
Air Berlin on 21 December.
298
 
This decision followed the approval granted on 12 December to easyJet for the acquisition of 
Air Berlin's operations at Berlin Tegel airport.
299
 In both cases, the Commission's 
investigation focused on airport dominance, in order to adapt the framework of the 
competitive assessment to two specific facts. First, with the exception of NIKI and LGW, Air 
Berlin's fleet had been grounded by the time of the notification of the transactions; therefore, 
Air Berlin was not actively competing anymore on the routes that it used to operate. Second, 
Air Berlin's assets were key to getting access to highly demanded and increasingly congested 
European airports. In this context, the Commission assessed whether the slot portfolio to be 
acquired by easyJet and Lufthansa at different airports would allow them to prevent 
competitors from entering or expanding their presence in the markets for passenger air travel 
to and from these airports. While the Commission found that the easyJet transaction was not 
likely to bring anti-competitive effects at any airport, it raised serious doubts about the 
compatibility of the Luftahnsa transaction with the internal market as a result of the 
reinforcement of Lufthansa's slot holding position at Düsseldorf airport. Lufthansa remedied 
the Commission's doubts by  amending its sale and purchase agreement with Air Berlin to 
reduce the scope of the transfer of slots at Düsseldorf airport. 
The Lufthansa/Air Berlin case – an example of the application of merger control rules to an insolvent air 
carrier 
Lufthansa's failed attempt to acquire NIKI examplifies two elements of the application of EU merger control 
rules to transactions occuring in the framework of an air carrier's insolvency proceedings.   
Firstly, it is important that the risk that a transaction may not be implemented on regulatory grounds (including, 
but not limited to, State aid and merger control rules) is not underestimated by creditors' committees and 
insolvency administrators. In this regard, the Commission had informed Air Berlin's insolvency administrator of 
the problems that may be entailed by the proposed takeover of parts of Air Berlin, Germany's second largest air 
carrier, by Lufthansa ahead of the designation of the latter as preferred bidder.  
Secondly, the potential acquirer of the insolvent company may take interim measures to preserve the viability of 
the latter, subject to compliance with the Merger Regulation. Following the initiation of Air Berlin's insolvency 
proceedings in August 2017, its financial situation quickly deteriorated, to the extent that it became clear that the 
rescue aid granted by Germany in order to ensure an orderly liquidation of the company would not suffice to 
maintain Air Berlin's operations until the completion of the Commission's merger control procedures. On 27 
October 2017, the Commission granted Lufthansa a derogation from the standstill obligation, as allowed under 
Article 7(3) of the EU Merger Regulation.300 Lufthansa was notably authorised to lease or purchase aircraft for 
use by LGW and NIKI and to wetlease them from LGW and NIKI. These measures aimed at ensuring the 
continuity of LGW's and NIKI's operations, thus limiting the seat capacity shortage and disturbance brought 
about by Air Berlin's insolvency. Considering the prima facie competition concerns raised by the transaction, the 
Commission attached clear conditions to its authorisation.    
In 2017, in the framework of commitments attached to previous clearance decisions, a 
                                                            
298 Case M.8633 Lufthansa/certain Air Berlin assets, Commission decision of 21 December 2017 pursuant to 
Article 6(1)(b) in conjunction with Article 6(2) of Council Regulation No 139/2004 and Article 57 of the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
5402_en.htm.  
299 Case M.8672 easyJet/certain Air Berlin assets, Commission decision of 12 December 2017 pursuant to 
Article 6(1)(b) in conjunction with Article 6(2) of Council Regulation No 139/2004 and Article 57 of the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8672_673_5.pdf.  
300  Case M.8633 Lufthansa/Certain Air Berlin Assets, Commission decision of 27 October 2017 pursuant to 
Article 7(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 and Article 57 of the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8633_1376_4.pdf.  
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number of new applications highlighted increased interest in slots made available under the 
Commission commitments. The Commission approved the acquisition of British Midlands 
Limited (bmi) by IAG in 2012 subject to among others slot commitments. The Commission 
received requests for additonal slots by Aeroflot on the London Heathrow – Moscow routeand 
by Flybe on two routes connecting London Heathrow to Aberdeen and Edinburgh.
301
   
Furthermore,  Transavia requested additional slots at Ibiza for the city pair Pairs-Ibiza under 
the commitments given by Iberia in the framework of the Commission clearance decision of 
Iberia's takeovoer of Clickair and Vueling.
302
  
State aid to airports and airlines 
On 14 June, the Commission has simplified the State aid rules for smaller airports by 
including them in the GBER.303 The revised GBER introduces a block exemption for 
investment aid for airports with less than 3 million passengers. This implies that for such 
airports an individual approval by the Commission of State aid is no longer needed provided 
the conditions set out in the GBER are met (in particular, avoiding financing airport 
infrastructure which unnecessarily duplicates existing infrastructure and ensuring aid is 
limited to what is necessary to trigger the investment). The revised GBER also foresees 
simplified and less demanding rules for investment and operating aid for very small airports  
(below 200 000 passengers), compared to the substantive rules laid down in the 2014 
Aviation Guidelines
304
. The Commission's experience has shown that it can be difficult for 
very small airports to comply with the rules in the Aviation Guidelines. In addition, many 
small airports are dependent on public funding for their survival. On the other hand, the 
impact of aid to such airports on competition is very limited, of a local nature and therefore 
does not warrant an EU scrutiny. Airports under 200 000 passengers represent almost half of 
all airports in Europe, but less than 1% of the traffic at EU level.  
In addtion, the Commission continued to apply the Aviation Guidelines adopted in 2014. In 
2017, several decisions were adopted, closing long-standing investigations into aid to airports 
and airlines.  
In the Brussels airport case305, the Commission conducted an in-depth investigation of the 
public support granted by Belgium to three airlines flying from Brussels Airport. After 
discussions with the Commission, the Belgian government abolished the scheme and ordered 
the beneficiary airlines to reimburse the aid already received, with interest, whilst the 
                                                            
301  Case M.6447 IAG/bmi, Commission decision of 30 October 2017 concerning the assessment of the viability 
of Applicants and evaluation of their formal bids pursuant to Clause 1.4.9 of the Commitments attached to the 
Commission decision of 30 March 2012 in case M.6447 IAG/bmi following the Monitoring Trustee's opinion of 
19 October 2017, available at http://ec.europ.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6447_5764_7.pdf. 
302  Case M. 5364 Iberia/Clickair/Vueling, Commission decision of 31 October 2017 concerning the Assessment 
of the viability of Applicants and evaluation of their formal bids pursuant to Clause 1.4.9 of the commitments 
attached to the Commission decision of 9 January 2009 in case M. 5364 Iberia/Clickair/Vueling available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=2 . 
303 Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1084 of 14 June 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 as regards 
aid for port and airport infrastructure, notification thresholds for aid for culture and heritage conservation and for 
aid for sport and multifunctional recreational infrastructures, and regional operating aid schemes for outermost 
regions and amending Regulation (EU) No 702/2014 as regards the calculation of eligible costs. OJ L 156, 
20.6.2017, pp. 1–18 available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1497952641554&uri=CELEX:32017R1084.  
304  Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJ C 99, 4.4.2014, 
p. 3 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2014.099.01.0003.01. ENG.  
305 Commission decision of 18 July 2017, SA.38105 (2014/C (ex 2014/NN)) - Belgium - Subside en faveur de 
certaines compagnies aériennes opérant à l’aéroport de Bruxelles-National. For further information see Daily 
News (MEX/17/2071) of 18 July 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-17-2071_en.htm. 
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investigation was still pending. As the competitive harm caused by the aid has already been 
remedied before the end of the Commission's investigation, the decision did not order 
recovery of the illegal aid, found to be incompatible with the internal market.  
In the Irish Air Travel Tax case306, the Commission examined whether the exemption for 
transfer and transit passengers from the Irish air travel tax was in line with EU State aid rules. 
The in-depth investigation confirmed that the exemption did not selectively favour certain 
airlines and therefore involved no State aid.  
The Commission's decision307 on Lübeck airport closed its formal investigations opened in 
2007 and 2012. The Commission found that FLG and the city of Lübeck had both acted 
according to the Market Economy Operator Principle (MEOP) and therefore no advantage 
had been granted to Ryanair and to Infratil, respectively. Two airport service agreements 
concluded between FLG and Ryanair in 2010 will be assessed in a separate decision. 
Furthermore, the Commission adopted several decisions in cases involving start-up aid to 
airlines308 and cases involving operating and/or investment aid to airports
309
.  
The Commission has also authorised a temporary EUR 150 million bridging loan granted by 
Germany in favour of AirBerlin
310
. The airline filed for insolvency in August, after its main 
shareholder Etihad withdrew its financial backing for the loss-making company. The 
Commission found that the measure would help to protect the interests of air passengers and 
to maintain temporarily air passenger services. At the same time, the strict conditions attached 
to the loan, its short duration and the fact that Air Berlin was expected to cease operations at 
the end of the process, would reduce the distortion of competition, potentially triggered by the 
state support, to a minimum.  
 
                                                            
306 Commission decision of 14 July 2017, SA.29064 (2011/C) (ex 2011/NN) - Ireland -Non-application of the 
Air Travel Tax to transit and transfer passengers. For further information see Daily News (MEX/17/2042) of 14 
July 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-17-2042_en.htm. 
307 Commission decision of 7 February 2017, SA.21877, SA.27585, SA.31149 - Germany - Alleged State aid to 
Flughafen Lübeck GmbH, Infratil Limited, Ryanair and other airlines using the airport, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2017:339:FULL&from=EN. 
308  See for example Commission decision of 4 August 2017 SA.47746 - Netherlands - Start-up aid to 
Maastricht-Aachen airport (Provincie Limburg), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47746; Commission decision of 
27 March 2017, SA.46709 - Italy - Start-up aid for new routes from/to airports in the Region of Calabria, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46709 .  
309  See for example Commission decision of 25 September 2017, SA.42413 - France – Aide à l'investissement 
pour l'aéroport de Tarbes, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/ 
case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_42413;  Commission decision of 7 September 2017, SA.43787 - Germany - 
Investment aid to Memmingen airport, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_43787; Commission decision of 13 February 2017, SA.44058 - 
Germany - Saarbrücken Airport, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/ 
case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_44058; Commission decision of 9 August 2017, SA.44377 - Denmark  - 
Aarhus Airport - Operating and Investment Aid, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_44377; Commission decision of 
7 April 2017, SA.47969 - Germany - Operating aid to Frankfurt-Hahn Airport, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47969.  
310  Case SA.48937 – Germany – Rescue aid in favour of Air Berlin PLC & Co. Luftverkehrs KG, Commission 
decision of 4 September 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48937. For further information 
see IP/17/3083 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3083_en.htm. 
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Merger review in maritime transport 
The global container shipping industry is undergoing a period of change, in reaction to the 
challenges it has been facing in recent years. The sector is characterised by overcapacity, 
resulting from several carriers' expansion and investment in ultra-large vessels in recent years, 
and a slow recovery of demand following the economic crisis. Also as a means to improve 
their efficiency and reduce their operating costs, container shipping companies do not only 
provide services individually, but they have also put in place operational agreements, such as 
consortia or alliances, with other shipping companies that allow them to combine their vessels 
and offer a joint service.  
2017 saw a significant change in the alliances landscape, with the termination of three of the 
previously four global alliances, namely CKYHE, G6 and the Ocean Alliance, and their 
replacement by only two, The Alliance and the Ocean Alliance, by 1 April. Together with the 
enlarged 2M, there are now only three global alliances. Moreover, a wave of consolidation 
can be observed, which started in 2014 with the merger of Hapag-Lloyd and CSAV
311
 and 
intensified in 2016 and 2017. Like the year before,
312
 there were three major mergers in the 
industry.  
On 10 April, the Commission cleared the acquisition of Hamburg Süd by Maersk Line, the 
Danish world market leader.
313
  
The Acquisition of Hamburg Süd by Maersk Line 
As initially notified, the transaction would have created new links between previously unconnected consortia to 
which the two companies belonged (Maersk is a founding member of the 2M Alliance whereas Hamburg Süd 
was a member of certain route specific consortia).  
The Commission had concerns that these potential new links would have resulted in anti-competitive effects on 
five trade routes, notably between Northern Europe and (i) Central America/Caribbean, (ii) West Coast South 
America and (iii) Middle East as well as between the Mediterranean and (iv) West Coast South America and (v) 
East Coast South America. On these routes, competition from liner shippers which have no connection with the 
merged entity or its alliance partners would have been insufficient. As a result, the transaction could have 
enabled the merged entity, through the consortia that the two companies belong to, to influence capacity and 
therefore prices to the detriment of shippers and consumers for a very large part of those markets.  
Maersk offered to terminate the participation of Hamburg Süd in the five consortia (Eurosal 1/SAWC, Eurosal 
2/SAWC, EPIC 2, CCWM/MEDANDES and MESA) which entirely removes the problematic links between 
Maersk Line and HSDG's consortia that would have been created by the transaction. 
The Commission also cleared the combination of the global container liner shipping and 
container terminal business (excluding terminals in Japan) of the Japanese carriers MOL, 
NYK and K-Line in a joint venture.
314
 As MOL, NYK and K-Line were, since 1 April and 
therefore prior to the merger, already members of the same global alliance, the Alliance, no 
                                                            
311  Case M.7268 CSAV/HGV/Kühne Maritime/Hapag-LLoyd, Commission decision of 11 September 2014 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7268_1503_2.pdf.  
312  Case M.7908 CMA CGM / NOL, Commission decision of 29 April 2016 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7908_1366_3.pdf; Case M.8120 Hapag-Lloyd / 
United Arab Shipping Company (UASC). For further information see IP/16/2942 of 23 November 2016 available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3942_en.htm, and the merger between the two Chinese state-owned 
enterprises Cosco and CSCL. 
313 Case M.8330 Maersk / Hamburg Süd, Commission decision of 10 April 2017 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-904_en.htm 
314 Case M.8472 NYK, MOL and K Line, Commission decision of 28 June 2017 available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8472_128_3.pdf 
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new links between previously unconnected consortia were created. Since also the market 
positon of the merged entity, including its consortia partners in the Alliance, would be rather 
moderate, the Commission cleared the merger unconditionally. 
The last merger dealt with by the Commission in 2017 was the takeover of Hong Kong-based  
OOCL by the Chinese state-owned firm Cosco
315
 which created the third largest container 
shipping company in the world. The Commission found that the combination of the Parties' 
activities would not raise competition concerns. despite very high combined market shares of 
COSCO and OOIL and their consortia partners on the Northern Europe-North America trade 
route, since on that route (a) the link between the consortia the two firms were members of 
was pre-existing (b) there would still be significant competitors left post-merger, (c) the 
companies were not close competitors and (d) COSCO position was marginal. 
State aid enforcement in the maritime transport sector 
In 2017, the Commission continued to ensure compliance with the Maritime State aid 
Guidelines
316
. The aim of those Guidelines is to maintain the European maritime sector's 
competitiveness and to avoid flagging out to "flags of convenience" for which environmental 
and security standards might be low. The Commission is determined to ensure consistency 
and equal treatment throughout the EU whilst at the same time making sure that the beneficial 
tonnage tax regimes do not contravene internal market rules.  
For example, on 6 November, the Commission approved under the EU State aid rules the 
prolongation until end 2022 of the Belgium tonnage tax scheme.317 The Belgian authorities 
have committed to extend the benefit of the scheme to all eligible ships that fly an EEA flag 
and thus prevent any discrimination between shipping companies and registries of different 
EEA States. Furthermore, the Commission took a decision concerning the prolongation and 
modification of the Lithuanian tonnage tax scheme318. In December, the Commission 
approved the Maltese tonnage tax scheme subject to commitments
319
. The Commission's in-
depth investigation found certain features of the original scheme, such as tax exemptions 
applied to Maltese residents and the broad scope of the scheme extending to vessels not 
carrying out maritime transport activities, to be in breach of EU State aid rules. As a result, 
Malta has committed to introduce a number of changes to its scheme to prevent any 
discrimination between shipping companies and to avoid undue competition distortions.  
 
 
                                                            
315 Case M.8594 Cosco Shipping/OOIL, Commission decision of  5 December 2017 available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-17-5149_en.htm 
316 Communication from the Commission, Community guidelines on State aid to maritime transport, OJ C 13, 
17.01.2004, p. 3, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52004XC0117(01). 
317 Case SA.41330 Prolongation du régime de taxe au tonnage Belgique, Commission decision of  6 November 
2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3&case_num
ber=41330. For further information see IP/17/4382 of 6 November 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-4382_en.htm. 
318 Case SA.45764 Lithuania – State aid in favour of maritime transport Prolongation and modification of the 
tonnage tax scheme, Commission decision of 16 June 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_45764.  
319 Case SA. 33829, Maltese tonnage tax scheme and other State measures in favour of shipping companies and 
their shareholders, Commission Decision of 19 December 2017, not yet published. For further information see 
IP/17/5361 of 19 December 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5361_en.htm.  
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Antitrust enforcement in the rail sector 
On 2 October, the Commission fined Lithuanian Railways
320
 (Lietuvos geležinkeliai, LG321) 
for abusing its dominant position in the management of rail infrastructure in Lithuania by 
removing a rail track connecting Lithuania and Latvia an amount of €27.9 million. The 
Commission also orderred LG to bring the infringement to an end.  
The Lithuanian Railways (LG) Case 
The infringement started in 2008 when Orlen, the only oil refinery in the Baltic states and a major commercial 
customer of LG, considered redirecting its freight from Lithuania to Latvia by using the services of another rail 
operator from Latvia. In October 2008, LG dismantled a 19km long section of track connecting Lithuania and 
Latvia, close to Orlen's refinery. The removal of the track meant that Orlen would need to use a much longer 
route to reach Latvia. Since then the dismantled track has not been rebuilt. 
The Commission's investigation found that these actions hindered competition on the rail freight market by 
preventing a major customer of LG from using the services of another rail operator. LG failed to show any 
objective justification for the removal of the track. The EU's rail freight market was liberalised in 2007. Since 
then, the Commission has been working to complete the single market for rail services, including by ensuring the 
independent management of rail infrastructure and fostering investment in tracks that interconnect Member 
States. In this context, the enforcement of EU competition rules is important to ensure that regulatory barriers are 
not replaced by anti-competitive behaviour of dominant rail companies that would prevent the EU from 
achieving its ultimate goals for rail transport. 
Rail and intermodal State aid enforcement  
In 2017, the Commission approved a number of schemes supporting rail and intermodal 
transport, which aim to support the transfer of cargo from the road to the safer and more 
environmentally friendly rail transport modes
322
, including support for systems ensuring 
                                                            
320 Case AT.39813 Baltic Rail, Commission decision of 2 October 2017. Summary of the decision was published 
in OJ C 308, 14.11.2017, p. 7.  
321 LG is the incumbent state-owned rail company in Lithuania. The company is vertically integrated, meaning 
that it is responsible for both railway infrastructure and rail transport. It enjoys a statutory monopoly of the 
management of the rail infrastructure in Lithuania and a de facto monoply in the provision of both passenger and 
freight rail services in Lithuania. 
322 Commission decision of 25 July 2017, SA. 46806 - Italy - Aid for combined transport in the Province of 
Trento, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_46806;  
Commission decision of 14 June 2017, SA.47779 - Italy - Friuli Venezia Giulia - Interventi per lo sviluppo del 
trasporto combinato, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47779;  Commission decision of 
6 June 2017, SA.47109 - Belgium - Prolongation du régime de promotion du transport combiné ferroviaire et du 
trafic diffus pour 2017-2020, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_47109;  Commission decision of 
25 October 2017, SA. 48759 - Italy - Prolongation of rail freight transport scheme, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48759;  Commission decision of 
25 October 2017, SA.48390 - Austria - Aid scheme supporting rail freight transport in certain production forms 
2018 – 2022, for further information see Daily News (MEX/17/4163) of 25 October 2017 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-17-4163_en.htm; Commission decision of 15 September 2017,  
SA.48485 - Austria - BMVIT - Prolongation of a programme supporting the development of connecting railways 
and transfer terminals in intermodal transport 2018 - 2022, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_48485; Commission decision of 
12 October 2017, SA.48634 - Denmark - Subsidy Scheme Rail Freight, for further information see Daily News 
(MEX/17/3924) of 12 October 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-17-3924_en.htm; 




In August, the Commission also approved EUR 96 million of State aid for the building of 
light maintenance workshops for passenger trains in Slovakia.
324
 This will further help to shift 
transport from road to rail in Slovakia, fostering environmental protection and decongestion 
of roads. The Commission has made sure that the aid will not hinder the development of 
competition on the Slovak rail transport market with respect to access to light maintenance 
facilities. While the workshops will initially be operated by the Slovak incumbent rail 
operator, in the future, its operation can be transferred to other rail transport companies, if 
they win new tenders for rail transport services under public service contracts. In addition, an 
equal and non-discriminatory access for other train operators is safeguarded.  
Moreover, the Commission has examined the restructuring of the Bulgarian publicly-owned 
railway incumbent BDZ
325
.  As BDZ is the only provider of railway passenger transport in 
Bulgaria, it is of crucial importance to the country's connectivity and economy. The 
Commission concluded that certain debt write-offs granted by Bulgaria were necessary and 
proportionate to support BDZ's operation and did not prevent effective competition in the 
market. Another investigation in the rail sector related to the restructuring of OSE
326
, the 
Greek national rail infrastructure manager, and TRAINOSE
327
, the passenger and freight rail 
transport operator. The restructuring measures will ensure that rail services continue operating 
in Greece, thus avoiding a serious disturbance of the Greek economy. For the aid measures to 
OSE and TRAINOSE that the Commission found to be in line with EU state aid rules, the 
Commission took into particular account the difficulties the Greek railway sector is facing 
and the importance of a well-functioning railway service for the population. The measures 
have the legitimate objective of avoiding a serious disturbance of the Greek economy, without 
unduly distorting competition in the Single Market. 
State aid review in the road sector 
The Commission continued to enforce Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 on public passenger 
transport services
328
. On 23 August, the Commission took a negative decision with recovery 
on the shadow toll compensation granted by Poland to the A2 motorway concessionnaire to 
                                                            
323 Commission decision of 10 July 2017, SA.38283 - Denmark - ERTMS funding for Danish rail freight 
operators. For further information see IP/17/1961 of 11 July 2017 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-1961_en.htm. 
324 State aid case SA.42525 – Slovakia – Workshops for light maintenance of trains, Commission decision of 23 
August 2017 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_42525. 
325 Case SA.31250 – Bulgaria – Measure implemented by Bulgaria in favour of BDZ Holding EAD SA, BDZ 
Passenger EOOD and BDZ Cargo EOOD, Commission decision of 16 June 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_31250. For further information 
see IP/17/1659. 
326 Case SA.32543 – Greece – Measures in favour of OSE group, Commission decision of 16 June 2017 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_32543. For further 
information see IP/17/1661. 
327 Case SA.32544 – Greece – Restructuring of the Greek Railway Group - TRAINOSE S.A., Commission 
decision of 16 June 2017 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_32544. For further information 
see IP/17/1661. 
328 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 October 2007 on public 
passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos. 1191/69 and 
1107/70, OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1. 
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compensate for a legislative change
329
.  
State aid review in the postal services sector 
The postal sector continues to evolve and traditional letter delivery, against the backdrop of 
electronic substitution, remains on a declining trajectory. Nevertheless, postal services have 
retained a very significant economic and social value. In a shrinking market of traditional 
letter delivery, many postal incumbents are being forced to diversify the portfolio of their 
activities and innovate in order to stay competitive. At the same time, the explosive growth of 
e-commerce necessitates a well-functioning parcel delivery market linking buyers and sellers. 
Efficient postal services are thus a key factor in allowing e-commerce to realise its potential in 
propelling growth and creating jobs.  
Through State aid control in the postal sector, the Commission pursues multiple related goals. 
State aid control ensures that where a postal service provider – typically a postal incumbent – 
is entrusted with a costly public service obligation, any compensation paid to the provider 
does not undermine a level playing field between postal incumbents and new entrants. State 
aid should not shield the recipients from competitive pressures and market developments, but 
should incentivise efficiency, innovation and investment.  
In 2017 the Commission continued its investigation in the Correos case, on which it opened 
the formal investigation procedure in 2016.
330
 The investigation focusses on whether Correos 
had been overcompensated between 2004 and 2010 for the provision of the universal postal 
service given that profitability levels achieved by Correos with the public funding seemed to 
exceed the level of reasonable profit allowed under EU State aid rules on public service 
compensation. The Commission is also investigating other measures granted by Spain to 
Correos since 2004, notably tax exemptions, capital increases and compensation for the 
distribution of electoral material.  
  
                                                            
329 Commission decision of 25 August 2017, SA.35356 - Aid to Autostrada Wielkopolska - Shadow toll 
compensation, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code= 
3_SA_35356. 
330 Case SA.37977 Complaint regarding unlawful State aid in favour of Sociedad Estatal Correos y Telégrafos, 
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SA.32745 (2017/NN-2) – Sale of parts of 
Kommunalkredit Austria AG 
No aid decision 17/03/2017 
2 Austria 
SA.46205 (2016/N) - Amendment of the 
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SA.48287 (2017/N) - Prolongation of the 
resolution scheme for small credit 






SA.34720 (2015/C) - Aid for the 
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Final decision 18/07/2017 
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SA.46664 (2017/N) - State guarantee on 
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companies 
No aid decision 04/08/2017 
30 Poland 
SA.46982 (2016/N) - Sixth prolongation of 
the Credit Unions Orderly Liquidation 
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of Credit Unions Orderly Liquidation 





SA.48302 (2017/N) - Prolongation of the 
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SA.47168 (2016/N) - 15th Extension of the 





SA.47178 (2017/NN) - Recapitalização da 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos, S.A. 
No aid decision 10/03/2017 
38 Portugal 
SA.49275 (2017/N) - Sale of Novo Banco 
with additional aid in the in the context of 
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SA.46974 (2016/N) - Prolongation of the 
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COR 
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concerning alleged unlawful State Aid for T-
2 
No aid decision 27/04/2017 
44 Slovenia 
SA.33229 (2017/N-2) - Restructuring of 





SA.47174 (2016/N) - Amendment of the 
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46 United Kingdom 
SA.47702 (2017/N) - Alternative package to 
replace the commitment for the Royal Bank 
of Scotland to divest the Rainbow business  







47 United Kingdom 
SA.47702 (2017/C) - Alternative package to 
replace the commitment for the Royal Bank 
of Scotland to divest the Rainbow business  
Final decision 18/09/2017 
 
 
